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ABSTRACT
VOTING RADICAL RIGHT IN EUROPE: A COMPREHENSIVE EXPLANATION
FOR VOTE CHOICE
by
Michael A. Hansen
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016
Under the Supervision of Professor David A. Armstrong II
Although the radical right in liberal democracies have received a wealth of attention in
the literature, the mechanisms explaining individual radical right vote choice are unclear.
This analysis provides the first comprehensive theoretical framework and empirical mod-
eling of individual radical right vote choice. The choice to vote for a radical right party
is a function of several factors. First, the opportunity structure in the form of external
supply-side factors must be conducive for radical right success. Second, parties must
make crucial decisions in order to take advantage of the opportunity structure (internal
supply-side factors). Then, macro-social force illicit the adoption of crucial attitudes
correlated with the radical right. Finally, these attitudes directly impact vote choice for
radical right parties. This dissertation finds that attitudes alone do not necessarily lead
to voting for a radical right party. Instead, macro-forces and supply-side factors play a
significant role in the ability and desire to cast a vote for radical parties.
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Chapter 1
Theory Explaining Illiberal Politics in
Liberal Democracies
“At issue is the future of France, of even the idea we have of our country, of
its great humanist tradition, of its universal calling. Also at issue is our ca-
pacity to live together and respect each other.... ” (French President, Jacques
Chirac 2002)
“I think that tonight there are lots of people crying. This is not the France
that we love.” (French Finance Minister, Laurent Fabius 2002)
The above were made in response to the National Front (NF) leader’s, Jean-Marie
Le Pen, acquisition of 16.85% (4,804,713 votes) of the vote in the first round of the 2002
French Presidential Election. This vote share was only 3.02% (861,142 votes) behind
incumbent President Jacques Chirac, and was the second largest vote share received by
a presidential candidate in the election. Since Chirac was unable to acquire a majority
of the votes, a runoff election was scheduled between Chirac and Le Pen. Following
the initial result, a massive electoral campaign led by all parties across the ideological
spectrum was conducted to encourage voters to cast a vote for Chirac in the runoff.
The campaign was encouraged by all political parties because of the anti-Semitic and
xenophobic views that the National Front’s leader espoused. Even the staunchest of
opponents of Chirac encouraged voters to vote for Chirac over Le Pen. Some opponents
fashioned the slogan, “Vote for the crook, not the fascist” (Broughton 2002). Thanks in
part to the campaign, Chirac would end up winning 82.21% of the vote in the second
round, which was 64.42% more than Le Pen. The result was the largest winning margin
for a presidential candidate since the start of the French Fifth Republic (1958) when
Charles de Gaulle won 78.51% of the vote. The final result was hailed as a successful
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defeat of the “neo-fascist” party, while also recognizing embarrassment over the fact that
such an illiberal party could gain so many votes in France. As of 9 May 2014, a similar
threat exists in France’s future. A French poll exploring the 2017 French general election
demonstrates that NF leader Marine Le Pen, Jean Marie Le Pen’s daughter, would beat
incumbent president Franc¸ois Hollande if a runoff was held between the two candidates
(Le Figaro 2014). Further, on 1 November 2014 the FN reached 83,000 fully paid-up
members, which the highest membership number since the party was founded, and 100%
more than in 2012 (Huffington-Post 2014).
The anecdote above conveys the perceived threat that the success of a radical right
party has on mainstream political system participants, as well as the response from those
actors. Political parties that would normally be in contentious ideological conflict with
each other combined their resources to ensure that the radical right candidate would not
win the election. Figure 1 demonstrates the extremity of the National Front’s ideology
in comparison to the other parties participating in the 2002 French National Election.
The extreme ideology of radical right parties leads mainstream political figures to view
the radical right as detrimental to the liberal democratic values of equality that Europe
has progressed towards over the last 60 years. Europe’s fascist and Nazi legacies of the
1930’s and 1940’s has increased the public’s attentiveness to the success of parties on the
far right of the ideological spectrum. Thus, it is no wonder that these parties receive a
significant amount of attention from the media, political observers, and elected officials.
Figure 1: Party Manifesto Ideological Scores: France 2002
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
2002 French National Election
Liberal-Conservative Ideological Score
Socialist Party
The Greens
Communist Party
Union for the Presidential Majority
Union for French Democracy National Front
Parties of the far right on the ideological spectrum have also garnered a wealth of
attention in the comparative political parties literature. This attention is due to the fact
2
that these parties appear to be undemocratic and illiberal in their political platforms,
yet they achieve a significant level of success in some liberal democratic countries (ex.
French National Front in 2002). Scholars argue that the radical right deserves particular
attention because these parties pose a significant threat to liberal democratic governance
(Mudde 2007, van Spanje 2010, Bale et al. 2010). Further, scholars question why radical
right movements are continuing to gain in popularity even though far right ideologies
have long been considered dangerous. These broad puzzles have led scholars to explore
several diverse research agendas on the radical right.
Important areas of exploration related to radical right parties include explanations for
their emergence (Betz 1994, Kitschelt 1995, Ignazi 2003, Mudde 2007), the substantive
effects of radical right parties on the European political landscape (Howard 2010, Mudde
2013), how other political parties interact with the radical right (Norris 2005, Meguid
2005, Hainsworth 2008, Bale et al. 2010, Howard 2010, van Spanje 2010, van Heerden
et al. 2014), and how to define and categorize parties of the radical right (Betz 1994,
Kitschelt 1995, Mudde 2007). Additionally, a large number of research projects focus on
the determinants of the electoral success of radical right parties (Jackman and Volpert
1996, Carter 2002, Golder 2003, Givens 2005, Carter 2005, Veugelers and Magnan 2005a,
Meguid 2005, Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Art 2007, Hainsworth 2008). Despite the
wealth of attention, however, extant literature fails to identify the mechanisms linking
macro forces, voter demographics, voter attitudes, and internal and external supply-side
factors to radical right vote share. A great debate still exists regarding which factors
are important, and if there is a relationship between these factors. For instance, some
scholars argue that supply-side factors are most important for explaining success (Luther
2011), while others argue that demand-side factors translate into success (Arzheimer and
Carter 2006). On the other hand, the phenomena may be understood as demand-side
factors that generate the creation of supply-side mechanisms to express this demand.
This research agenda develops a theory explaining differences in individual radical right
vote choice, and provides statistical testing to confirm the existence of crucial mechanisms
that connect these different theories. The main argument presented here is that a simple
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spatial model explains radical right vote choice fairly well, but external supply-side factors
do affect the ability of a political party to align at a particular space on the ideological
spectrum.
No research agenda to date has explained radical right vote choice by teasing out
casual mechanisms and linking them together in a single, coherent theory. Instead, con-
temporary research either looks at correlations between radical right vote share and one
of these explanations (i.e. such as solely looking at radical right voters), or estimates
models using a combination of variables from more than one of the explanations (i.e
voter socio-demographics and internal party organization). This work seeks to improve
on the current literature in two major ways.
The first problem addressed in this work is that models estimated without all im-
portant explanatory variables may be overemphasizing the significance of variables that
are empirically less important. Further, recognition of endogeneity problems is more
difficult when only testing one theory or a single subset of variables. Secondly, without
recognizing the important mechanisms that convey how variables relate, results are only
tenuous (Brady and Seawright 2004). Elster (2007) argues that social science should seek
to explain phenomena in terms of causal mechanisms, or causal chains. The argument is
that in social science it is not possible to discuss explanations for a phenomenon in terms
of law-like statements; therefore, explanations must be phrased in terms of causal mech-
anisms. In addition, without teasing out the mechanisms that explain the causal effect
of some phenomena, the researcher is simply discussing correlations that could possibly
be spurious (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). Thus, the absence of fully formed, clear
mechanisms leads to an incomplete explanation for radical right party vote choice. This
incomplete understanding does not allow the researcher to understand how variables rep-
resenting different theories may interact in order to build a comprehensive explanation.
By being explicit about the level of analysis (individual-level), and testing all theoret-
ically relevant variables (marco-forces, attitudes, socio-demographics, and internal and
external supply-side factors), this analysis is able to develop a comprehensive theory for
radical right vote choice.
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The introduction proceeds by providing evidence of the illiberal tendencies of radical
right parties in Europe. This includes a recognition of the negative effects that these
parties have had on liberal democratic governance. Next, the major puzzle is laid out
in terms of demonstrating the tension between radical right party ideology and the cur-
rent policy practices implemented in European countries that express the importance of
equality. This discussion is followed by a brief discourse regarding defining and conceptu-
alizing the radical right. In addition, case selection is discussed during the defining and
conceptualizing stage. Finally, factors for radical right vote choice that are recognized
in the literature are discussed, and the theory explaining individual vote choice for a
radical right party is presented. The theory presented here provides the roadmap for the
empirical analysis that is conducted throughout the rest of the study.
Illiberal Politics
In order to fully understand the extent to which radical right parties are incompatible
with liberal democratic governance, this section discusses several examples of the illib-
eral policy and ideological stances of radical right parties. Some of the examples provided
here point to the direct anti-liberal effects that radical right parties have had on govern-
mental policy. The important points to take away from this section are the many ways
that radical right parties are in conflict with contemporary norms of liberal democratic
governance.
On 20 November 2009, Switzerland surprisingly became the first European country
to ban the building of minarets, which curbed Islamic religious freedom in the process
(Cumming-Bruce and Erlanger 2009). The referendum passed with a clear majority of
57.5% of voters supporting the ban. Further, 22 out of 26 cantons had a majority sup-
porting the referendum. The proposal was put forward to a vote in a national referendum
by the Swiss People’s Party (SVP). The SVP is the largest party in Swiss parliament,
and a recognized radical right party in the scholarly literature. The reason for the refer-
endum was, according to the SVP, to reduce the Islamization of Switzerland. The SVP’s
general secretary, Martin Baltisser, stated that, “the successful vote was against minarets
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as symbols of Islamic power” (BBC 2009).
The ban is just one example in a long line of incidents where the SVP has antago-
nized Swiss immigrants. Notably, the United Nations (UN) officially labeled the party
as a racist organization during their “UN Convention against Racism” over a political
campaign ad that displayed white sheep kicking a black sheep out of Switzerland (Foulkes
2007). During the campaign to ban minarets, the SVP utilized another highly controver-
sial poster. The campaign poster depicted a women in a full body hijab standing next to
black minarets that appear to be stabbing through the Swiss flag. In fact, it has become
common place for the SVP to display a controversial ad during each election season or
salient referendum. Clearly, the SVP’s ads convey xenophobia, and there is no doubt
that their effect on public policy is illiberal (see Appendix for ads).
In France, the radical right party supported a different contentious policy directed at
the Islamic community in Europe. On 3 March 2004, France banned the wearing of reli-
gious symbols in public schools (Vaisse 2004). The law was meant to integrate France’s
large influx of Muslim immigrants into French culture, while continuing to promote re-
ligious neutrality (Vaisse 2004). Initially, the French Interior Minister Nicholas Sarkozy,
who would become President in 2007, was opposed to the law. However, increased po-
litical pressure, and radical right leader Le Pen’s continued influence, compelled Sarkozy
to switch his stance on the policy (Vaisse 2004).
Later, following the initial 2004 ban, France moved to ban similar religious symbols
in the mass public. On 11 April 2011, France successfully passed a law that banned
the hijab, niqa¯bs, and burqas (Erlanger 2011). The ban was broadly targeted against
any object that would cover the face while in public, which even includes objects such
as motorcycle helmets. The punishment would be either a fine, or a police officer could
require citizenship instruction. Interestingly, French authorities imply two reasons for
this more recent ban. First, the authorities state explicitly that the ban was put in place
in the interest of safety (Erlanger 2011). The argument is that the covering of the face
does not allow authorities to recognize individuals that may be criminals or dangerous.
The second reason is implicitly conveyed. The second justification for the law is that
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the wearing of religious facial coverings is in conflict with elite-level notions of French
culture. This conflict between French culture and specific religious practices is the reason
for the mandatory citizenship instruction for citizens wearing religious facial coverings.
The European Court of Human Rights (2014) (ECHR) upheld the French ban by agreeing
with the first argument. The Court stated that the ban, “was not expressly based on the
religious connotation of the clothing in question, but solely on the fact that it concealed
the face” (ECHR 2014). The decision by the ECHR has been followed by similar bans in
Belgium and Spain. Further, Marina Le Pen has called for the banning of headscarves,
Jewish Kippas, and the djellaba (Gibbons 2012). She argues that the basis for this
policy is a desire to have “equality of discrimination” (Gibbons 2012). Meaning, that the
current law’s opposition to Islamic religious symbols justifies the government’s ability to
ban the symbols of other religions (i.e. Judaism) that elites view as in conflict with their
notions of French culture. Nevertheless, the important point to take away here is that a
precedent has been set where the banning of religious symbols or dress is justified, and
this precedent was largely influenced by radical right parties.
Substantive public policy implementation is not the only political arena where radical
right parties play a role in conveying illiberal tendencies. Some authors argue that radical
right parties could also have a significant impact on the political thought of citizens in
a country (Betz 1994, Kitschelt 1995, Mudde 2007). If this claim is true, it is impor-
tant to evaluate the ideological positions that these parties convey. For instance, in the
Netherlands, the Party for Freedom’s (PVV) leader, Geert Wilders, has been a force in
the mainstream media in terms of conveying radical right ideology to European citizens.
Wilders notoriety is especially surprising given the high levels of tolerance towards im-
migrants that traditionally exist in the Netherlands. For instance, the Netherlands is
ranked 11th in the world in the raw number of asylum seekers the country accepted in
2011 (OECD 2014). Wilders has even appeared on television in the United States to
“warn people about the dangers of Islam.” In fact, he appeared with Newt Gingrich at
Ground Zero in New York on 11 September 2011 to give a speech warning against the
building of a mosque at the location (Wilders 2010). The member of Dutch parliament
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(MP) argued that building a mosque at the location would convey a failure to stand up
to the “radical religion” (Wilders 2010).
Wilders has been know to make incensing comments towards the Islamic faith and
Muslims around the world on a regular basis. In 2008, Wilders created a short movie title
Fitna. The movie consists of text displayed for the viewer from the Quran that could be
considered violent, followed by visuals of radical Islamist terrorist attacks. In addition,
the movie presents emergency distress calls from victims of these attacks, along with
Islamic leaders and terrorists calling for violence action against western nations. The
film presents Islam as an inherently violent religion that has an ultimate goal of killing
non-followers. The movie had received condemnation throughout the world from Muslim
communities. In fact, Al-Qaeda and an Australian Imam issued Fatwa¯s calling for the
beheading of Wilders following the release of the movie.
In addition to creating Fitna, Wilders has incited Muslim communities by stating
that the Quran should be banned in the Netherlands for the same reason that Adolf
Hilter’s Mien Kampf has been banned for over 60 years. (Waterfield 2007). Wilders
claims that the Quran is a fascist text that holds extinction of groups of people as its
ultimate goal (Waterfield 2007). Further, he argues that the Quran, “calls on Muslims
to oppress, persecute or kill Christians, Jews, dissidents and non-believers, to beat and
rape women and to establish an Islamic state by force” (Wilders 2007). Following a series
of newspaper editorials where Wilders called for the banning of the Quran, the MP was
brought up on five charges of inciting hate speech (Traynor 2010). Following an increase
of expressed support in the public, Wilders was acquitted of all charges (Jolly 2011). The
judge found that while offensive, Wilders statements were considered protected speech.
The German National Democratic Party (NPD) provides another example of a radical
right party conveying an obvious illiberal ideological platform where such an ideology is
commonly considered unacceptable. The NPD has recreated many of the contentious
campaign ads that were originally created by the SPD; including a poster displaying
the a white sheep kicking a black sheep out of Bavaria. In addition, NPD leader Udo
Voigt created and displayed a notorious campaign ad with the slogan “GAS geben!” (see
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Appendix A). This slogan in english is translated as “step on the gas,” “step on it,” or
in a more literal interpretation as “give gas.” Clearly, a radical right party displaying
the slogan “give gas” in a country where Jewish citizens were mass executed using gas
chambers is considered in poor taste at best. However, this would not be the only time the
NPD would refer to Germany’s Nazi legacy. Voigt, the son of a Nazi Sturmabteilung (SA)
assault division member, was convicted in 2004 of promoting Nazism when he referred to
Hitler as “a great man” and Berlin’s Holocaust Memorial as “an undesirable stain in the
Reich capital” (Bacchi 2014). More recently, Voigt has stirred up controversy by seeking
and being granted a committee seat in one of the European Parliament’s human rights
committees (Bacchi 2014). In addition, Viogt’s predecessor, Gu¨nter Deckert, previously
served five years in prison for Holocaust denial and incitement to racial hatred. Perhaps,
no where is the link between 1930-1940 Nazi and Fascist ideology and current radical right
ideology more clear than when exploring the statements of NPD members. The apparent
link between the ideologies clearly portrays the current NPD ideology as illiberal and
anti-democratic.
A final area of inquiry regarding the impact that radical right parties have on the
illiberal direction of politics in a country is the interaction between the radical right
and mainstream parties. Norris (2005) argues that radical right parties that achieve
success in one election will have their policy platforms co-opted by mainstream parties
in subsequent elections. Therefore, a shift will occur towards illiberal policies in that
particular country. For example, Howard (2010) finds that the strength of radical right
parties serves to mobilize anti-immigrant public opinion, which deters pressure for im-
migration policy liberalization of leftist parties. Further, van Heerden et al. (2014) find
that radical right parties have successfully been able to force mainstream parties to give
more attention to immigration and integration issues. This increased attention has led to
mainstream parties promoting cultural integration (vs. socio-economic integration) and
a monoculturalist position (vs. a multiculturalist position) (van Heerden et al. 2014).
Although research on the radical right’s effect on mainstream party policy platforms is
rather limited, there is some evidence that anti-liberal effects exist. What should be clear
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from this section is that radical right parties adhere to illiberal ideological platforms,
support illiberal governmental policies, and pressure mainstream parties towards illiberal
positions on salient issues.
The Puzzle
The previous section demonstrated the different ways in which radical right parties
promote illiberal political ideas and policies. This section provides evidence for the dis-
agreement between those illiberal tendencies and contemporary political norms of Eu-
ropean countries. The goal here is to provide a convincing argument for the idea that
countries in Europe have progressed further than most in terms of the liberal democratic
values that they convey through public policy, and that this progression is in conflict
with the success of the parties in question.
The first place to start such an inquiry would be by exploring the concept of democ-
racy. Dahl (1971) provides one of the earliest and most complete classification strategies
for defining a regime type associated with democracy, which the author labels “pol-
yarchy.” The author promotes the argument that polyarchy should be conceptualized as
measures on two axes representing the levels of participation and contestation in a coun-
try. The Polity IV dataset, which is one of the most utilized datasets for regime type,
is inspired by Dahl’s (1971) classification and measures regime type by scoring countries
on these two attributes (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2010). Munck and Verkuilen (2002)
provide one of the most in-depth discussions related to conceptualizing, measuring, and
aggregating the concept of democracy. The conclusion the authors arrive at is that the
two main attributes that represent the concept of democracy are contestation and par-
ticipation. The authors argue that there are useful components of these attributes that
researchers could leverage to fully measure the concept of democracy. However, they
note that any attributes unrelated to contestation and participation that are included in
a definition of democracy risk conceptual stretching or incorrect measurement. This is a
problem that Collier and Levitsky (1997) caution researchers to avoid when attempting
to define and measure democracy. In fact, several datasets that measure regime type
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commonly include contestation and participation as the main component attributes for
democracy; including Freedom House (2011) and Economist (2010).1
How do Western European countries compare to other countries in terms of contesta-
tion? It would not be a stretch to argue that Western European countries see on average
the highest levels of contestation, government turnover, and coalition formation. In fact,
the bulk of the literature on coalition formation was inspired by the governmental struc-
tures and practices of several European countries. For instance, the most revolutionary
study on coalition formation, which was implemented by Laver and Schofield (1998), fo-
cused solely on coalition formation in ten European democracies. Building upon the work
of Laver and Schofield (1998), Martin and Stevenson (2001) explore coalition formation
relying on data from mostly European countries because the authors point out that this
is where the majority of coalition governments are formed. In fact, the Polity IV (2010)
dataset finds that European countries are at the highest levels in terms of competitive-
ness when compared to other countries. However, this is only one component attribute
of democracy. The other component attribute of democracy, participation, is more likely
to be targeted and limited by radical right parties.
When defining the concept of democracy there is perhaps no variable more utilized
as a proxy, or component attribute, for measuring participation than universal suffrage.
Following New Zealand and Australia, the next 11 countries to grant suffrage to women
were European countries (Przeworski 2009).2 Notably, all thirteen of these countries
granted women the right to vote before the United States. In terms of universal suffrage,
Europe led the way in granting suffrage to all people irrespective of gender or ethnicity
(Hicks 2013). Today, in a time where particular voting eligibility rules and barriers to
voting are more scrutinized, European countries have some of the most extensive voting
laws in the world.
One example of the democratic-ness of voting laws throughout Europe is that any
1It is important to note that these measures are more or less successful at upholding Dahl’s classifi-
cation. However, each of them have a hint of his underlying components.
2The year women were granted suffrage: Finland 1906; Norway 1913; Denmark 1913; Austria 1918;
Czechoslovakia 1918; Hungary 1918; Poland 1918; United Kingdom 1918; Germany 1919; Netherlands
1919; and Sweden 1919
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European Union (EU) citizen is allowed to cast a vote for EU representation in any EU
country, even if they are not a citizen of that country (Europa 2011). In order to cast a
vote in a EU election the citizen need only demonstrate residency in that country (Europa
2011). For example, a Polish citizen could cast a vote for a German EU representative
so long as they have residency in Germany. What makes this law particularly stunning
is that many European citizens expect, in some respects, that their representative will
protect national interests. Therefore, it is particularly interesting that a citizen from one
country would be allowed to elect an EU representative of a different country. The EU’s
culture of compromise and ideal of putting Europe before national interests may provide
some explanation for the implementation for this policy. Nevertheless, the policy does
demonstrate the liberalness of European voting laws.
Additional examples of the extension of participation beyond the norm worldwide
involves the extension of suffrage to non-citizens and people convicted of a crime. First,
many European countries allow people convicted of a crime to vote. For instance, France
allows people convicted of a crime to designate a proxy voter while incarcerated if the
crime was not related to voting fraud (Assemblee Nationale 2012). Second, several Eu-
ropean countries allow non-citizens to vote in municipal elections if the person can prove
residency. For instance, in France any EU citizen could register to vote in municipal
elections (Assemblee Nationale 2012). For comparison, imagine the outrage that would
ensue if a U.S. politician suggested that non-citizens be allowed to vote in local level
elections. It is not difficult to see why radical right parties would find these democratic
policies in conflict with their policy.
It should be clear that European democracies are considered advanced in terms of
democratic practices and policies, but where do these countries rank in terms of liberal
policies? One area of government practice to explore would be the extent to which the
government provides assistance to those in need. Esping-Anderson (1990) defines the
welfare state as a state believing that it has the responsibility for securing some basic
modicum of welfare for its citizens. Welfare could take the form of government economic
assistance, schooling, healthcare, etc. European democracies were among the first to
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provide universal healthcare for their citizens, and this healthcare has even expanded to
non-citizens that have residency in the country. The citizenship assistance practices of
Europe have even led to a new conceptual category in the welfare state literature. The
concept of social democracy owes it creation to the extended welfare practices of several
European countries. For instance, scholars commonly cite the Scandinavian countries as
having the most extensive welfare benefits for its citizens, including some of the most
liberal family policies (Huber and Stephens 2012).
An area of public policy where liberal policy practice creates a large amount of conflict
occurs between radical right parties and government entities involves immigration and
asylum policies. In terms of immigration inflow (standardized by population size), from
2001-2010, 17 out of the top 25 countries are European (OECD 2014).3 Relatively loose
restrictions on immigration inflows are not the only area where non-citizens enter these
countries. European countries are also more accepting of asylum seekers than other
countries throughout the world. In terms of the raw number of asylum seekers allowed
in the country, 11 out of the top 15 countries are European (OECD 2014).4 France
and Germany alone accepted almost 100,000 asylum seekers in 2011. In comparison,
the United States accepted 60,587 even though the United States has a population of
around 170 million more people than Germany and France combined. Clearly, European
countries are much more liberal in terms of their immigration and asylum seeking policies.
Why do citizens in advanced liberal democracies cast a vote for parties that are
clearly illiberal or anti-democratic ideologically and in policy practice? This section has
discussed a few ways in which European countries are liberal and advanced democratically
in terms of a few key policy outcomes. Further, the previous section explored the ways in
which radical right ideology and policy practices are incompatible with the values of these
3 The percentage of immigrants standardized by population between 2001-2010: 1. Luxembourg
32.8%; 2. Israel 27.7%; 3. Switzerland 26.5%; 4. Australia 24.7%; 5. New Zealand 19.5%; 6. Canada
18.3%; 7. Estonia 17.3%; 8. Austria 14.7%; 9. Sweden 13%; 10. Germany 12.8%; 11. Belgium 12.2%;
12. United States 12.1%; 13. Ireland 12.1%; 14. France 11.3%; 15. Spain 11.3%; 16. United Kingdom
10.7%; 17. Netherlands 10.7%; 18. Greece 10.3%; 19. Slovenia 9.9%; 20. Iceland 9%; 21. Norway 8.9%;
22. Italy 7.6%; 23. Denmark 6.7%; 24. Portugal 6.3%; 25. Czech Republic 4.4%
4The raw number of asylum seekers by country in 2011: United States 60,587, France 52,147; Ger-
many 45,741; Italy 34,117; Sweden 29,648; Belgium 26,003; United Kingdom 25,455; Canada 24,985;
Switzerland 19,439; Turkey 16,021; Austria 14,416; Netherlands 11,590; Australia 11,505; Greece 9,311;
Norway 9,053
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countries. Therefore, a major puzzle exists. Why is it that citizens raised in countries
with liberal policies and liberal values would cast a vote for parties that are looking
to deconstruct these policies? How is it that radical right parties could gain votes in
countries that have progressed towards such liberal values over the past 60 years? These
questions comprise the major puzzle guiding this research.
Defining the Radical Right - Case Selection
Before attempting to solve the major puzzle discussed here, it is important to define
the dependent variable of interest. The major dependent variable analyzed in this research
project is the individual level choice to vote for a radical right party. Undoubtedly, any
analysis exploring a specific party family must inevitably confront the onerous task of
conceptualizing the party family in question. In the comparative literature, most of
the research and debate that has been dedicated to the radical right has focused on
conceptualization and elite level content analysis. The debate on conceptualization is
presented in this section, which includes a discussion on why the analysis here does not
restrictively define the radical right.
Where does the radical right lie on the ideological spectrum? Some scholars make lots
of distinctions between parties on the far right of the spectrum. For example, Arzheimer
(2009) argues that there are significant differences on the right between extreme, radical,
populist, and new right parties. In contrast, Zaslove (2004) argues that categories on the
far right include neo-fascist, extreme and radical, populist, nonpopulist, and new populist
right parties. However, the Zaslove (2004) concludes that the real difference on the far
right is between broadly defined fascist parties and radical right parties. Some scholars
do not treat these parties as distinctive. Meguid (2005) argues that these parties should
be understood only as niche parties (Meguid 2005, 347). She categorizes them in this
way because she believes that positioning of mainstream parties on the left-right scale
accounts for the support of all small parties, which means that there is no need for further
categorization. The four most commonly employed ways of categorizing parties of the
far right are as populist, populist radical, extreme, and anti-immigrant. Table 1 presents
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the four commonly utilized concepts to allude to the far right, and several scholars are
placed into the category that they most recognize as the phenomenon currently sweeping
throughout Europe.
Table 1: How Do Scholars Categorize the Far Right?
Populist
Radical Populist Extreme Anti-
Author Right Right Right Immigrant
Art (2007) !
Arzheimer (2009) ! ! !
Bale et al. (2010) !
Betz (1994) !
Bos and van der Brug (2010) !
Canovan (1999) !
Cutts, Ford and Goodwin (2011) !
Evans and Ivaldi (2010) !
Ford and Goodwin (2010) !
Hakhverdian and Koop (2007) !
Ignazi (1992) !
Kitschelt (1995) !
Luther (2011) !
Mudde (2007) ! !
Norris (2005) !
Pauwels (2010) ! !
Rydgren (2008) !
Sprague-Jones (2010) !
van der Brug, !
Fennema and Tillie (2000a),
van Spanje (2010) !
Zaslove (2004) !
In Table 1, some authors have checkmarks in multiple categories. Mudde (2007) and
Pauwels (2010) both recognize the radical populist right and populist right categories
because they make a clear distinction between the two groups, and argue that both
have been a part of the recent far right wave of success. A second point in regards to
the table is that some scholars are placed into a category based on how they primarily
view the type of far right party achieving success, or how they commonly refer to these
parties in their research agendas. A final point is that these four categories are not
15
completely different. For instance, as Mudde (2007) argues, populist parties contain all
the same elements of populist radical right parties except for a radical opposition to the
fundamental values of liberal democracy in regards to immigration and authoritarianism.
Further, anti-immigrant attitudes are commonly attributed to all of these parties, but
some scholars simply refer to far right parties as anti-immigrant because they argue that
this is the only policy issue position that really matters (van Spanje 2010). Finally,
the category “extreme right” is usually utilized when one seeks to make a blanket claim
about the far right without wanting to delve into a conceptual framework argument. In
fact, when dissecting the literature one would be hard pressed to find any real difference
between the scholars above that make use of the extreme right concept when compared
to those using the populist radical right concept. It is not that the extreme right is being
discarded as a category, but that there is no meaningful distinction in the literature
between extreme right and populist radical right parties except for the fact that these
parties are more commonly referred to as populist radical right. As far as categorization
based on multiple characteristics, the literature distinguishes between two types of far
right parties: populist radical right and populist right.
The literature indicates that there are four possible features of populist radical right
parties: nativism, populism, neoliberalism, and authoritarianism. In one of the earliest
studies, Betz (1994) argues that the defining features of these parties are that they contain
elements of national populism and a certain degree of neoliberalism (Betz 1994, 107-139).
He attributes the first feature of neoliberalism to these parties due to the fact that these
parties utilize neo-liberal economic programs that include an emphasis on individualism,
competition, efficiency, entrepreneurship, and selectivity (Betz 1994, 109). Kitschelt
(1995) also picks up on this neo-liberal stance from populist radical right parties, which
is a theme that loses steam when moving towards more recent works. Betz’s (1994)
second feature, national populism, points to the stance from these parties that they
reject a multi-cultural society (Betz 1994, 125).
In comparison, the recognized authority on radical right parties, Cas Mudde (2007),
defines populist radical right parties based on three main features: nativism, authoritar-
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ianism, and populism. The scholar does not recognize neoliberalism as a feature of these
parties. Nativism is identified as a belief that only native groups should inhabit states,
and that non-native people are threatening to society (Mudde 2007: 19). Authoritarian-
ism can be understood as a belief in a strictly ordered society and a strong idea of law and
order (Mudde 2007: 23). Mudde (2007) argues that populism as an ideological feature
could be understood as an idea that there is a struggle that pits “the pure people” against
“the corrupt elite” (Mudde 2007, 23). This idea can also be understood as advocating
that nothing is more important than the general will of the people, and that problems
can be solved through “common sense” solutions (Mudde 2007, 23). The author argues
that these parties are “radical” in their opposition to fundamental values of a liberal
democracy because they hold the rights of native people over those of non-native people
(Mudde 2007, 36). However, Mudde (2007) argues that this is not the only party on the
far right of the ideological spectrum to enjoy recent success. The scholar also recognizes
a different variant of far right party achieving success: populist right parties.
How do populist right parties differ from radical populist right parties? Mudde (2007)
argues that populist right parties are understood in terms of their neo-liberal populist
stance. He contrasts this argument with Betz (1994), who argues that national populism
and neo-liberal populism are both features of the same type of party in Europe. In con-
trast, Mudde (2007) argues that the relatively large occurrence of populist right parties
containing a neo-liberal element but not a national populist element, points to the lack of
usefulness in Betz’s (1994) framework (Mudde 2007, 30). In other words, he believes that
national populist, or radical populist, and neo-liberal populist parties exist separately
and are just as different as they are similar. Pauwels (2010) is in agreement with this
conclusion. In fact, Pauwels (2010) demonstrated that at a minimum the parties’ mes-
sages were different in his comparison of the neo-liberal populist Lijst Decker and radical
populist Vlaams Belang in Belgium. As Pauwels (2010) notes, the neo-liberal populist
parties also advocate the “pure people” vs. “corrupt people” view, but the neo-liberal
element is the most important aspect of this message. Also, the scholar finds that these
parties are not anti-immigrant, and do not espouse authoritarian attitudes. Clearly, the
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process of defining these parties is a complicated one.
What is the best conceptualization for defining the radical right? Should an analysis
focus on Mudde’s (2007) populist radical right parties? Is there a different subset of
the “far right” that should be explored? The argument presented here is that a strict
conceptualization of the radical right restricts the ability of the researcher to explain
outcomes, and that a broad conceptualization is the most useful for understanding the
success of these parties. Sartori (1970) argues that we need information to be precise
when conducting research in order for it to be meaningful. On the other hand, King,
Keohane and Verba (1994) point out that the goal of good social science research is to
strive for grand theory. When taking into account both of these research suggestions one
is left with a trade-off. The researcher could either make their findings precise at the
expense of the applicability of the theory, or commit more error in their findings in order
to gain a greater snapshot of the causes of the phenomenon in question. There are three
reasons why empirical research agendas exploring radical right vote choice should rely on
a loose definition of the radical right over a strict definition.
First, there is the problem of selecting on the dependent variable. The problem of
selecting on the dependent variable occurs when scholars exploring radical right parties
categorize parties based on success. An example of this would be when a scholar decides
a cutoff for success in large-N research, then the party is not included in the party family
if it does not meet the cutoff. For instance, Norris (2005) excludes parties that do not
obtain at least 3% of the seats in the national lower house. The decision to exclude an
exploration of votes for these parties ignores the fact that these parties might achieve
success in vertical elections (local or state level). For example, the NPD in Germany has
been able to obtain a number of state parliament seats over the past 20 years, but not
one seat at the national level. Further, this type of cutoff also ignores horizontal (EU vs.
national parliament) differences in success. For instance, there are a number of radical
right parties that perform better in EU elections than they do in parliamentary elections.
One example of a party that achieves success at the EU level but not the national level
is the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). The party holds only 1 of the 650
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House of Commons seats. However, the party holds a large 24 out of 73 EU parliament
seats. Lastly, by defining a cutoff in this manner the scholar is losing variation in the
dependent variable of interest. If a scholar wants to understand why some parties are
successful and others are not, they would be ill suited to only look at successful parties.
The second reason to have a more encompassing definition for the radical right is to
account for the fact that subtle ideological differences between parties might actually be
an important explanatory variable for explaining differences in success. If the definition is
too restrictive the explanations do not travel beyond that small number of parties. On the
other hand, if the definition is too loose the scholar risks conceptual stretching (Sartori
1970). However, the problem of conceptual stretching could be controlled in this partic-
ular situation. Since the only factors that change in highly debated conceptualizations
of the radical right are ideological elements, it is possible to control for these differences
by including an independent variable to capture this variation. It might be the case that
the extremity of the ideology is the major explanatory variable that explains individual
vote choice. If the scholar were to only explore parties with the exact same ideological
makeup they would not be aware of the fact that ideology is what is driving differences
in success. The inclusion of this independent variable allows the researcher to lessen the
attributes and move up Sartori’s (1970) “ladder of abstraction” in order to uncover more
generalizable findings.
The final reason to utilize a looser definition for the radical right is that the radical
right party family is largely homogeneous. To some extent, qualitative party research on
the radical right is leading to an unnecessary proliferation of party categories to represent
this family. Ennser (2012) explored whether the proliferation of categories was warranted.
The author’s research explored the extent to which radical right parties were more or less
homogenous than other party families. Using expert survey data on 94 parties from
17 Western European countries the author found that the party family of the radical
right exhibits a degree of policy homogeneity that is similar to mainstream right parties
(conservatives and Christian democrats). Further, the author found that the radical right
is considerably more homogenous than the liberal party family. These findings led Ennser
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(2012) to conclude that the debate on categorizing radical right parties is largely splitting
hairs. Parties that lie to the far right on the ideological spectrum have largely adopted
similar policy platforms, and there is only minimal amount of error when grouping them
together in empirical analyses.
Table 2: Cases: Radical Right Parties
Literature’s
Majority
Country Radical Right Party Classification
Austria Freedom Party (FPO¨) !
Belgium Vlaams Blok (VB)/ !
Vlaams Belang (VB) !
Bulgaria Attack !
Croatia Pure Party of Rights (HC˘SP)
Cyrpus National Popular Front (ELAM)
Czech Republic Worker’s Party of Social Justice (DS)
Denmark Danish People’s Party (DF) !
Estonia Estonian Independence Party (EIP) !
Finland True Finns (PS) !
France Front National (FN) !
Germany National Democratic Party (NPD)/
Republicans (REP)
Greece Popular Association - Golden Dawn !
Hungary Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)/ !
Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIE´P)
Italy Lega Nord (LN)/ !
National Alliance (AN) !
Latvia National Alliance (NA) !
Netherlands List Pim Fortuyn (LPF)/
Party for Freedom (PVV) !
Norway Progress Party (FrP)
Portugal National Renovator party (PNR) !
Romania Romanian National Unity Party (RUNR) !
Slovakia Slovak National Party (SNS) !
Slovenia Slovenian National Party (SNS) !
Sweden Sweden Democrats (SD) !
Switzerland Swiss People’s Party (SVP) !
United Kingdom British National Party (BNP)/ !
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
Given the reasons discussed above, the current research agenda includes all of the
parties to the right of mainstream conservative and Christian democratic parties on the
ideological spectrum in European countries. There is agreement in the literature that all
of these parties are categorized as either populist radical right or populist right parties.
Therefore, considerable confidence exists that all of the parties belong under the radical
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right party label. Any significant variation that does happen to exist in terms of ideolog-
ical platforms will be captured by an independent variable that measures party ideology
when exploring internal party factors. Since the focus is on vote choice and not specific
elite level policy differences, the choice to have a more inclusive definition does not create
a large problem. The choice to avoid overly specific subtypes means that the research
put forth here is better capable to strive for grand theory. A complete list of the parties
being explored here is presented in Table 2.
Theory: Individual Level Radical Right Vote Choice
What explains an individual’s choice to vote for a radical right party? As previously
stated, no research agenda to date has theorized and empirically tested a complete ex-
planation for individual level vote choice that includes all factors. On the other hand,
the literature has done a good job of theorizing a number of factors that could restrain
or induce a vote for a radical right party. Broadly, the literature has theorized that
macro forces, voter demographics, and voter attitudes could induce a vote for a radical
right party, while internal party factors and external institutional factors could effect the
availability of a radical right party. The literature labels the factors that could induce a
vote as “demand,” and the factors that could impact the availability of a radical right
party as “supply.” Before discussing the theoretical construct presented here, this section
summarizes these important supply and demand factors.
Supply: Internal Party Factors
The first scholar to note the importance of factors internal to radical right parties for
explaining vote choice was Kitschelt (1995). The author argues that the capabilities and
choices of the radical right entrepreneurs and parties matter for success. In particular,
the author notes that politicians may face a favorable opportunity structure, but fail to
create a powerful message that enhances their success at the polls. In addition, Golder
(2003) notes that it is important to distinguish between the extremity of radical right
messages because more extreme parties (i.e. neo-fascist) are less successful at the polls.
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The message that the party is conveying is very important. The message should be
moderate and neglected by mainstream political parties if it is going to be successful in
gaining a large number of votes (van Holsteyn, Irwin and den Ridder 2003, van Holsteyn
and Irwin 2003, Norris 2005, Carter 2005, Mudde 2007, Rydgren 2008, Mudde 2011).
Although the explanation is usually not satisfactory in political science as a whole, a
number of scholars have made the argument that leadership is important for radical right
success (Zaslove 2004). For instance, DeClair (1999) argues that much of the success of
the French National Front is due to the leadership skills of Jean Marie Le Pen. Simi-
lar arguments have been made about List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the Netherlands (van
Holsteyn and Irwin 2003), Party for Freedom and Democracy (PVV) in the Netherlands
(Bos and van der Brug 2010), Lijst Dedecker (LDD) in Belgium (Pauwels 2010), and the
British National Party (BNP) in the United Kingdom (Copsey 2008). Qualitative re-
search has done a particularly good job of demonstrating that leadership is an important
internal supply-side factor that determines radical right success. However, this concept
is much more difficult to operationalize in a quantitative analysis.
Similar to leadership, professionalization and party organization are important vari-
ables for determining whether the public views any particular radical right party as
legitimate. Norris (2005) argues that for persistent success over a series of elections these
parties need to build and consolidate their organization. Carter (2005) further argues
that a centralized organizational structure and the existence of mechanisms for enforc-
ing party discipline are likely to lead to better performance at the polls. For instance,
Copsey (2008) argues that the British National Party (BNP) demonstrated profession-
alization through personal contact with voters in order to show that the party was not
simply made up of a collection of Nazis in disguise. What should be clear is that internal
supply-side variables matter. In fact, Luther (2011) argues that internal supply-side fac-
tors (or agency) explain more of the success of radical right parties than do demand-side
factors.
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Supply: External Institutional Factors
In conjunction with internal factors, external factors also determine the supply of
radical right parties. External supply-side factors could be described as the political op-
portunity structure that allows for the existence of a radical right party. These political
opportunity factors include the political party system, electoral system, and the type of
government system under which the radical right party is operating. First, the party sys-
tem has a significant impact on the emergence of a radical right party. Kitschelt (1995)
argues that mainstream convergence between the left and right conventional parties cre-
ates an ideological space that a radical right party could exploit. Further, Carter (2005)
shows that the ideological proximity of the parties of the mainstream right in relation to
the radical right determines how much political space may be available for success at the
polls. The author argues that the greater the space to the right, the greater the result.
Norris (2005) argues that the reduction of traditional party cleavages to catch-all parties
leaves space for radical right parties to gain success. This is echoed by work arguing that
ideologically vacant space in the party system is important for success (Meguid 2005,
Mudde 2007, Pauwels 2010).
More broadly, multi-party systems are positively correlated with radical right vote
share. Jackman and Volpert (1996) find that multi-partism increasingly fosters parties
of the extreme right with rising electoral proportionality. In addition, Givens (2005) find
that increasing the number of parties in a coalition government significantly increases
the existence of a radical right party. Finally, using Lijphart’s (2010) two institutional
dimensions of government, Hakhverdian and Koop (2007) find that increasing the number
of parties on the executive-parties dimension is correlated with increased radical right
presence. The authors conclude that consensus democracy is more conducive to radical
parties.
Additional research finds that institutional features that structure the number of
parties in a political system is correlated with the success of the radical right. First,
Jackman and Volpert (1996) find that increasing electoral thresholds dampen support for
the extreme right as the number of parliamentary parties expands. In fact, DeClair (1999)
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uncovered that National Front members in France commonly cite the electoral threshold
as their greatest barrier to success. Norris (2005) finds support for this finding when
looking at radical right success cross-nationally. Second, scholars argue that party finance
laws could create a situation where radical right parties are essentially eliminated from
participating in an election. For instance, rules that restrict public financing for these
parties based on past electoral success leads to a perpetual cycle of these parties losing
and missing out on funding. Again, Norris (2005) finds some evidence that stricter party
finance laws hamper radical right success. Third, ballot access is also a electoral system
feature that could ban a party from competing. For instance, the German system bans
political parties that express anti-democratic principles, which almost led to the banning
of the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). Finally, and most importantly,
several authors find that the proportionality of the electoral system impacts radical right
vote share (Jackman and Volpert 1996, Carter 2002, 2005, Givens 2005, Arzheimer 2009).
As proportionality increases, so does radical right vote share. Therefore, any analysis of
radical right success needs to account for these features of the electoral system.
The final two external supply-side factors clarify the type of government under which
the radical right parties operate. First, Fieschi (2004) finds that presidentialism is posi-
tively correlated with the success of radical right parties. The author argues that presi-
dentialism creates a bi-furcation situation that pits a left against an opposing right. This
fragmentation is seen as normal in presidential systems. Thus, extreme rallying cries are
seen as non-threatening. It would be important to test whether any correlation exists
between presidentialism and radical right vote share. So far, Fieschi’s (2004) book is
the only piece of scholarly research that advances this argument. Second, federalism is
believed to create an opportunity structure that leads to radical right success. Mudde
(2007) argues that federalism may protect the national government from radical right
success, but it creates a breeding ground for these parties’ success at the state level. In
addition, Hakhverdian and Koop (2007) argue that federal states are more conducive to
radical right success than are unitary states. Therefore, when exploring success at other
levels besides the national level, these factors need to be taken into account.
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Demand: Macro-Forces
Ragin (1987) argues that the comparative politics subfield is distinguished mainly by
its focus on macro-social units for explaining country-level phenomena. Macro-social units
are explored in order to explain and interpret diverse historical outcomes and processes,
and their significance for current institutional arrangements. The major macro-social
force that scholars argue leads to demand for the radical right is a profound transformation
of the socioeconomic and sociocultural structure of Western democracies (Ignazi 1992,
Betz 1994). Betz (1994) was the first to argue that the breakthrough of capitalism on a
worldwide scale created a global economy where national governments lost the capacity
to control their economies. This new economy promotes individualism and breaks down
long-standing identities, resulting in new identities and social fragmentation. In the face
of economic struggles in a changing global economy, there are bound to be losers of
this modernization process: modernization-loser theory. Mudde (2007) argues that these
parties attract the losers of modernization, and that processes of modernization leads to
important societal changes, which in turn have political effects. Similarly, Rydgren (2013)
argues that being on the losing side of modernization creates frustration and anger with
the system. Unfortunately, this theory has only been loosely tested due to the complexity
of operationalizing such an all-encompassing idea. On the other hand, the usefulness of
this theory is that the grand logic upon which it is based lends support for the testing of
two macro-level variables believed to impact radical right vote share. That is, this theory
underpins the idea that when voters are the losers of modernization, the individual voter
is more conscious of perceived threats to economic security.
The consequence, and basis for the modernization-loser theory, is that citizens who
are negatively effected by modernization are likely to be insecure about there economic
position. Therefore, the argument is that these people will react negatively to what they
perceive to be “economic threats.” One of the most important macro economic threats
advanced in the literature is that an influx of immigrants arriving into the country leads
to a radical right vote (Betz 1994, Golder 2003, Norris 2005, Mudde 2007, Bowyer 2008,
Berezin 2009, Arzheimer 2009, Jesuit, Paradowski and Mahler 2009, Ford and Goodwin
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2010, Evans and Ivaldi 2010, Fitzgerald and Lawrence 2011, Dinas and van Spanje 2011,
Poznyak, Abts and Swyngedouw 2011, Rydgren and Ruth 2011, van der Waal, de Koster
and Achterberg 2013). Indeed, this threat is perceived to be so large that several scholars
simply refer to radical right parties as “anti-immigrant” parties (van der Brug, Fennema
and Tillie 2000a, Bos and van der Brug 2010, van Spanje 2010). The idea is that radical
right vote share will increase as immigration rates increase. The logic is that a demand
for radical right parties arises in order to deal with the cultural and economic threats
posed by high immigration rates.
Additionally, scholars have recognized another economic threat linked to the modernization-
loser theory. As discussed, it is believed that losers of the modernization process are more
likely to demand and support a radical right movement. Therefore, an economic crisis,
or high levels of unemployment, are hypothesized to lead to a higher radical right vote
share in a given country (Betz 1994, Jackman and Volpert 1996, DeClair 1999, Golder
2003, Norris 2005, Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Mudde 2007, Bowyer 2008, Berezin 2009,
Arzheimer 2009, Jesuit, Paradowski and Mahler 2009, Evans and Ivaldi 2010, Fitzgerald
and Lawrence 2011). An economic crisis, such as high levels of unemployment, creates
demand for a new party, not aligned with the mainstream, to handle such an issue.
Therefore, the rise of the radical right is hypothesized in the literature as being created
by demand for a party that is willing to take radical steps to deal with economic problems
believed to be caused by mainstream party governance. In the present research, it will
be important to uncover whether there is an interaction relationship between economic
crisis and immigration rates, which is an analysis that was conducted in isolation from
other explanatory variables in previous research (see, Arzheimer 2009).
Demand: Voter Demographics
A second area of the literature that explains radical right demand includes exploring
the socio-demographics of voters. The idea is to recognize trends in order to establish the
demographic patterns that represent a higher vote share. For instance, several authors
note that radical right voters tend to be at low to moderate levels of education in compar-
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ison to other groups of citizens (Kitschelt 1995, Norris 2005, Givens 2005, Arzheimer and
Carter 2006, Hainsworth 2008, Stefanova 2009, Mudde 2011, Ivarsflaten and Stubager
2013). There are several additional trends established in the literature; including the fact
that men are more likely to vote for these parties, these parties attract a larger number
of younger voters, private sectors and working class employees are more likely to sup-
port these parties, and voters tend to be non-practicing Catholics (Betz 1994, DeClair
1999, Mudde 2007, Bale et al. 2010, Coffe and Voorpostel 2010, Ford and Goodwin 2010,
van der Brug et al. 2013, Betz and Meret 2013, Coffe 2013, Oesch 2013).
One important trend to control for in the time-series analysis is whether the impor-
tance of education stays the same over time. It would be important to determine whether
the effect of education in the early years of a party’s existence is the same as in later years.
Education as an independent variable explaining radical right vote choice is one where
there is a large amount of disagreement in empirical findings. In addition, it would be
important to understand whether radical right success is a product of “population bub-
bles.” Meaning, that it is important to determine whether younger voters always tend to
vote for the radical right, or whether it is the case that an initial group of young voters in
a particular time period continued to be loyal to the party. Therefore, the radical right’s
success is not a product of attracting young voters per se, but instead, the success is owed
to the initial attraction of some young group.
Demand: Voter Attitudes
The final factor that drives demand for a radical right vote are a voter’s attitudes
on a number of important policy issues and political ideas. The thought process here
is that radical right parties are able to obtain a vote by placing themselves similarly on
issues that voters find important. Therefore, if voters holds attitudes similar to the policy
platforms of radical right parties then these voters would be rational to vote for the party.
Here, several voter attitudes are briefly discussed that scholars believe are theoretically
important for explaining radical right vote choice.
First, far right positioning on a left-right ideological scale is theorized to explain a
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radical right vote. Givens (2005) found that far right ideological positioning on a left-
right scale was positively correlated with voting for a radical right party. Mudde (2007)
solidifies the finding that radical right voters view themselves to the far right of the
ideological spectrum in his theoretical discussion of radical right voters. However, there
is some debate regarding the importance of this attitude. Hainsworth (2008) argues that
most party members and voters for the radical right do not self-identify as members of
the extreme right. Instead, the author provides some evidence that these people tend to
respond that they are more moderate than the radical right party they supported.
Second, several scholars argue, and find, that there is a relationship between anti-
immigrant, xenophobic, and racist attitudinal positions and radical right vote choice
(van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000b, Kitschelt 1995, van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003,
Givens 2005, Mudde 2007, Rydgren 2008, Sprague-Jones 2010, Cutts, Fieldhouse and
Russell 2010, Ford and Goodwin 2010, Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2012, Doosje et al.
2013). The argument is that the voters holding these attitudes will vote for radical
right parties because these parties are the only ones in the electoral market representing
their view on issues related to these attitudes. These issues include immigration, foreign
workers, asylum seekers, and multicultural societies. The most obvious way that anti-
immigrant attitudes manifest themselves is with strong welfare-chauvanist positions.
Third, Mudde (2007) argues that populist attitudes are a major driving force of voting
for the radical right. Pauwels (2010, 2011) argues that populism should be understood
as the idea that the “pure people” are in conflict with the “corrupt people.” The idea
is that the common people are in conflict with those corrupt politicians that seek to
reap the benefits from the labor of the common folk (Luther 2011). In contrast, several
authors define populism more broadly as people who are discontent or disillusioned with
the system and have no trust in government (i.e. politics of discontent) (Ignazi 2003,
Norris 2005, Stefanova 2009, Ford and Goodwin 2010, Doosje et al. 2013). This attitude
is said to be a function of insecurity with the citizen’s economic situation (Bornschier
and Kriesi 2013). In fact, voting for the radical right has commonly been attributed as
protest voting against the current system (Ignazi 2003).
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A fourth major attitudinal position of radical right voters is an authoritarian posi-
tion on issues such as crime. Authoritarianism can be understood as the position that
infringements of society should be punished severely, and that punishment is more im-
portant than rehabilitation (Mudde 2007). Rydgren (2013) argues that working class
support for the radical right can be explained by the fact that the working class, on
average, tends to be more socio-culturally authoritarian. Indeed, several authors find
that authoritarian positions on legal punishment practices are positively correlated with
radical right vote choice (Kitschelt 1995, Givens 2005).
The last two attitudes receive some empirical support in the literature, but are heavily
debated between radical right scholars. First, Betz (1994) argues that radical right voters
hold neo-liberal economic positions. The problem with this argument is that welfare-
chauvinism, which is an attitudinal position of these voters that is not debated, does
not necessarily translate into neo-liberal economics. However, there is a small amount
of evidence in the literature that voters hold some neo-liberal economic positions. For
instance, Norris (2005) finds that these voters seek to roll back the power of the state, and
advocate pro-market economic ideas of privatization and inequality (45). The concern
here is that this attitudinal position differs for voters across countries, which is an area
of inquiry that should be explored.
Finally, Euro-skepticism is an attitudinal feature that some radical right voters are
found to possess. The debate over this attitude is whether voters for all radical right
parties hold anti-European Union attitudes. Recently, Ford, Goodwin and Cutts (2012)
find that Euro-skepticim was the most important driver for the radical right United
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). However, Givens (2005) finds mixed results when
exploring whether voters for radical right parties hold negative attitudes towards the EU.
Mudde (2007) and Givens (2008) argue that this perceived Euro-skepticism is really just
a skepticism of large multi-state organizations that subvert the power of the state. Again,
it is important to note that these last two attitudes are highly debatd in the literature.
Nevertheless, these findings reveal an important area of inquiry.
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Comprehensive Theory
The theoretical framework provided in this research agenda is a sequential theory of
individual radical right vote choice that links all of the previously hypothesized factors.
Whereas previous research focused on either voters, supply of radical right parties, or
some arbitrary combination of multiple factors, this research provides the first complete
theory of radical right vote choice. It is important to note that the research here is specif-
ically focused on individual level vote choice because previous research was hampered by
an inability to distinguish between vote choice and vote share, and these analyses would
arbitrary alternate between them. Random alternating between the two dependent vari-
ables made interpretation of results in order to construct a more coherent theory more
difficult. A visual interpretation of the theoretical construct is provided in Figure 1. The
two stages of the model consist of factors that determine the supply of a viable radical
right party, and the factors that determine the individual demand to vote for such a
party.
The first stage of the theoretical vote choice model involves the existence (supply) of
a viable radical right party in the electoral market. Obviously, before a voter is able to
cast a vote for a particular party type, that party must exist as an electoral option. The
existence of a viable radical right party to locate at a particular ideological space currently
occupied by voters is a function of two types of factors. First, systems-level institutional
factors that are external to the party have the ability to either restrict the ability of a
radical right party to form, or damage the viability of the party. For example, plurality
electoral rules have been known to restrict the ability of third parties to obtain votes.
These external institutional factors have the ability to determine whether a radical right
party exists in a political system, as well as the relative viability of a party to compete.
The second set of factors that determine the supply of a viable radical right party
are those factors that are internal to the party, such a professionalization, organization,
message/ideology, and leadership. For example, professionalized parties that are highly
organized are going to be more viable because professional parties are traditionally better
at running electoral campaigns. What determines party internal factors? The theory
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Figure 2: Theory: Individual Radical Right Vote Choice
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presented here argues that party internal factors are largely determined by the external
institutional rules of a country. For instance, let us pretend that we have a country
operating under plurality electoral rules and party finance laws that bias major parties.
In this situation, even if a radical right party was able to form and get on the ballot,
these institutional factors would make it utterly impossible for the radical right party to
gain any significant amount of votes. The radical right party would lack the resources
due to party finance laws to create an effective electoral campaign, the party would look
unprofessional in comparison to the two main parties, and it would be irrational for an
individual to waste their vote on the party (Downs 1957, Cox 1997). The party would not
be able to compete at the level of the mainstream parties. The logic of this relationship
is developed further in Chapter 2 and 3.
Given that a radical right party exists in the electoral market, the second stage of the
theoretical vote choice model involves demand (desire to cast a vote) for a radical right
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party. As perviously stated, prior research hypothesizes that three types of factors impact
an individual’s propensity to vote for the radical right party, or a radical right party’s
vote share in a country: macro factors, voter soci-demographics, and voter attitudes.
Macro factors include those factors related to the modernization-loser theory; including
perceived threats due to economic crisis and high immigration. Research on the socio-
demographics of radical right voters has largely demonstrated patterns dealing with age,
education, working status, etc. Finally, scholars have explored several attitudes that are
hypothesized to lead to a radical right vote, such as anti-immigration, far right ideological
positioning, authoritarianism, etc. However, previous analyses were not explicit about
the level of analysis being conducted, which made hypothesizing about a relationship
between these factors difficult.
In Figure 1, a theoretical framework is displayed that conveys the relationship between
these demand factors. The argument presented here is that macro-forces play a key role
in driving demand by conditioning attitudes of specific socio-demographic populations.
Alternatively stated, macro forces create attitudes in the population of voters that are
commonly understood as the losers of modernization. Then, these attitudes are what
drives an individual to vote for a radical right party. Once these attitudes are ignited
in a population where a viable radical right party exists, a one-dimensional ideological
spatial model explains radical right vote choice.
The logic of the relationship between the factors that drive demand are presented in
the simplified spatial model in Figure 2. Here, there is an original bi-modal distribution
of voters that is predominantly captured by two parties (Party A & Party B). The dotted
line demonstrates a new distribution of the same voters following the activation of atti-
tudes, which the theory presented here argues is caused by the conditioning of attitudes
through a change in macro forces. If the factors that determine supply are conducive
to the existence of viable radical right party, then voters in the far right mode of the
tri-modal distribution should move their vote from Party B to the radical right party.
Therefore, after accounting for supply-side factors, individual radical right vote choice
is explained by voter positioning on a one-dimensional ideological space. This sparse
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Figure 3: Theory: Spatial Model Example
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discussion encompasses the basics of the theory. Supporting chapters that follow fully
tease out the mechanisms that link these factors together into a single, coherent theory.
Chapter Layout
The chapters that follow develop the theory in a more concrete manner, as well as
provide empirical testing to confirm the important mechanisms that demonstrate the
validity of the theory. The chapter layout follows in an order that is consistent with the
sequential nature of the theory. Chapter 2 specifically explores the external institutional
factors and internal party factors that impact the availability and success of a viable
radical right party in the electoral market. In this chapter, the relationship between the
existence of a radical right party and external institutional factors is explored. Next,
the chapter explores the relationship between external factors and radical right success.
Finally, the chapter estimates the impact that internal supply-side factors have on radical
right success.
The third chapter specifically explores the relationship between external and internal
factors. The chapter seeks to determine whether external supply-side factors impact
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important characteristics of the party that could later lead to a higher probability of
success. Specifically, empirical testing is conducted utilizing statistical techniques in order
to determine the relationship between external institutional factors and each theoretically
important internal party factors in countries where a radical right party exists. The
chapter concludes by estimating an overall model of success with all of the important
supply-side variables of interest.
Chapter 4 explores the relationship between political attitudes and radical right vote
choice at the individual level. The chapter conducts a large-N analysis using survey data
across European countries in order to explore the important attitudes that translate into
radical right vote choice. The analysis includes discussion and exploration of the ability
of a one-dimensional spatial model to explain vote choice. The findings indicate that
far right ideology, nativism, populism, anti-equality, and anti-EU attitudinal stances are
correlated with radical right vote choice.
The fifth chapter investigates the conditioning effect that macro-social forces have on
political attitudes. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the effect that immigration and
negative economic circumstances have on the creation of the political attitudes that are
correlated with a vote for the radical right. Further, the chapter posits a novel theory and
argues that the mechanism that links macro-social forces to radical right vote choice is
the creation of important radical right attitudes. The findings indicate that macro-forces
do impact attitudes correlated with radical right vote choice.
The final chapter reviews the complete theory of radical right vote choice. In this
chapter, an empirical model is estimated in order to represent a complete empirical test
of the overarching theory. The model is a hierarchical model that incorporates important
independent variables at both the individual level and country level. In this vein, the
final statistical model represents the first attempt to estimate a comprehensive model for
radical right vote choice.
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Chapter 2
Impact of Supply-Side Factors on the
Radical Right
“But the system has been diverted from its original purpose. It does not filter
out clownish candidates. It now filters out candidates who pose a danger to
those in power.” (French National Front Head of Charente-Maritime, Jean-
Marc de Lacoste 2012)
“I have my 500 signatures and therefore I will be a candidate in the presidential
election.” (French National Front Leader, Marine Le Pen 2012)
The quotes offered above were made during the 2012 French presidential campaign by
two members of the National Front (NF). Presidential candidate hopeful, Marine Le Pen,
and one of her regional leaders, made these statements in reference to a potential insti-
tutional barrier to entry for the party’s participation in the election. The rule mandates
that a candidate must secure at least 500 signatures from elected individuals in order to
be recognized on the ballot for the first-round of the French presidential elections. The
NF argues that this institutional rule allows politically established politicians to block
the entry of a new, democratic movement. In opposition, established politicians point
out that the rule is intended to prevent illiberal or populist movements from entering
office.
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How valid is the concern that institutional rules are capable of preventing parties
from competing in elections? The previous NF party leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, was
prevented from competing in the 1981 French presidential election due to not meeting
the 500 signature limit. Le Pen competed in the previous presidential election of 1974
receiving .8% of the first-round vote (190,921 votes). In the presidential election of 1988,
Le Pen secured 14.4% of the vote; equal to 4,570,838 votes in the first-round. At 14.4%,
Le Pen obtained the fourth largest vote share in the 1988 election.
In regards to French national elections, there is another unique institutional feature
that may prevent some minor party candidates, or candidates of newer parties, from
being competitive. The French national electoral system is a two-round system. If no
candidate receives 50% plus one vote in the first-round, then the two top vote receiving
candidates face off in a second electoral round. The NF has only witnessed their pres-
idential candidate move on to a second round of voting on one occasion. In the 2002
presidential election, Jean-Marie Le Pen was defeated in the first-round by only 3.02% of
the vote. However, the second-round consisted of a massive campaign where all defeated
parties joined together in order to ensure that the fringe candidate did not win. In the
second-round, Le Pen was beaten by 64.42% of the vote.
This chapter seeks to determine what effect supply side factors, such as the insti-
tutional features discussed above, have on radical right emergence and success. More
specifically, this research agenda posits hypotheses explaining how supply-side factors
impact the viability of a political party in the voter’s eyes. The analysis is divided into
two sections in order to distinguish external supply-side factors from internal supply-side
factors. First, external supply-side factors are examined. External supply-side factors
are country-specific and election specific rules and features; such as party system type,
electoral system proportionality, party finance laws, ballot access, and ideological space
on the party spectrum. These factors have been theorized in previous literature to have
a substantial effect on the ability of a radical right party to emerge and achieve success
(Jackman and Volpert 1996, Golder 2003).
The second set of supply-side factors that could impact the emergence and success
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of a radical right party are internal supply-side factors. Internal factors are characteris-
tics of the political party; such as the party’s level of professionalization, organizational
structure, ideology, and leadership (Mudde 2007). These internal supply-side factors are
evaluated by prospective voters. Voters calculate the probability of voter for a given party
based on these characteristics. For instance, voters regularly evaluate whether their ide-
ological beliefs are in accordance, or in conflict with, the platform of the available parties
in the electoral market (Downs 1957).
This chapter proceeds by considering each of these supply-side factors and providing
an overview of the literature regarding their impact on radical right emergence and suc-
cess. Based on the expected relationships, hypotheses are provided for empirical analysis.
Subsequently, each set of factors is tested in isolation in order to verify whether it has an
effect on both emergence and vote share. The data in this research agenda are gathered
for European countries between 1990-2013. The empirical results indicate that specific
election rules have an effect on radical right emergence, while candidate-centered electoral
rules and the overall electoral type impacts success. In addition, party professionaliza-
tion, organizational structure, and electoral experience are internal supply-side factors
that lead to radical right success.
External Supply-Side Factors
External supply-side factors are more concretely understood as factors that dictate
the political opportunity structure that exists in a given country or election. Tarrow
(1994) defines political opportunity structures as, “consistent, but not necessarily formal
or permanent, dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people
to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success of failure” (85).
In the case of the radical right, these external supply-side factors could theoretically alter
the political opportunity structure in a number of ways.
For instance, whether political entrepreneurs view the creation of a radical right party
as a fruitful endeavor, or simply the creation of another unsuccessful minor party, matters
for the political opportunity structure. Similarly, if a radical right party already exists,
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the existing structure could dissuade political entrepreneurs from joining the party if
the prospects for success are low. If politicians are acting rationally, it would not be
beneficial for a politician to create or join a radical right party that, in their eyes, could
not secure a substantial number of votes, office positions, or changes in policy (Mu¨ller
and Strøm 1999). There is a vast literature in American politics which demonstrates this
relationship regarding the incentive to win election politician entrepreneurship behavior
(Mayhew 1974, Miller and Stokes 1963, Erikson 1978, Hibbing 1991, Stratmann 2000,
Griffin 2006). Therefore, low prospects of winning an election could dissuade political
entrepreneurs from creating or joining a radical right party since the cost of party creation
is not worth the low possibility of reward.
The political opportunity structure available in a country or election could also alter
voters’ perception of the viability of a radical right party. Voter support for a political
party relies on satisfying two important requirements. First, prospective voters must
view radical right parties as representing their interests and ideological viewpoints. The
ideological beliefs of a voter must align with the political policy platform of the party.
The importance of ideological congruence is discussed and empirically tested in a later
chapter specifically exploring demand-side factors for radical right vote choice. The sec-
ond requirement is that the voter must view the party as legitimate. In other words,
the party must be viewed as a competitor with a realistic chance of success. Accord-
ing to rational voting theories, voters are much less likely to support a party that does
not have a legitimate chance of winning office (Duverger 1986, Riker 1986, Cox 1997).
In addition, Duch, May and Armstrong (2010) find that voters even make calculations
about the prospects for participation in a coalition government for niche parties based on
strategic behavior. This is precisely the reason why there is a tendency to see two-party
political systems correlate with first-past-the-post electoral rules. Voters will not cast a
vote for a party that has no realistic chance of wining. Similarly, the electoral system
rules discussed above could significantly impact the calculation that voters make when
determining the prospects for success of the party.
There is no doubt that some electoral rules put certain types of parties at a disadvan-
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tage in terms of electoral competition, thus narrowing the political opportunity structure.
For example, it has long been asserted that first-past-the-post electoral systems make it
difficult for third-parties to achieve success (Duverger 1986, Riker 1986, Cox 1997), and
this assertion is commonly used to explain the inability of radical right parties to achieve
success in specific settings (Jackman and Volpert 1996, Carter 2002, Golder 2003, Norris
2005, Carter 2005, Givens 2005, Mudde 2007, Arzheimer 2009). The United States and
the United Kingdom are prime examples of the ability of electoral rules to prevent third-
parties from becoming a significant electoral force. Historically, neither country has ever
witnessed the success of a radical right party at the national level. In addition, ballot
access rules and party finance laws could put parties at a significant disadvantage. For
instance, the French presidential election ballot access rule requiring 500 signatures from
politicians in order to compete in the first-round of the election was able to prevent Le
Pen from competing in the 1981 election.
This section will explore the ability of external supply-side factors, such as electoral
rules, to narrow or widen the political opportunity structure available to radical right
parties. The section is organized as follows. First, I present a brief review of literature,
followed by a proffered set of hypotheses that identify the precise effect that these factors
have on radical right parties. Finally, variable operationalization and the fit of these
variables with the statistical approach is explained.
Electoral System Type
The type of electoral system a country utilizes to fill elected positions is of great
interest to both political scientists and governing parties. Classical comparative pol-
itics literature offers numerous explorations of the consequences of different electoral
systems. Broadly, Duverger (1967), Riker (1986), and Cox (1997) acknowledge that first-
past-the-post electoral rules tend to create two-party systems. Riker (1986) argues that
two mechanisms explain this outcomes. First, the author identifies a ‘mechanical effect’
whereby losing parties are underrepresented by plurality electoral systems (33). The
effect of this mechanism is that plurality systems tend to underrepresent and therefore
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discourage the success of less supported parties mathematically in their translation from
votes to seats. Second, Riker (1986) argues that a ‘psychological effect’ exists whereby
voters, being aware of this mechanical discrepancy, will not vote for third parties because
they do not want to waste their vote. In addition, first-past-the-post electoral systems
tend to see political parties converge ideologically in the center of the ideological distri-
bution near the median voter in order to win a plurality of the votes (Cox 1997, Shepsle
2010). Therefore, the resulting party system for countries utilizing first-past-the-post is
a system in which two, ideologically convergent parties compete for the median voter on
the ideological spectrum. In sum, it should be more difficult for radical right parties to
exist and succeed in countries using first-past-the-post electoral systems (Jackman and
Volpert 1996, Carter 2002, Golder 2003, Norris 2005, Carter 2005, Givens 2005, Mudde
2007, Arzheimer 2009).
There are several distinct electoral rules that could also impact radical right parties.
The total number of seats up for election could be related to the ability of radical right
parties to compete. Generally, as the number of seats contested in an election rises,
the competition area becomes more geographically bound. The effect of this type of
bounded competition could mean that smaller, regionally popular parties are better able
to compete (DeClair 1999). Alternatively, a rise in the total number of seats could simply
provide smaller parties with a greater chance for contesting seats due to the increase in
the number of opportunities for success. Second, elections for legislatures sometimes
operate under split rules to elect the entire chamber. The general intent behind split
rules elections is to create stable governance, while also allowing smaller parties to win
and represent the interests of minority groups. Usually, elections operating under split
rules are done in order to satisfy an ethnic minority. However, sometimes the intent, or
at the very least the outcome, is to ensure greater party choice and stable governance
(i.e. Germany’s split rules elections to the Bundestag). In addition, an increase in
districts and use of two-round elections are believed to stifle radical right success. An
increase in districts and use of two-round elections are believed to have the same effect
as first-past-the-post electoral rules. There is a tendency for these two electoral features
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to be associated with two-party systems that witness the convergence of parties on the
ideological median voter.
There are two electoral rules that are specifically intended to limit the success of
extreme parties. First, a few countries contain bans on neo-nazi, fascist, and radical
nationalist parties. For instance, Germany and Lithuania have constitutional bans on
political parties that disrupt the current liberal democratic order of the government. The
bans are intended to limit the nationalistic rhetoric that swept throughout Europe in the
1930s-1940s. In these countries, the existence of radical right parties is thought to be
limited by these bans since radical right parties contain ideological ties with these more
extreme parties of the World War II era. In addition, several countries adopted electoral
thresholds in order to prevent small, extreme parties from entering office. Again, Germany
provides a prime example. Germany’s adoption of the electoral threshold was a direct
consequence of the rise of the National Socialist German Worker’s Party (Nazi). The
Nazi party started as small party receiving less than 5% of the vote and winning a few
elected positions. The party leveraged these government positions as a political platform
to spread their extreme rhetoric. Thus, the implementation of electoral thresholds seeks
not only to limit the success of extreme parties, but also to limit their ability to spread
extreme ideologies.
The final electoral rule theorized to effect radical right parties is compulsory voting.
Norris (2005) was the first scholar to hypothesize that a relationship exists between
compulsory voting and radical right party success. She argues that forcing people to
vote who are dissatisfied with the mainstream parties could result in the increase in
votes for more radical parties (122). The author does not statistically test this assertion,
but she does provide some descriptive statistics that lend credence to the initial claim.
Empirically testing this assertion would give us a good indication of the precise effect of
compulsory voting on radical right existence and vote share.
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Electoral System Disproportionality
The disproportionality of the electoral system is commonly cited as a barrier to success
for radical right parties (Jackman and Volpert 1996, Carter 2002, 2005, Givens 2005,
Arzheimer 2009). NF members in France cite the electoral system’s lack of proportionality
as their greatest barrier to success (DeClair 1999). Cross-nationally, Norris (2005) finds
some evidence for this claim. As proportionality increases so does radical right vote
share. However, it will be interesting to test whether proportionality is a function of the
electoral system, a specific electoral rule, or whether this factor is isolated from other
external factors. Carter (2005) argues that the proportionality of the electoral system
impacts radical right success more than the overall electoral system type. This occurs
because several specific electoral rules work together in order to determine the overall
proportionality of the system. Here, the hypothesis is that a more disproportionate
system makes it less likely a radical right party with emerge and succeed.
Multi-Party Systems
Multi-party systems are positively correlated with radical right vote share. Jackman
and Volpert (1996) find that multi-partism increasingly fosters parties of the extreme
right with rising electoral proportionality. In addition, Givens (2005) find that increasing
the number of parties in a coalition government significantly increases the existence of
a radical right party. Finally, using Lijphart’s (2010) two institutional dimensions of
government, Hakhverdian and Koop (2007) find that increasing the number of parties on
the executive-parties dimension is correlated with increased radical right presence. The
authors conclude that Lijphart’s consensus democracy categorization is more conducive
to radical parties.
The assertion that multi-party systems lead to radical right party success is one that
is tangled in a web of other theories. Classical electoral system research asserts that the
number of parties in a country is a function of electoral system design (Duverger 1972,
Riker 1986). On the other hand, contrasting arguments claims that the number and type
of parties in a country are a function of social cleavages caused by the ideological makeup
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of voters (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Taagepera and Grofman 1985). What becomes im-
portant here is the statistical relationship between the number of parties in a system and
specific electoral rules. If electoral rules correlate highly with the number of parties in a
system, perhaps the number of parties in the system is really a confounding variable in
the analysis.
Ballot Access
Electoral laws and regulations targeting candidates and parties have the ability to
sway the prospects of parties to exist and succeed in a political system. Norris (2005)
splits these laws and regulations into two categories: nomination and campaigning (83).
In regards to nomination, her major focus is on rules related to ballot access, such as
banning the participation of a party or group. However, there are several other rules
related to ballot access that deserve attention. Theoretically, the manipulation of minor
ballot access laws could have a big impact on the ability of parties to represent the
interests of specific groups. For instance, a high age barrier could make it difficult for
younger people to achieve substantive representation on their issues. For example, in
order to run for the Czech Republic Senate a candidate must be at least 40 years old.
Overall, as the strictness of ballot access laws increase it should be more difficult for
smaller, extreme parties to be successful. To date, the precise effect of ballot access on
outcomes for radical right parties has not been empirically tested.
Campaign Finance
Within Norris’s (2005) second category, campaigning, campaign finance laws and
regulations emerge as most important. The strictness of campaign finance laws can make
it difficult for newer and/or smaller parties to compete in elections. For instance, loose
restrictions on donor contributions could allow a wealthy minority of citizens to finance
the activities of a party that started out fairly small. The increase in finance would
then allow the minority party to compete through several campaign activities, such as
advertising. In regards to campaign finance laws, there could be differing effects based
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on subtle particularities in the law. For example, candidate spending restrictions might
even the playing field between candidates, but the same effect would not extend to the
party. Some parties may be able to field more candidates, thereby increasing the number
of chances for success. Still, it is possible that spending restrictions of parties could even
the level of exposure each party is able to convey to the voters.
Norris (2005) attempted to explore this relationship between party finance and party
outcomes. Unfortunately, the data did not exist to test this assertion directly. However,
the author found indirect evidence that less strict campaign finance laws are positively
related to the number of parties in a political system. The overall conclusion from this in-
direct test was that radical right parties may benefit from looser restrictions on campaign
finance. Here, the assertion is tested empirically for the first time.
Unoccupied Ideological Space
It is commonly theorized that the ability of a radical right party to emerge and achieve
success in a country are a function of the space available on the ideological spectrum for a
party to locate. Carter (2005) argues that the ideological proximity of the parties on the
mainstream right determines how much political space is available to the extreme right
parties. Stated simply, the author argues that the greater the space to the right, the
greater the probability of emergence and sustained success. Mudde (2007) concurs with
the idea that there needs to be ideological space for a new party (i.e. electoral volatility)
to emerge. Unfortunately, existing literature has been unable to test this assertion due
to data unavailability and measurement hurdles. This research provides the first attempt
to empirically test this assertion.
Operationalization: External Supply-Side Factors
The most straightforward external supply side variables to operationalize for empir-
ical testing were those variables that represent the electoral system; including several
specific electoral system features. Broadly, each country’s overall electoral system type
was coded as operating under either first-past-the-post or proportional representation
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electoral rules.5 Originally, the electoral system variable was coded to account for two
other types of electoral systems. Ireland and Malta were coded as operating under single-
transferable vote electoral rules, and Poland was coded as operating under plurality-bloc
voting. However, the lack of variation on the electoral system variable led to model con-
vergence problems and inflated standard errors. Further, successful attempts to remedy
these problems did not produce substantively different results.6 Since single-transferable
vote and plurality-bloc voting mimic the high election thresholds outlined in first-past-
the-post electoral rules, these cases were coded as first-past-the-post.
There were several additional electoral rules that were included in the statistical anal-
yses. First, the total number of seats up for election is included in the analysis in order
to account for the fact that a larger number of seats may lead to a greater opportunity
for contestation.7 Second, several countries operated under split rules in order to fill their
legislative chamber(s).8 Certainly, it is possible that countries with split rules elections
signal to voters and parties that there is ample opportunity for successful entry into the
legislature. Finally, the statistical models accounted for the electoral rule of compulsory
voting.9 Where people are forced to vote in an election, there could be a higher incidence
of voters casting protest votes in favor of radical right, or more broadly, anti-system,
parties.10
5In the dataset, there were 93 elections (32.18%) conducted under first-past-the-post electoral rules,
and 196 elections (67.82%) conducted under proportional representation electoral rules. In the truncated
dataset including success, there were 25 elections (20.83%) conducted under first-past-the-post electoral
rules, and 95 elections (79.17%) conducted under proportional representation electoral rules. The highest
correlation between this variable and any another independent variable in the models was .333.
6Firth logistic regression models were estimated in order to determine whether single-transferable and
plurality-bloc voting rules were significantly and substantively different in terms of effecting outcomes.
The model results indicated that they were not.
7In the dataset, the total number of seats ranged from zero to 659, with a mean of 197.4 seats. The
elections where 0 seats were contested included elections where a first-round was necessary in order to
advance and receive a chance at winning a seat. In the truncated dataset for success, the minimum and
maximum number of seats remained the same, but the mean was 203.5. The highest correlation between
total seats and any other independent variable in the models was .281.
8In the dataset, there were 66 out of 289 elections (22.84%) operating under split rules in order to
fill the legislature. In the truncated dataset for success, 23 out of 120 elections (19.17%) were operating
under split rules. The variable did not correlate higher than .234 with any of the other variables in the
models.
9In the dataset, 16.96% of the elections were held with compulsory voting in place. In the truncated
dataset for success, 22.5% of the elections were held with compulsory voting in place. The variable
correlated no higher than .24 with any of the other independent variables included in the models.
10There were a number of electoral rules also considered for statistical testing that were ultimately
excluded due to their high correlation with other variables; these include two-round elections, the number
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The disproportionality of the electoral system could be measured in a number of
possible ways (Mudambi 1997, Karpov 2008). For instance, Gallagher (1991, 1992) has
done substantial work related to how scholars should measure electoral system propor-
tionality, and the effects of proportionality on outcomes. The measure utilized here, in
order to represent electoral system proportionality, is derived from Lijphart’s (1994) work
on electoral and party systems. Lijphart’s (1994) index is represented mathematically as
ILijphart =
(si−vi)+(sj−vj)
2
. The equation only takes into account the two largest vote receiv-
ing parties’ vote share and share of the seats. Since the largest parties usually have the
most significant deviations from the quota, the measure represents the disproportionally
of the entire system.11
The effective number of parties represented in a political system is included in this
analysis in order to account for the theory that larger party systems lead to radical right
of electoral districts, threshold, multi-seat constituencies, and extreme right bans. A few countries
operate under elections that have two-rounds. In the original dataset, 7.07% of elections were the first-
round of an election, and 8.75% were the second-round of an election. The first round of the election
determines which top-two vote receivers move on to a second-round runoff. The argument in favor of
a two-round electoral system is that the system is more democratic since the winner must receive a
plurality of the votes cast in the election. Since radical right parties appear to do very well in the
first-round of these elections, the variable merited consideration. The rounds variable correlated at .724
with a variable representing whether the constituency was a multi-seat constituency, .655 with a variable
representing the electoral system, and .587 with a variable representing the threshold. Second, a variable
representing the number of districts that are contested in the election was utilized in a previous analysis.
The variable ranged from one district for the entire country to 650 districts. The mean number of
districts was 74.49. The variable was originally included in order to account for whether having more
districts allows radical right parties to be more successful by taking advantage of regional strategies. The
district variable correlated at .682 with a variable representing whether the constituency was a multi-seat
constituency, .637 with a variable representing the electoral system, and .577 with a variable representing
the threshold. Third, a variable was included that represented the threshold percentage of the vote that
a party needed to obtain in order to be allocated seats in the legislature. In the original dataset, the
variable ranged from 3% to 50% plus one vote. The thought process is that a lower threshold would allow
more fringe parties to obtain success.The threshold variable correlated at .811 with a variable measuring
whether the constituency was a multi-seat constituency, and .988 with the electoral system variable.
Fourth, included in the original analysis was a variable that represented whether the constituency was
a multi-seat constituency. In the original dataset, 76.09% for the elections took places with multi-seat
constituencies. The variable was included originally in order to account for the fact that multi-seat
constituencies are less likely to lead two-party systems. Indeed, the variable representing multi-seat
constituencies correlated at .813 with the electoral system type. Finally, there was a variable included in
the analysis that represented whether extreme right/neo-nazi parties were banned from participating in
elections. Unfortunately, the inclusion of this variable led to model convergence issues. Less than 10%
of the elections in the sample occurred in places where these parties were banned. Further, in 51.58% of
the countries were extreme right parties were banned, there was a radical right party in existence.
11The disproportionality measure ranges from a minimum of -.333 (Slovakia - 2012) to a maximum
value of .34 (Lithuania - 2012). The mean electoral disproportionality was .04. In the truncated dataset
for success, the measure ranges from -.333 to .2763 (France - 1997). The mean was .04086. The highest
correlation between electoral system disproportionality and any other independent variable was .331
(electoral system type).
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success. The effective number of parties was calculated using Laakso and Taagepera’s
(1979) mathematical formula. Laakso and Taagepera’s calculation for the effective num-
ber of parties is N = 1∑n
i=1 P
2
i
. Party systems with a greater number of parties should
have a higher probability of radical right emergence, and these systems should witness
greater radical right success.12
A measure for the strictness of party finance laws was created by coding several
specific party finance laws, and then estimating factor analysis in order to create an
overall measure of strictness. First, a variable was coded in order to represent restrictions
on donors. The variable was coded a one if the election occurred under donor limits, and
a zero if there were no donor limits.13 Next, a variable was coded that accounted for
existing spending limitations on candidates. The variable was coded a one if there were
spending limitations imposed on candidates or parties, and a zero otherwise.14 Finally,
two variables were created to account for the reporting of campaign finance activities.
The first variable represents whether candidates needed to report contributions. The
variable was a coded a zero if candidates do not have to report contributions, a .5 if
reporting must occur when a contribution is over a certain amount, and a one if all
campaign contributions must be reported.15 The other campaign finance variable was
the targeted at expenditures. The variable was coded a zero if candidates did not have to
report expenditures, a .5 if they did have to report expenditures over a certain amount of
money, and a one if candidates must have reported all expenditures.16 The factor analysis
technique was estimated including these four variables. The factor scores were saved for
each observation in order to represent the strictness of the countries party finance laws.17
12The variable ranged from 2.024 (Malta - 2003) to 13.83 (Poland 1991), and had a mean of 5.014.
In the truncated dataset for success, the measure ranged from 2.508 (Italy - 2001) to 10.24 (Belgium -
1999), and had mean of 5.669. The highest correlation between electoral system disproportionality and
any other independent variable was .229 (electoral system type).
13In the original data, 47.14% of elections occurred where there were donor limitations.
14In the original dataset, 51.51% of elections had spending limitations in place.
15In the original dataset, 27.6% of the time there was no reporting law in effect for contributions, and
5.38% of the time contributions only had to be reported if the contribution was over a certain amount.
16In the original dataset, 27.94% of the time there was no reporting law in effect, and 1% of the time
there was a reporting law in effect only for certain expenditures amounts.
17The proportion of the variance explained with one factor loading was .591. The calculation for the
squared multiple correlation of the factor scores for all of the variables was .855, which means that the
values from the variables are highly weighted when calculating the factor analysis scores. The original
calculation included a variable representing whether public funding was available for candidates and
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Factor analysis scores were also estimated to represent the restrictiveness of ballot
access laws. There were five separately coded ballot access laws used for the estimation.
First, the required age a person must be in order to run as a candidate for election
was obtained.18 Second, a variable was coded to represent whether a person must be a
member of a registered political party in order to run for election. The variable is coded
a one if you must be a registered member, and a zero otherwise.19 Third, the number of
signatures a person must obtain from the voting population in order to run for election
was represented.20 Fourth, the number of signatures a person must obtain from current
elected officials in order to run for election was represented.21 Finally, a variable was
created to represent whether a person needed support from both elected politicians and
the voting population before being allowed to stand for election. The variable was coded
a one if support was needed from both, and a zero otherwise.22 Factor analysis scores
were estimated based on the values for these five variables, and scores were saved for each
observation.23
The final external supply-side variable was ideological space. Ideological space was
the most difficult variable to operationalize since political party positioning could be
measured in a number of ways. In order to operationalize party ideology and space, Party
Manifesto Project’s “rile” scores were utilized for elections where available (Volkens et al.
2014). The Party Manifesto Score scale ranges from -100 to 100. The smallest possible
score of -100 indicates the most extreme left party, and the largest possible score of 100
indicates the most extreme right party. Here, the ideological space available for a radical
whether a payment must be made in order to run for election. However, these two variables were not
correlated with other variables utilized for measuring party finance law restrictiveness.
18In the original dataset, the required age for candidacy ranged from 18 to 40 years old with a mean
of 22.03.
19In the original dataset, 14.42% of candidates are required to be members of a registered political
party in order to run for election.
20In the original dataset, the number of signatures needed from voters ranged from 0 to 10,000 (Bul-
garia) with a mean of 1964.
21In the original dataset, the number of current elected officials signatures needed ranged from 0 to
500 (France) with a mean of 18.68.
22In the original dataset, 6.52% of the time a person must receive signatures from voters and current
elected officials.
23The proportion of the variance explained with one factor loading was .289. The calculation for the
squared multiple correlation of the factor scores for all of the variables was .991. This high statistic
indicates that the factors scores were created based on value of these variables with minimal error.
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right party was calculated using party manifesto scores for each election (i) with one of
the two equations below:24
If the radical right party is the furthest party to the right:
PartyiRR − Partyil
If the radical right party is not the furthest party to the right:
(Partyir−Partyil)
PartyiLargest−PartyiSmallest
Partyil represents the party manifesto score of the party to the left of the radical right
party in the election. Likewise, Partyir represents the party to the right of the radical
right party. The denominator of the second equation represents the difference between the
largest and smallest party manifesto scores in the election. The above calculations were
done in order to err on the side of caution and not overestimate the available space for a
radical right party. For instance, if the radical right party is the furthest right party, that
party could technically locate anywhere between Partyil and the party manifesto value of
100. However, this assumption would not be realistic due to the fact that a distribution
of voters may also be limiting the available ideological space for a radical right party to
locate, which is an assertion left for future research to test.
Method and Dependent Variable
The empirical analyses testing for the effect of external supply-side factors occurs in
two-stages. The first stage of empirical testing seeks to understand the effect of external
supply-side factors on radical right party existence in an election. The dependent variable
is coded a one if a radical right party contested seats in the election, and a zero if no
radical right party participated in the election. In the dataset, 67% (194) of European
elections between 1990-2014 witnessed a radical right party contesting seats. Since the
variable is binary, Bayesian binary models are estimated using the Markov Chain Monte
24The ideological space variable ranges from -0.5392 (Austria - 1995) to 49.97 (Croatia - 2003-2011),
and has a mean of 7.508. The ideological space variable did not correlate any higher than .214 with any
other independent variables in the models.
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Carlo (MCMC) simulation method.25 One of the main differences between frequentist
and Bayesian inference is that Bayesians assume that data are fixed and parameters
are variable, whereas frequentists assume that data come from some infinitely repeatable
generating process with constant, fixed parameters. The frequentist assumption of infinite
repeatability may not be realistic here where the universe of cases is known.
The model testing the effect of external supply-side factors on radical right existence
had the prior variance for each variable set at multivariate normal with the mean vec-
tor equalling zero and a precision matrix that is diagonal. The prior means for each
variable were set at zero when estimating the model.26 When plotting the distributions
for the chains, the distributions overlapped quite closely. The model presented here was
estimated by using a burnin of 100,000, and a sample of 700,000 that was thinned by
5.27 In regards to model convergence, each parameter for both chains passed Gelman and
Rubin, Geweke, and Heidelberger and Welch tests. The Gelman and Rubin test statistics
gave a potential scale reduction factor of 1 for all parameters; indicating there was no
need to run the chains longer to improve convergence of the stationarity distribution28
The Geweke diagnostic test statistics indicated that the means of the parameters from
two different locations in the chains converged to a standard normal distribution. All
parameters passed the stationarity and half-width tests of the Heidelberger and Welch
test. In addition, trace plots of the Markov chains showed that there was no trending
present for the chains, or the individual parameters for each chain. Lastly, density plots
25The Bayesian models were estimated in JAGS version 3.4.0. The models were estimated in R version
3.1.3 on a MAC running OS X 10.10.3.
26It is important to note that two additional models were estimated for each model presented here.
The first additional model set the prior mean for each variable as either +1 or -1 depending on the
directionality of the theoretical expectations for the variable. For instance, the effective number of
parties prior mean was set at +1, because the theory expects that the number of parties is positively
related to radical right existence. Then, another model was estimated where the prior mean for each
variable was set as the opposite of the first model (i.e. effective number of parties set at -1). This was
done in order to test the robustness of the prior specification. In particular, one would want to know
whether the probability distributions of the estimated Markov Chains for the models were statistically
different from each other in any meaningful way that could skew results. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests indicated that the probability distributions of the models were not statistically different from one
another, which means that prior mean specification did not bias results received here. However, model
convergence was impacted by prior specification. Models where prior means were set to the opposite of
theoretical expectations took significantly longer to converge, or did not converge at all.
27Several models were estimated where the number of burning, sampling, and thinning were changed.
When the models converged, the results were substantively the same.
28Statistics of 1.2 or higher are the cutoff.
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conveyed that the distribution of the posterior parameters were normally distributed.
The equation for the model is presented here:
log
(
Pr(RadicalRightParty)
1− Pr(RadicalRightParty)
)
= α + β1ElectoralSystem + β2TotalSeats
+ β3SplitRules + β4CompulsoryVoting
+ β5ElectoralSystemDisproportionality
+ β6Effective#ofParties + β7PartyFinanceLaws
+ β8BallotAccessLaws + 
 ∼ N(0, θ2 )
The second stage of empirical testing explored the effect that external supply-side
factors have on radical right success. Radical right success is measured here in two ways.
First, success is measured as the percentage of the vote that the radical right party re-
ceived in the election. The variable ranges from 0% to 34.33% (Austrian Freedom Party
- 2006) of the overall vote share.29 Second, success is measured as the proportion of the
seats that the radical right party obtained. The variable ranges from 0% to 36.07%.30
Again, Bayesian regression models were estimated while using the MCMC method. How-
ever, here the Bayesian models were linear Bayesian regression since the dependent vari-
ables are theoretically continuous. Another unique aspect of these Bayesian models is
that prior mean and variance were set as the coefficients and standard errors of frequentist
regression models in order to help with model convergence. This approach is useful since
the results of the frequentist models conformed with theoretical expectations.31 Plots of
the distributions for the chains confirmed that the distributions overlapped. The mod-
els presented here were estimated using a burnin of 500,000, and a sample of 200,000
29The mean of the variable was 4.96%
30The mean of the variable was 4.95%.
31Additional models were estimated with different prior specifications (see, footnote 32). Aside from
impacting the quickness of model convergence, the model results were substantively similar where con-
vergence occurred.
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that was thinned by 25.32 In regards to model convergence, the models passed all of the
same convergence tests discussed previously. The equations for the models are presented
below.33 In the equation, radical right success stands for vote share and seat share in
separate models.34
RadicalRightSuccess = α + β1ElectoralSystem + β2TotalSeats
+ β3SplitRules + β4CompulsoryVoting
+ β5ElectoralSystemDisproportionality
+ β6Effective#ofParties + β7PartyFinanceLaws
+ β8BallotAccessLaws + β9IdeologicalSpace + 
 ∼ N(0, θ2 )
bj ∼ N(µj, τj)
Results: External Institutional Factors on Party Existence &
Success
Statistical output from models estimating the relationship between external supply-
side factors and radical right existence and success are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
Before discussing the results, it is important to note that there are four models predicting
radical right success. The reason for estimating four models is because the ideological
space variable requires calculations from the Party Manifesto Project. This calculation
32Several models were estimated where these specifications were different. No substantively different
results emerged where the models converged.
33Additional models was presented where ideological space was excluded as an independent variable.
This was done due to the fact that the ideological space variable has a lot of missing values, as not all
elections were coded for the Party Manifesto Project.
34In the vote share model, the prior means are µ = (0.043, 0.053, 0.000, 0.031, 0.024, 0.175, -0.000,
-0.027, -0.014, -0.000), and the prior variance are τ = (0.041, 0.023, 0.000, 0.022, 0.019, 0.127, 0.005,
0.008, 0.014, 0.000). In the seat share model, the prior means are µ = (-0.024, 0.122, 0.000, 0.052, 0.029,
0.068, -0.002, -0.027, -0.018, -0.000), and the prior variance are τ = (0.041, 0.024, 0.000, 0.000, 0.019,
0.129, 0.004, 0.008, 0.014, 0.000).
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reduces the number of observations to 120 for both measures of success due to missing
data. Therefore, results from both models are presented in order to compare differences
in outcomes.
Table 3: The Effect of External Supply-Side Factors on Radical Right Existence
Existence
Intercept 0.431
(-0.097, 0.970)
Electoral System (PR) 0.603
(-0.079, 1.286)
Total Seats 0.417∗
(0.116, 0.736)
Split Rules 0.392∗
(0.090, 0.706)
Compulsory Voting 0.401∗
(0.093, 0.734)
Disproportionality -0.149
(-0.466, 0.156)
Effective # of Parties 0.458∗
(0.128, 0.805)
Party Finance Laws -0.180
(-0.477, 0.111)
Ballot Access Laws -0.143
(-0.432, 0.144)
N 289
PRE .147
(0.000, 0.253)
95% credible intervals are in parentheses
∗ indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.
PRE = Proportional Reduction in Error
While reviewing the results, notice the measure of fit scores. On average, the existence
model explains about 14.7% in the variance of radical right parties contested elections
throughout Europe. For the models predicting vote share, the range in explanatory on
average is between 14.5% and 15.3%. In comparison, models predicting the share of the
seats that the radical right party received performs substantially better. On average,
these models explain between 21% and 35.5% in the variance in seat share. The results
conform well with Norris’s (2005) expectation that external factors are more capable of
explaining seat share than vote share.
Output from the model predicting the existence of a radical right party contesting
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seats in a national legislative election reveals theoretically guided results. First, the total
number of seats available for contestation is positively related to the existence of a radical
right party. As the number of seats increase, the expectation that radical right parties will
have a higher propensity to contest seats increases. Second, elections for legislative bodies
that are contested under split rules have a higher probability of witnessing the existence
of a radical right party. As stated, split rules have been known to level the playing field for
smaller parties seeking to obtain some representation in the legislature, while maintaining
some ability for majorities to govern. Finally, the only other variable statistically related
to radical right existence is the effective number of parties in a political system. As the
effective number of parties increases, the probability of the existence of a radical right
party in the election increases.
There were several variables that were thought to be theoretically relevant that had
no statistical impact on radical right existence. The electoral system as a whole does not
dissuade radical right parties from participating in the election. This result is somewhat
surprising given that first-past-the-post electoral systems are thought to create two-party
systems where third-parties have no chance of existence. Perhaps, the electoral system
plays less of a role for radical right party emergence when controlling for the effective
number of parties. The results is made stronger by the fact that the electoral system
and effective number of parties are not correlated. Further, the disproportionality of
the electoral system is not statistically related to radical right existence. Therefore, no
claims can be made that radical right parties are dissuaded from emergence by the uneven
translation of votes to seats. Finally, neither ballot access or party finance laws have a
statistical effect on radical right existence. However, the results suggest that several
variables not related to existence do play a role in determining radical right success.
Results predicting radical right success reveal that there are different external supply-
side factors at play than those that predict emergence. First, electoral system type has
a statistically significant relationship with radical right party success. Obviously, the
result is susceptible to the possibility of endogeneity. The variable is significant across
all models, but was not significant for predicting radical right existence. In particular,
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Table 4: The Effect of External Supply-Side Factors on Radical Right Success
Vote Vote Seat Seat
Share Share Share Share
Intercept 0.005 0.058 0.015∗ -0.002
(-0.023, 0.033) (-0.014, 0.129) (0.000, 0.030) (-0.075, 0.071)
Electoral System (PR) 0.024∗ 0.044∗ 0.042∗ 0.113∗
(0.006, 0.042) (0.002, 0.086) (0.022, 0.061) (0.070, 0.156)
Total Seats -0.000 0.000 -0.005 0.000
(-0.000, 0.000) (-0.000, 0.000) (-0.014, 0.003) (-0.000, 0.000)
Split Rules 0.002 0.028 -0.000 0.044∗
(-0.017, 0.022) (-0.013, 0.069) (-0.009, 0.008) (0.003, 0.086)
Compulsory Voting 0.004 0.021 -0.003 0.027
(-0.016, 0.025) (-0.015, 0.057) (-0.011, 0.005) (-0.009, 0.064)
Disproportionality -0.005 0.069 -0.008 0.033
(-0.098, 0.088) (-0.081, 0.218) (-0.017, 0.000) (-0.117, 0.183)
Effective # of Parties 0.007∗ -0.000 0.016∗ -0.003
(0.003, 0.011) (-0.009, 0.008) (0.007, 0.024) (-0.012, 0.006)
Party Finance Laws -0.006 -0.027∗ -0.006 -0.027∗
(-0.014, 0.002) (-0.042, -0.012) (-0.015, 0.002) (-0.042, -0.012)
Ballot Access Laws -0.017∗ -0.011 -0.012∗ -0.015
(-0.025, -0.008) (-0.037, 0.015) (-0.021, -0.003) (-0.042, 0.012)
Ideological Space NA -0.000 NA -0.001
(-0.002, 0.001) (-0.002, 0.000)
N 289 120 289 120
R2 0.145 0.153 0.210 0.353
(0.120, 0.157) ( 0.097, 0.184) (0.185, 0.222) (0.303, 0.379)
95% credible intervals are in parentheses
∗ indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.
PRE = Proportional Reduction in Error
proportional representation is associated with an increase in radical right vote share and
seat share. It is easy to understand how electoral system formulas could impact seat
share, but here the results indicate that the decision to cast a vote for a radical right
party is also affected by the electoral system. This result contradicts Carter’s (2005)
argument that the electoral system does not effect overall vote share. On average, the
increase in vote share for proportional representation is between 2.4% and 4.4% when
compared to first-past-the-post electoral systems, and an increase of 4.2% to 11.3% for
seat share. The other three variables statistically related to radical right success are not
consistent across models. Model 1 and 3 indicate that the effective number of parties
in an election is related to radical right vote share and seat share. The average effect
is a little less than an increase of 1% per additional party competing in the election.
The effective number of parties variable is significant in the full dataset where ideological
space is not included as an independent variable. Likewise, in model 1 and 3, ballot
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access laws are statistically related to radical right success. In particular, an increase
in the restrictiveness of ballot access laws leads to a decrease in radical right vote share
and seat share. On the other hand, the results of model 2 and 4 indicate that party
finance laws are statistically related to radical right success. Specifically, an increase in
the strictness of party finance laws leads to a decrease in radical right success. The result
indicates that where radical right parties exist, more restrictive ballot access laws could
make it more difficult to obtain a higher overall vote share.
What story do these results tell regarding the direct effect of external supply-side
factors on radical right parties? The story here is that there are specific electoral rules
that might dissuade radical right parties from emerging and participating. In particular,
rules dealing with how many seats are contested and filled, voter mandates, and the
number of parties available in the electoral market increase the probability of a radical
right party contesting seats. On the other hand, more broad electoral rules effect radical
right success. For instance, electoral system type effects whether it is rational to vote
for a radical right party, as well as the translation of votes to seats. In addition, laws
targeted at candidate behavior also appear to impact radical right success. Party finance
and ballot access laws could be putting radical right parties and candidates.
In sum, countries seeking to limit the existence and success of radical right parties
would be wise to make electoral laws that guide candidate behavior and the number of
relevant parties. For example, strict party finance and ballot access laws put smaller
parties at a disadvantage due to the inability to compete financially or evolve into a
professional party. Further, electoral rules that limit the number of parties, such as first-
past-the-post electoral systems, could make casting a vote for a radical right party the
same as wasting a vote.
Internal Supply-Side Factors
Internal supply-side factors encompass the qualities that are chosen by the political
party in order to best compete in the political market. Mudde (2007) states this best
when he says that, “irrespective of how favorable the breeding ground and the political
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opportunity structure might be to new political parties, they merely present actors with
a series of possibilities” (256). Kitschelt (1995) also emphases that the choices of rightist
entrepreneurs and parties matter for success. He states that “politicians may face a fa-
vorable opportunity structure but fail to create strategies that enhance their power at the
polls and in legislatures.” Meaning, parties must decide the course of action that will best
lead to success while taking into account the existing constraints. Stated clearly, parties
play a significant role in their prospects for success. This section posits hypotheses for
the effect that internal supply-side factors have on success, operationalizes these factors,
and then provides empirical testing.
Party Message
The most important, and widely acknowledged, internal supply side factor is the
party’s ideology/message. Hainsworth (2000) makes a convincing argument that parties
that are able to distance themselves from the ideas of the historically extreme parties on
the ideological spectrum tend to be the most successful in Europe. Further, Golder (2003)
points out that it is important to distinguish between parties on the right because their
fortunes depend on the extremity of their ideology. van Holsteyn, Irwin and den Ridder
(2003) provide an example of the importance in party messages by demonstrating that
the Netherlands’ List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) strategically placed themselves in ideologically
moderate, unoccupied spaces. By constructing a moderate and flexible ideology, LPF
was able to go from political newcomer to legitimate competitor.
The party’s ideology matters immensely in terms of success because vote choice is
predicated on a voter’s closeness to the ideology of the party. If radical right parties
are adopting ideologies that are so extreme that voters do not hold the same beliefs,
than these parties should not witness any success. In addition, parties would be wise to
locate themselves on an ideological spectrum where there is a sizable segment of otherwise
unrepresented voters. Overall, it will be important to test whether there is an overall effect
of ideology without accounting for the distribution of voters. It will also be important to
understand whether there is a specific ideologically extreme threshold that radical right
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parties are not able to surpass if they want to achieve success.
Organizational Structure
Political parties tend to organize based on contrasting incentives and goals. Since
Olson’s (1965) piece discussing the collective action problem, scholars have sought to un-
derstand the organizational structure of parties. Wilson (1974) has argued that there are
three types of parties: machines, purposive, and solidarity. The three types of parties are
organized based on their dominant goal. However, Mu¨ller and Strøm (1999) argue rather
convincingly that contemporary political parties are guided by interacting goals. These
goals include a desire to win votes, a desire to win office, and a desire to implement
policy. For this reason, most parties today are similar in overall structure. However,
there is one major organizational feature which parties commonly differ. Mudde (2007)
argues that parties differ on the centralization of party organization, and that centralized
parties are better able to enhance party cohesion and leadership stability. The author ar-
gues that without these features, other parties will not take radical right parties seriously
and voters will refuse to support them. Carter (2005) agrees with this argument. The
scholar argues that centralized organizational structures are better able to enforce party
discipline. When party discipline is enforced, radical right parties are able to do better
at the polls. Zaslove (2004) mentions that most radical right parties have implemented
a hierarchical structure, and that this structure is able to control party members’ activi-
ties. Therefore, the expectation is that decentralized radical right parties should not be
able to enforce the type of party discipline necessary for success. As a final point, any
discussion of organization would not be complete without at least mentioning Panebianco
(1988). The conclusions reached by the author regarding the importance of structures
that maintain internal cohesion are not lost on this study. Unfortunately, longitudinal
quantitative codings over multiple years of Panebianco’s (1988) qualitative analyses were
not feasible here.
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Professionalization
Closely related to organizational structure is the level of professionalization that a
party exhibits. Kitschelt (1995) was one of the first scholars to recognize that radical
right parties moving towards professionalization appeared to be more successful. For
instance, Copsey (2008) demonstrates how the British National Party (BNP) was able to
achieve success by vetting candidate backgrounds and building professional networks for
donations. No where is professionalization more important and salient than determining
a party’s leadership. Professional parties have democratic leadership structures that are
responsive to important movements within the party. For radical right parties, one would
expect that party professionalization sends a signal to voters that the party is able to
represent their needs. One of the most important concerns when voting for a fringe party
is whether the party will be able to govern once elected. Increased professionalization
sends a strong signal that the party could govern if given the chance.
Leadership
In political science, no explanatory variable gains more attention than the role of
leadership. There is no doubt that political entrepreneurs are able to induce outcomes
ranging from successful election bids to revolution. Due to the difficulty of measuring
leadership, several qualitative studies have been better equipped to dissect the role that
leadership plays in determining radical right success. Using interviews with French FN
members, DeClair (1999) highlights how Jean-Marie Le Pen was successful in making the
party more professionalized. Further, Zaslove (2004) points out that some of the most
successful radical right parties contain charismatic leaders. Still, another example is how
Nick Griffin of the BNP was able to modernize the party from an unelectable band of neo-
nazis to a more moderated party concerned with worke’s issues (Copsey 2008). Indeed,
there are countless examples of political entrepreneurs taking advantage of a favorable
opportunity structure.
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Operationalization: Internal Supply-Side Factors
The operationalization of internal supply-side factors was difficult due to a lack of
data over multiple years and the inherent difficulty in operationalizing specific party fea-
tures. In all, there were five internal supply-side variables included in the final statistical
analysis.35 First, party experience is measured as the number of years a party had been
in existence since the official creation/registration of the political party.36
Second, party ideology was included in order to determine whether the extremity of
the party’s ideology positively or negatively impacts success. In other words, this variable
is meant to test whether very ideologically extreme parties really do perform worse in
elections. The ideological value utilized in the analysis is taken from the Party Manifesto
Project’s coding of the “rile” variable (Volkens et al. 2014). The “rile” variable is a
numeric left-right coding of the parties’ overall ideology.37 Originally, a dummy variable
was included that indicated whether the radical right party was the furthest party to the
right in the election.38 Unfortunately, a high correlation of .589 with the ideology variable
led to model convergence problematic. In turn, the dummy variable was dropped in favor
of the ideology variable, which contains more substantive information.
Two internal supply-side variables explored overall party attributes. The first vari-
able, party professionalization, was coded as a binary variable. If a party has a democratic
leadership structure it was coded a one, and if the party had no means of electing lead-
ership it was coded a zero.39 The other party attribute variable was party organizational
structure. The variable was coded as a zero if the structure is decentralized and the party
operates distinctively at different levels of government. The variable was coded as a one
35Previous attempts at statistical modeling included additional aspects related to party organization.
For instance, an attempt was made to include party membership size, which is a theme throughout Katz
and Mair (1994). However, there was an absence of data over multiple years.
36The number of years a party had been in existence ranged from one to 52 (Austrian Freedom Party).
The mean number of years was 14.69. The highest correlation between the year variable and any other
independent variable was .378 (organization).
37The variable ranges from a value of -8.59 (Pure Party of Rights - 2000) to 57.34 (Pure Party of
Rights - 2007). The mean of the variable is 17.34. The variable did not correlate higher than .189 with
any other independent variables.
38In the original dataset, 42.06% of radical right parties were the furthest right party ideologically in
the election.
39In the dataset, 80.83% of radical right parties had a democratic leadership structure in place. The
highest correlation between the party professionalization variable and any other independent variable
was .3 (leadership).
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if the party is centralized; meaning that decisions at all levels of government are made
by party leadership. Finally, the variable was coded a two if there is an individualistic
organizational structure where a dynamic leader runs the party.40
The final internal supply-side variable included for empirical testing, and the most dif-
ficult variable to operationalize, was party leadership. Political scientists commonly refer
to leadership as an important explanatory variable for a number of outcomes including
party success. Quantifying leadership is a difficult endeavor with several potential pit-
falls. Indeed, qualitative research has been more effective at teasing out the importance
of party leadership in electoral outcomes. Here, party leadership is quantified using the
party leader’s level of electoral experience. Quantitative research has long been quanti-
fying leadership based on the experience of the politician (Abbott and Rogowsky 1971).
The coding scheme for the variable is presented in Table 5.41 The variable attempts to
quantify the political success and entrepreneurship of the radical right party. Of course,
there are likely other ways to measure leadership, but given the time-period under review
this way was the most realistic.42
Table 5: Leadership Coding
Leader Experience Numeric Value
No Experience 0
State and Local Office (previously held) 1
European Parliament (previously held) 2
National Office (previously held) 3
State and Local Office 4
European Parliament 5
National Office 6
40In the dataset, 21.16% of the parties had a decentralized organizational structure, 65.83% had a
centralized organizational structure, and 12.5% had an individualistic organizational structure. The
highest correlation between party organizational structure and any other independent variable was .378
(organization).
41In the dataset, 20.83% of radical right leaders had no prior experience holding elected office, 3.33%
previously held office at the state or local level, 15.83% currently hold office at the state or local level,
25.83% currently hold office at the European Parliament level, and 34.17% currently hold office at the
national level.
42When the variable is left categorical the substantive result that arises is that previously holding state
and local office leads to an increase in vote share. However, the result is not very robust given the small
number of cases (4) in the category.
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Method and Dependent Variable
In order to test for the effect of internal supply-side factors on radical right success,
radical right vote share and seat share are used as the dependent variables. Similarly, a
Bayesian linear regression model utilizing the MCMC method is estimated here where the
prior means and variance are set as the coefficients and standard errors of an estimated
frequentist regression model.43 The original frequentist results conformed with theoretical
expectations. The models were estimated using a burnin 500,000, and a sample of 200,000
thinned by 25.44 Plots of the distributions for the chains confirmed that the distributions
overlapped, and the chains passed all model convergence criteria discussed previously.
The model equations are presented here:45
RadicalRightSuccess = α + β1Years + β2Party Ideology
+ β3PartyProfessionalization + β4OrganizationalStructure
+ β5PartyLeadership + 
 ∼ N(0, θ2 )
bj ∼ N(µj, τj)
43Again, several models were estimated where the prior means and variance were specified differently.
Where model convergence occurred, there were no substantively different results.
44Similarly, additional models were estimated where the number of burnin, sampling, and thinning
was changed. However, no substantively different results arose where significant.
45In the vote share model, the prior means are µ = 0.05, 0.001, 0.000, 0.033, -0.021, 0.011), and the
prior variance are τ = (0.02, 0.001, 0.000, 0.016, 0.011, 0.003). In the seat share model, the prior means
are µ = (0.077, 0.001, -0.000, 0.04, -0.031, -0.000), and the prior variance are τ = (0.025, 0.000, 0.000,
0.02, 0.014, 0.003).
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Results: Effect of Internal Party Factors on Radical Right Suc-
cess
Table 6 presents the results of the model estimating the relationship between internal
supply-side factors and radical right success. The R2 statistic reveals that the vote share
model predicts 19.2% of the variance in radical right success across elections, while the
seat share model predicts 13% of the variance. There were two variables in the models
that were not significantly related to success. First, a party’s ideology does not necessarily
determine the level of electoral success the party will achieve. The result may be surprising
due to the fact that extreme ideologies are not seen as electorally viable. However, this
model does not take into account the distribution of voter ideology present in an election.
Therefore, the explanation could simply be that extreme ideologies are only electorally
damaging when a distribution of voters is absent on that ideological position. Second,
party leadership, measured as party leadership experience, does not have a statistical
relationship with radical right success. Future research could test the importance of
leadership through more in-depth qualitative research.
Table 6: The Effect of Internal Supply-Side Factors on Radical Right Success
Vote Share Seat Share
Intercept 0.062∗ 0.078∗
(0.023, 0.101) (0.031, 0.125)
Years 0.001∗ 0.001
(0.000, 0.002) (-0.000, 0.002)
Party Ideology 0.000 -0.000
(-0.000, 0.001) (-0.001, 0.001)
Party Professionalization 0.032∗ 0.039∗
(0.000, 0.063) (0.001, 0.077)
Organizational Structure -0.022 -0.031∗
(-0.044, 0.000) (-0.058, -0.005)
Party Leadership 0.001 -0.000
(-0.004, 0.007) (-0.007, 0.006)
N 120 120
R2 0.192 0.130
(0.144, 0.209) (0.082, 0.149)
95% credible intervals are in parentheses
∗ indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.
Three internal supply-side variables that had a statistical relationship with radical
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right success. The number of years a radical right party has been in existence is statisti-
cally related to success. The year variable attempts to capture a combination of qualities
related to experience or notoriety. However, the substantive effect is fairly weak. For
every year in existence, a radical right party gains on average around .1% more in vote
share. Therefore, it would take around ten years for a radical right party to gain a 1%
increase. On the other hand, party professionalization has a much larger substantive
impact on radical right success. The coefficient indicates that a professional party with
a democratic leadership structure receives, on average, an increase of around 3.2% in
vote share when compared to radical right parties with no professional party leadership
organizations. Further, a professional party would receive on average an increase of 3.9%
in seat share. The final statistically significant variable is organizational structure. For
radical right parties, centralized and decentralized organizations produce the same rela-
tive levels of success. In contrast, those parties with personalistic structures can expect
to obtain significantly fewer seats than decentralized parties.
Conclusion
This research agenda examined the effect of external and internal supply-side factors
have on radical right existence and success. Previous research has explored the statistical
effect of one, or a small combination of these factors, but no research to date has system-
atically tested all theoretically relevant factors. For external factors, previous research
has not explored both radical right existence and success under the assumption that
different external factors could have differing substantive effects on these two outcomes.
Instead, previous research has assumed that the same external factors effect emergence
and success to similar degrees. By relaxing this assumption and testing for individual
effects, this research has shown that differing effects exist. There are external factors that
effect emergence but not success, and vice versa.
The major findings of this research are threefold. First, particular electoral rules have
a statistical relationship with the absence of a radical right party contesting seats in an
election. Rather surprisingly, bans on extreme parties do not prevent radical right parties
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from existing, and compulsory voting is positively associated with the presence of radical
right parties. The idea that bans do more harm than good runs counter to the literature,
and is a notion that elected policy-makers should consider if they want to prevent radical
right parties. Second, radical right success is more of a function of the overall electoral
system and rules targeting candidates than it is a function of particularized electoral rules.
Rules targeting candidate behavior and guiding the overall electoral tone dictate success.
Finally, factors internal to the party matter in terms of success. Party professionalization,
organizational structure, and experience do play a role in determining the vote and seat
share received by radical right parties.
The next step to take moving forward would be to test for the relationship between
external and internal factors. Meaning, that research should seek to uncover whether
internal factors are the product of values for specific external factors. For instance,
one may want to know whether party professionalization is a function of electoral rules
handicapping the ability of parties to organize elections freely. Further, statistical opera-
tionalization of internal factors is lacking in the literature, and future studies should seek
to find better measures for internal party factors.
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Chapter 3
The Relationship Between External and
Internal Factors
“We identified ourselves as right-wing radicals first. And now, the big main-
stream party is radicalizing.” (Jobbik Supporter, Lajos Deak 2015)
“They stole this issue. But if it was a good idea, then why not steal it? Even
if Jobbik hadn’t said it first, I think our prime minister would have done the
same.”(Hungarian Graduate Student, Istvan Kiss 2015)
The quotes above derive from a recent development in Hungarian politics where the
mainstream governing conservative party is co-opting a large segment of the radical right
party’s political platform (Frayer 2015). Hungary’s radical right party, Jobbik, is wit-
nessing their restrictive stance on immigration being adopted by the Fidesz - Hungarian
Civic Alliance, which is the ruling mainstream conservative party/coalition. The situa-
tion has led Jobbik politicians and supporters to voice their anger over the “stealing” of
their platform. The question is why would Jobbik complain that a governing party in the
position to implement new policy is adopting the policy positions that they so staunchly
advocate?
The question appears perplexing at first glance, but a closer exploration into the
goals of the party elucidate an answer. Mu¨ller and Strøm (1999) argue that parties must
balance three often conflicting goals: policy-seeking, office-seeking, and vote-seeking. In
66
this situation, Jobbik members are recognizing that policy success at the hands of the
ruling party would mean less relevance for their party. Voters seeking Jobbik’s particularly
harsh stance on immigration would have a more reputable and successful political party
towards which to shift their support. Such a shift could result in the need for Jobbik to
alter its tactics or strategies for success.
This narrative illustrates a situation where external supply-side factors outside of a
radical right party’s control could cause a significant shift in a party’s internal supply-
side factors. For instance, if the ruling party in Hungary is able to successfully co-opt
Jobbik’s anti-immigrant platform, then Jobbik may need to shift their ideology in order
to distinguish themselves to voters. The particular impact of external supply-side factors
on internal-supply side factors is the focus of this chapter. Here, Bayesian statistical
models and the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method are utilized in order to estimate
the precise impact that several prominent external supply-side factors have on four key
internal supply-side factors: leadership, organizational structure, professionalization, and
party ideology. The major finding is that candidate-centered electoral laws shift the
party’s internal composition.
Theory - Individual Relationships
Factors internal to the party make a significant difference in determining a radical
right party’s level of success. Internal supply-side factors encompass the qualities that
are chosen by the political party in order to best compete in the political market. Mudde
(2007) states this best when he says that, irrespective of how favorable the breeding
ground and the political opportunity structure might be to new political parties, these
factors merely present actors with a series of possibilities (256). Carter (2005) argues
that radical right parties are “masters of their own success.” The authors goes on to state
that:
“That is, regardless of the political environment in which they operate and
regardless of the institutional contexts within which they find themselves,
their electoral success will depend, in part, on the ideology they espouse and
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the policies they put forward, and on the way in which they are organized
and led.” (Carter 2005: 13)
Stated clearly, parties play a significant role in their prospects for success. However,
external supply-side factors (i.e. political opportunity structure) may play a large role in
limiting the range of acceptable strategies to achieve success.
The previous chapter demonstrated that party professionalization and organizational
structure are correlated with success. In particular, these aspects are related to the vote
and seat shares that a party receives in an election. Further, the number of years a party
has been in existence is also a predictor of vote share. While it is clear that internal
factors matter for party success, the determinants of these factors remain nebulous.
The relationship between external and internal supply-side factors is one that has not
been empirically explored in the literature. Instead, the literature tends to acknowledge
the fact that external factors may limit the availability of certain internal factors, but
does not specifically test for a relationship. Assuming that parties are actors who take
advantage of the political opportunity structure available to them, one would expect
specific external factors to be correlated with certain internal factors. If this relationship
exists, there should be a trend where parties systematically choose the best strategy,
given the institutional structures, in order to achieve success.
The easiest way to demonstrate how external supply-side factors could impact an
internal supply-side variable would be to explore party ideology in-depth. Downs (1957)
describes the logic of voting as a citizen casting a vote for the party that is closest to them
on an ideological scale. The caveat to this basic logic is that the voter must view the
party as having a legitimate shot at winning government (Downs 1957: 36-50). Therefore,
Downs (1957) hypothesizes that parties develop political ideologies mainly as a way of
securing votes.
What is important to note here is that parties are not selecting a political party
ideology arbitrarily. Rather, the institutional structure that exists influences the party’s
selection of a political ideology. For instance, Duverger (1972) and Riker (1986) discuss
how plurality/first-past-the-post electoral rules inevitably lead to a two-party system.
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Riker (1986) indicates that plurality electoral rules underrepresent losing parties when
translating votes to seats. As a result, citizens choose not to vote for third-parties because
they do not want to waste their vote. In this situation, a radical right party could locate
itself anywhere on the far right of an ideological spectrum and the result would be similar.
The radical right party would only receive a small proportion of the vote from protest
voters. As stated, the important assumption of ideological spatial models is that citizens
will cast a vote for the party that is closest to their ideal ideological position if that party
has a legitimate shot at winning. Thus, one could predict which party a citizen would be
most likely to cast a vote in favor based on the structure of electoral rules.
Figure 4: Pure Plurality Electoral System
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Figure 4 illustrates a symmetric, uni-modal distribution of voters in a pure plurality
electoral system. In a plurality electoral system, a party must receive 50% plus 1 vote
in order to capture a seat. Therefore, there is a tendency in these electoral systems for
parties to converge on the median voter in order to win a plurality of the vote share. In
Figure 4, citizens to the left of Party A on the ideological spectrum will vote for Party
A, and citizens to the right of Party B on the ideological spectrum will vote for Party B.
The fight between the two parties is over who can capture the median in order to win
a plurality. In this scenario, even if a radical right party positions itself to the far right
of Party B where a distribution of voters is located, voters located near the radical right
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party would still be rational to vote for Party B. This relationship exists because the
radical right party has no real shot at winning the election due to the plurality system’s
mechanical discrepancy when converting votes to seats. Therefore, rational voters would
choose to vote for one of the parties that is closest to them and has a chance of winning
(i.e. Party B). Of course, there will be voters that continue to cast a vote for the radical
right party despite this mechanical discrepancy. However, the proportion of voters that
continue to “waste” their vote is minuscule when surveying radical right vote share in
plurality systems.
Figure 5: Pure Proportional Representation Electoral System
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In comparison, parties in proportional representation electoral systems have greater
flexibility to choose where to position themselves ideologically. To convey this arrange-
ment, Figure 5 displays a symmetric, uni-modal distribution in a pure proportional rep-
resentation electoral system. The figure has parties positioned equidistant away from
each other within the distribution of voters. In this scenario, Party A would capture the
voters between the furthest left voter in the distribution and cut-point 1, Party B would
capture the voters between cut-point 1 and the median voter, Party C would capture
the voters between the median voter and cut-point 2, and the radical right party would
capture the voters between cut-point 2 and the furthest right voter. What is important
to point out here is that party positioning is important. If radical right parties become
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more extreme in ideology and moves to the right on the ideological spectrum, cut-point
2 also shifts. This shift means that the radical right party is able to capture fewer voters.
The result exists because the movement of the cut-point further to the right means that
Party C will have a greater number of voters under the distribution.
Figure 6: Radical Right Space
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Similarly, the ideological space that competitor parties choose to occupy has an effect
on radical right parties. In particular, the position that mainstream conservative (i.e.
center-right) parties choose to occupy limits the available space for a radical right party
to locate on the spectrum. Figure 6 graphically displays this situation. As a mainstream
party shifts its ideological position towards the extreme end of the right spectrum, the
radical right party is given less available space to occupy. The result of such a scenario
would be that there are fewer citizens available to vote for the radical right party. Thus,
it makes sense why supporters of Jobbik would be upset that part of their ideological
platform is being co-opted by the mainstream right. Supporters are upset because the
mainstream right is squeezing the amount of supporters that Jobbik could hope to retain.
The examples provided above convey simplistic models of possible scenarios that could
occur in pure plurality and proportional representation electoral systems. However, it is
important to note that particular electoral rules contained within the overall electoral
system have large variation across countries. The electoral rule differences could have
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varying impact on party location. In addition, it is most certainly the case that a sym-
metric, uni-modal distribution of voters does not exist across country electorates (see,
Appendix for multi-modal distribution example). The examples are in no way intended
to represent the norm for party and citizen ideological positioning. However, these ex-
amples are useful for conveying the underlying logic behind external supply-side factors
having an effect on an internal supply-side factor (i.e. party ideology).
The idea that parties adjust their internal factors in order to achieve success is not a
new one. Schattschneider (1942) proposes that parties must be flexible in design in order
to achieve their electoral goals. Further, Aldrich (2011) discusses how parties are initially
organized in order to achieve the collective goal of winning office. Mu¨ller and Strøm (1999)
specifically point out that political institutions restrict party behavior (internal factors) in
two ways: directly and indirectly. Directly, party leaders face varying incentive structures
in different institutional settings. Indirectly, electoral rules may influence different types
of party organizational designs. Here, the empirical analysis tests whether several external
factors have an effect on four major internal party factors as an initial inquiry into this
topic.
Method
The empirical analyses utilize Bayesian statistical models and the Markov Chain
Monte Carlo method for estimating the impact of external supply-side factors on in-
ternal factors. A total of four models that were estimated. Two Bayesian ordered logistic
regression models were estimated in order to test for the effect of external factors on
party leadership and organizational structure.46 Party leadership is quantified as the
party leader’s electoral experience.47 The variable attempts to quantify the political suc-
46Prior variance for each variable was set at multivariate normal with the mean vector equalling zero
and a precision matrix that is diagonal. The prior means for each variable were set at zero. The model
presented here was estimated by using a burnin of 100,000, and a sample of 100,000 that was thinned
by 10. The models passed all convergence criteria.
47The variable is coded a zero for no experience, one for previously held state and local office, two for
previously held EP office, three for previously held national office, four for currently holding state and
local office, five for currently holding EP office, and six for currently holding national office.
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cess and entrepreneurship of the radical right party.48 Organizational structure is coded
into three categories: decentralized, centralized, and individualistic structures.49 Third,
a Bayesian binary regression model was estimated in order to test the effect that exter-
nal factors have on party professionalization.50 Professionalization is measured based on
whether the party has a democratic leadership structure.51 Finally, a Bayesian linear
regression model was estimated in order to test the effect of external factors on party
ideology.52 The ideological value is taken from the Party Manifesto Project’s coding of
the “rile” variable (Volkens et al. 2014). The “rile” variable is a numeric left-right coding
of the parties’ overall ideology.53 The independent variables include all of the external
factors included in the previous chapter. The base equation for the models estimated in
this analysis is presented below:
48In the dataset, 20.83% of radical right leaders had no prior experience holding elected office, 3.33%
previously held office at the state or local level, 15.83% currently hold office at the state or local level,
25.83% currently hold office at the European Parliament level, and 34.17% currently hold office at the
national level.
49In the dataset, 21.16% of the parties had a decentralized organizational structure, 65.83% had a
centralized organizational structure, and 12.5% had an individualistic organizational structure. The
highest correlation between party organizational structure and any other independent variable was .378
(organization).
50Prior variance for each variable was set at multivariate normal with the mean vector equalling zero
and a precision matrix that is diagonal. The prior means for each variable were set at zero. The model
presented here was estimated by using a burnin of 100,000, and a sample of 200,000 that was thinned
by 5. The models passed all convergence criteria.
51In the dataset, 80.83% of radical right parties had a democratic leadership structure in place. The
highest correlation between the party professionalization variable and any other independent variable
was .3 (leadership).
52Prior variance for each variable was set as the standard errors for the frequentist version of the model.
The prior means for each variable were set as the coefficients for each variable. The model presented
here was estimated by using a burnin of 500,000, and a sample of 200,000 that was thinned by 25. The
models passed all convergence criteria.
53The variable ranges from a value of -8.59 (Pure Party of Rights - 2000) to 57.34 (Pure Party of
Rights - 2007). The mean of the variable is 17.34. The variable did not correlate higher than .189 with
any other independent variables.
73
log
(
Pr(Internal Party Factor < j)
1− Pr(Internal Party Factor < j)
)
= τj − µ
= β0 + β1Electoral System + β2Total Seats
+ β3Split Rules + β4Compulsory Voting
+ β5Electoral System Disproportionality
+ β6Effective # Parties + β7Finance Laws
+ β8Ballot Access + β9Ideological Space
Results
The model outputs from the four Bayesian regression models are presented in Table
7.54 First, the model predicting leadership contains one significant variable. Further, the
model output indicates that dependent variable’s categories are statistically different from
one another. The external supply-side variable that is related to radical right leadership
is ballot access. The restrictiveness of ballot access laws are negatively related to radical
right leadership experience. Meaning, that as ballot access laws become more restrictive,
the experience of radical right leaders is lower. Theoretically, it makes sense that radical
right leaders would have less experience winning public office when ballot access laws are
stricter.
54The Bayesian models were estimated in JAGS version 3.4.0. The models were estimated in R version
3.1.3 on a MAC running OS X 10.10.3. In regards to model convergence, each parameter for both chains
passed Gelman and Rubin, Geweke, and Heidelberger and Welch tests. The Gelman and Rubin test
statistics gave a potential scale reduction factor of 1 for all parameters; indicating there was no need to
run the chains longer to improve convergence of the stationarity distribution. The Geweke diagnostic
test statistics indicated that the means of the parameters from two different locations in the chains
converged to a standard normal distribution. All parameters passed the stationarity and half-width tests
of the Heidelberger and Welch test. In addition, trace plots of the Markov chains showed that there was
no trending present for the chains, or for the individual parameters of each chain. Lastly, density plots
conveyed that the distribution of the posterior parameters were normally distributed.
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Table 7: The Effect of External Supply-Side Factors on Internal Factors
Org. Profession Party
Leadership Structure -alization Ideology
Intercept NA NA 2.494 0.010
(1.018, 4.111) (-0.135, 0.155)
Electoral 0.058 -1.125 -1.126 -0.052
System (PR) (-1.205, 1.328) (-2.633, 0.359) (-2.800, 0.453) (-0.232, 0.129)
Total 0.249 0.303 0.073 0.078
Seats (-0.131, 0.635) (-0.153, 0.766) (-0.456, 0.620) (-0.043, 0.199)
Split -0.117 -0.381 0.141 0.184∗
Rules (-0.615, 0.382) -0.987, 0.213) (-0.538, 0.852) (0.029, 0.339)
Compulsory 0.300 0.193 NA -0.072
Voting (-0.118, 0.719) (-0.249, 0.645) (-0.199, 0.055)
Electoral System 0.293 0.079 -0.572 -0.073
Disproportionality (-0.140, 0.748) (-0.367, 0.529) (-1.304, 0.075) (-0.198, 0.052)
Effective # 0.009 0.092 0.651 0.116
of Parties (-0.505, 0.522) (-0.501, 0.693) (-0.094, 1.466) (-0.048, 0.281)
Finance 0.333 0.223 -0.669 -0.144∗
Laws (-0.126, 0.796) (-0.273, 0.722) (-1.454, 0.041) (-0.278, -0.010)
Ballot Access -0.797∗ 1.220∗ -0.386 0.019
Laws (-1.619, -0.022) (0.289, 2.166) (-1.451, 0.746) (-0.153, 0.191)
Ideological -0.266 -0.362 -0.186 0.713∗
Space (-0.777, 0.257) (-0.888, 0.154) (-0.779, 0.407) (0.567, 0.859)
Cut-point 1 -1.543∗ -1.603∗ NA NA
(-2.040, -1.078) (-2.146, -1.102)
Cut-point 2 -1.289∗ 2.530∗ NA NA
(-1.755, -0.848) (1.889, 3.251)
Cut-point 3 -0.438∗ NA NA NA
(-0.842, -0.043)
Cut-point 4 0.762∗ NA NA NA
(0.358, 1.179)
N 120 120 120 120
PCP 0.221 0.294 NA NA
(0.192, 0.375) (0.208, 0.423)
PRE NA NA -0.087 NA
(-0.348, 0.130)
R2 NA NA NA 0.412
(0.382, 0.426)
∗ indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.
95% credible intervals are in parentheses
PCP = Percent Correctly Predicted; PRE = Proportional Reduction in Error
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Output for the model predicting a radical right party’s organizational structure are
presented in the second column. Again, the dependent variable’s categories are statis-
tically different from one another. Further, the restrictiveness of ballot access laws are
positively correlated with organizational structure. In particular, as the restrictiveness in
ballot access laws increases, the probability that the radical right party’s organizational
structure is centralized or personalistic also increases. The result makes sense theoreti-
cally because strict ballot access laws would create a need for a strong centralized party
that could organize candidate requirements. On the other hand, party professionalization
is not effected by any of the external factors in the model.
Lastly, in the model exploring a radical right party’s political ideology, there are
three significant variables. First, elections operating under split rules in order to elect
a legislature lead to an increase in the extremity of a radical right party’s ideology. A
possible explanation for the result is that split rule elections allow parties to contest
a number of seats for a legislature under proportional representation. Therefore, these
systems do not necessarily lead to two political parties converging on the median voter.
Instead, a radical right party could stake out a position on the right end of the political
spectrum and obtain voters from a distribution of voters located in that area. Citizens
will not view the allocation of a vote to a radical right party as irrational since the
party could realistically obtain a seat under these rules. Second, party finance laws
are negatively correlated with party ideology. As the strictness of party finance laws
increases, party ideology moderates. The result is not easily explained. However, one
possible explanation is that party’s operating under strict party finance laws must be
well-regulated. Therefore, these parties tend to have less ideologically extreme members
within the party leadership. Instead, these parties are more directed at navigating the
country’s strict electoral rules.
The final variable correlated with party ideology is ideological space. The ideological
space variable explores the space available for a radical right party to locate in order to
collect supporters. The result indicates that as more space is available on the right side
of the spectrum for the party to locate, party ideology becomes more extreme. Since the
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ideological space variable was calculated by taking into account the ideological positions
of the parties participating in the election, and the measure errs on the side of caution
in not overestimating the available space, the result is salient. If there is an increase of
space on the right side of the ideological spectrum in an election for a radical right party
to locate, the party will take advantage of this space in order to distinguish itself from
other right wing parties.
A Full Model of Success
The previous section tested the impact of external supply-side factors on internal
supply-side factors. However, the previous section does not touch upon how these vari-
ables exist in a full model predicting radical right success. Figure 7 displays a theoretical
model for understanding how external and internal factors impact radical right vote and
seat share. Since the complexity of these relationships has not been explored in empirical
research, the figure conveys expectations in an ideal election.
Figure 7: Basic Relationship Between External and Internal Factors
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Figure 7 demonstrates three sets of relationships. The first relationship specifies
that internal party factors directly impact vote share and seat share. In particular,
these internal factors convey to citizens the legitimacy of the party in the election, and
the ideological proximity of the citizen to the party. Second, the figure conveys the
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relationship between external factors and party success. The important aspect to note
here is that not all external supply side factors have an effect on success. In particular,
the effective number of parties, party finance laws, ballot finance laws, and ideological
space do not have a direct effect on success. However, rules specific to the electoral
system do have a a direct effect on success. For instance, electoral system type and
disproportionality have a direct impact on translating votes to seats. If voters know
about a discrepancy in this translation, a rational voter will choose not to vote for a
radical right party. Thus, decreasing the party’s overall vote share. In addition, previous
analyses have demonstrated that compulsory voting is correlated with a higher vote and
seat share. The third relationship demonstrated in the figure is the relationship between
external factors and internal factors. The previous section already tested for the existence
of this relationship. Therefore, the task at hand is to estimate a full model including all
of the external factors and internal factors on our measures of success. The model should
be estimated while excluding external factors that do not directly effect success in order
to avoid co-linearity.55 The models are estimated using Bayesian regression since the
dependent variables are continuous.56 The model equation is presented below:
RadicalRightSuccess = α + β1ElectoralSystem + β2TotalSeats
+ β3SplitRules + β4CompulsoryVoting
+ β5ElectoralSystemDisproportionality
+ β6PartyIdeology + β7PartyProfessionalization
+ β8OrganizationalStructure + β9PartyLeadership + 
 ∼ N(0, θ2 )
55An alternative strategy would be to test for an interactive relationship between external supply-side
variables and internal supply-side variables on success. This strategy would require first estimating a
model that regresses all of the external factors on the measures of success. A second model would be
estimated where all of the internal factors are regressed on success. Finally, the predictive values from
the first two models would need to be saved, and an interactive model would need to be estimated using
these predictions on success. The results of these models are presented in Appendix B. The result was
that the interactive relationships do hold predictive power. However, this method does not necessarily
follow well-grounded theoretical guidance.
56As before, prior means and variance for the parameters were set at the results of frequentist mod-
els (i.e. coefficients and standard errors respectively). Importantly, the models passed all important
convergence criteria.
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Results: Full Models
The results from the full model are presented in Table 8. The first aspect of the results
to compare between the two models are the measure of fit scores (i.e. R2). The model
predicting radical right seat share does substantially better than the model predicting vote
share. Since the variables are scaled to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation
of one, coefficients are comparable within models. The first substantive result is that
electoral system type has the largest effect on both radical right vote share and seat share.
For vote share, radical right parties receive an average increase of 2.2% in proportional
representation systems when compared to plurality systems. For seat share, the average
increase when moving from a plurality system to a proportional representation system
is 4.8%. As stated previously, the electoral system holds significant explanatory power
when calculating the translation of votes to seats.
The second substantive effect is that party characteristics matter in terms of success,
and this relationship holds even when accounting for internal factors. For instance, pro-
fessional parties with a democratic leadership structure can expect an average increase
in vote share of 1.8% and seat share of 1.7%. In addition, parties with individualistic
organizational structures can expect a decrease in vote share of and seat share of around
1.5%. Since the number of citizens in a population that hold extreme right ideological
views tends to be small in most countries, these models help to explain a large amount
of variance without including attitudes. On average, the additive substantive impact of
the variables in the vote share model explain around 5.5% of the variance. Further, on
average, the additive substantive impact of the variables in the seat share model explain
around 8.1% of the variance.
Conclusion
The analyses presented here include the first empirical tests that seek to determine
how electoral rules and other external/institutional supply-side factors constrain char-
acteristics internal to radical right parties. The concluding results are twofold. First,
external supply-side factors do correlate with specific internal party characteristics. For
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Table 8: Full Models: Vote Share & Seat Share
Vote Share Seat Share
Intercept 0.100∗ 0.091∗
(0.088, 0.111) (0.079, 0.103)
Electoral System 0.022∗ 0.048∗
(0.005, 0.039) (0.031, 0.066)
Total Seats -0.001 0.006
(-0.014, 0.013) (-0.008, 0.021)
Split Rules 0.002 0.011
(-0.012, 0.017) (-0.004, 0.025)
Compulsory Voting -0.003 -0.001
(-0.017, 0.011) (-0.016, 0.013)
Electoral System Proportionality 0.007 -0.001
(-0.007, 0.021) (-0.015, 0.014)
Party Ideology 0.012 0.009
(-0.000, 0.025) (-0.005, 0.022)
Professionalization 0.018∗ 0.017∗
(0.005, 0.032) (0.003, 0.031)
Organizational Structure -0.015∗ -0.016∗
(-0.028, -0.002) (-0.029, -0.003)
Leadership 0.007 0.008
(-0.006, 0.020) (-0.006, 0.021)
N 120 120
R2 0.187 0.349
(0.131, 0.216) (0.298, 0.375)
∗ indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.
95% credible intervals are in parentheses
instance, electoral laws targeted at candidates have an impact on leadership and organiza-
tional structure. Theoretically, the result makes sense because strict candidate-centered
laws force the party to be better organized in order to participate in elections. In addi-
tion, party ideology is correlated with both the ideological space available in the electoral
market and electoral rules. The second overarching conclusion is that additive models
including external and internal supply-side models in order to predict success perform rel-
atively well. The additive models predict a relatively large amount of variance in radical
right vote and seat share.
Where to go from here? External and internal supply-side variables represent only a
fraction of the story when exploring the fate of radical right parties. In particular, voters
are crucial to the story. For instance, it is important to understand why voters hold
radical right attitudes, and why a distribution of voters exist in the extreme right end of
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the ideological spectrum. Therefore, subsequent analyses should focus on uncovering the
attitudes correlated with radical right vote choice, as well as exploring the macro-social
forces that create these attitudes.
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Chapter 4
Political Attitudes and Radical Right Vote
Choice
These individuals wanted to, “kill out of xenophobic and anti-state sentiments
all citizens of foreign origin” (German Attorney General, Harald Range 2011)
In November 2011, a group calling themselves the National Socialist Underground was
confronted by German law enforcement officers after a botched bank robbery. German of-
ficials would later uncover that the group was responsible for the murders of at least nine
immigrants. In addition, the group conducted a number of bank robberies and bombings
between 2000 and 2011. The German Attorney General labelled the group a right-wing
extremist group, and in the quote above he indicates that these actions were based on
racial hatred (Range 2011). Upon investigation, the authorities uncovered that the mem-
bers of the group had known ties to skinhead organizations and Germany’s radical right
party, the National Democratic Party (NPD). The finding that members of this extreme
organization have known ties to the NPD, and speculation that the NPD was financing
underground terror networks, led members of the Bundestag to begin calls for a consti-
tutional banishment of the party. Although the banning was ultimately unsuccessful, the
situation brought a higher level of scrutiny to the NPD and its supporters.
While the events that occurred in Germany represent a very extreme situation where
supporters of a radical right party adopted violence and illegal tactics in order to achieve
their preferred outcome, previous research demonstrates that radical right supporters do
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not necessarily hold neo-nazi, fascist, or other ideologically violent beliefs (Norris 2005,
Hainsworth 2008). Instead, scholars argue that these supporters are people that have
grown dissatisfied with mainstream political parties and their ability to handle particu-
larized issues (Ignazi 2003, Givens 2005, Norris 2005, Mudde 2007, Ford and Goodwin
2010). This analysis provides a test in order to uncover the socio-demographic composi-
tion of radical right voters. In addition, this work explores salient attitudes that correlate
with voting for a radical right party. In order to empirically test the demographics and
attitudes that are correlated with radical right vote choice, this research utilizes the Eu-
ropean Social Survey (ESS 2015). The survey was conducted biannually from 2002-2012
for a large majority of European countries. The literature is riddled with conflicting
claims regarding the importance of specific attitudes and demographics for predicting
vote choice. Therefore, this chapter begins by reviewing the literature and providing
expectations. Then, Bayesian binary regression is used to conduct individual-level em-
pirical testing in order to predict vote choice. Finally, the findings are discussed and a
brief conclusion is offered.
Socio-demographics and Radical Right Vote
Is there a particular socio-demographic pattern that emerges when analyzing radical
right voters? The answer to this question has not been very consistent in the literature.
Betz (1994) argues that these voters are typically “floaters” (142). In other words, these
voters are people from all over the ideological spectrum that do not understand the
intricacies of politics, and fall pray to clever demagogues. In addition, Kitschelt (1995)
agrees that there is no one block of voters that give support to radical right parties. The
author goes on to argue that an individual level theories cannot explain the mobilization
of voters for these parties. On the other hand, newer studies have argued that a specific
demographic composition emerges clearly when exploring demographics in large-n studies
on radical right parties (DeClair 1999, Norris 2005, Givens 2005, Arzheimer and Carter
2006, Mudde 2007, Hainsworth 2008). In particular, studies have explored trends related
to age, gender, education, income, and social class. Authors have argued that the erosion
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of traditional social cleavages has led to the emergence of a new distinct social cleavage
when studying radical right voters. The theoretical contributions of these studies are
discussed here.
Age
In the literature, a puzzle exists regarding the relationship between age and radical
right vote choice. The conflict is whether radical right parties acquire their support from
predominately younger or older voters. DeClair (1999) was one of the first scholars to
uncover that radical right parties predominately draw support from younger voters. In
his analysis on the National Front (NF) in France, the DeClair (1999) found that younger
voters tend to be drawn to parties that are outside the older, established mainstream.
Younger voters tend to view mainstream parties as ineffective and the cause of current
problems. The result that younger people tend to vote for the radical right has been
confirmed in subsequent research (Givens 2005, Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Hainsworth
2008). Hainsworth (2008) clarifies his theory by arguing that radical right parties mostly
obtain support from first time voters, and that first time voters tend to be younger.
Therefore, age is not the independent variable, but instead first time participation is the
explanatory factor.
In comparison, a couple of scholars have argued that the relationship between radical
right vote choice and age is actually positive (Norris 2005, Ford and Goodwin 2010).
Norris (2005) found in her large-n study that there is a positive statistically significant
relationship between age and vote choice. Similarly, Ford and Goodwin (2010) determined
that British National Party (BNP) voters were statistically older than voters for all other
parties. The hypothesis provided here is that as age increases, the probability of voting
radical right decreases. Younger voters do not have the political ties to mainstream
parties, and radical right parties are able to paint mainstream parties as perpetuating
the same old problems.
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Gender
Radical right parties tend to be predominately supported by men. Several scholars
have theorized that radical right parties attract male voters (Betz 1994, Kitschelt 1995,
Mudde 2007, 2011), and empirical studies have found that the relationship is statisti-
cally significant (DeClair 1999, Norris 2005, Givens 2005, Arzheimer and Carter 2006,
Hainsworth 2008, Ford and Goodwin 2010, van der Brug et al. 2013, Coffe 2013). Coffe
(2013) provides one of the most in-depth analyses of the gender gap that exists within
supporters of the radical right. The author finds that when accounting for differences in
views of immigrants there is the same probability of voting for a radical right party be-
tween men and women. However, women are much less likely to hold anti-immigrant and
xenophobic attitudes. The author finds that men tend to vote for radical right parties
in higher numbers due to a concern for job security and the maintenance of household
finances. Male voters tend to ascribe uncertainty in the household as being a function
of immigration problems. The expectation is that men will have a higher probability of
voting for the radical right.
Education
The relationship between voting for radical right parties and education is theoretically
straightforward. Radical right voters tend to be at lower levels of education because
these are the voters that are most worried about losing their jobs to immigrants, and are
most susceptible to populist rhetoric. In particular, radical right voters are most likely
to believe that complex political problems could be solved through “common sense”
solutions, which populist rhetoric conveys. Voters at lower education levels are less able
to grasp the idea that even the most basic political problem requires complex solutions
in order to avoid unintended negative consequences. Norris (2005) found that there is a
statistically significant decrease in the probability of voting for a radical right party as
a voter obtains higher levels of education. Relative to middle-levels of education, where
Stefanova (2009) and Oesch (2013) find that radical right parties attract moderately
educated voters, Givens (2005) concludes that both low and middle education levels are
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overrepresented in support for the radical right. In fact, there appears to be consensus in
the literature that these parties attract a majority of their voters from lower education
levels (Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Mudde 2007, Hainsworth 2008, Ford and Goodwin
2010, Mudde 2011, Ivarsflaten and Stubager 2013). Here, it is expected that radical right
voters will be at lower levels of education.
Income
The relationship between income and radical right vote choice follows a trajectory
similar to education level. In fact, the relationship between income and education tends to
be interactive (Fox 2008). Therefore, supporters of radical right parties should tend to be
at lower to middle levels of income. However, income is rarely utilized as an independent
variable for predicting radical right vote choice. The reason for the exclusion of income is
because social class is a much more theoretically grounded variable of interest. However,
several surveys do not include questions that directly tap into social class. Therefore,
income is included here as an independent variable. The use of income would be an
indirect measure for getting at the mechanism that explains voting for the radical right.
One hypothesis that could be presented is that when controlling for education, income is
actually positively related to radical right vote choice. It would not be unreasonable to
presume that individuals at low education levels, but high income levels, are individuals
that would be likely to worry about increased competition for resources.
Social Class
Social class is a difficult concept to operationalize in a world where older, established
political ties are being deconstructed, and new political parties are emerging as a response
to salient (i.e. polarizing) issues. One could argue that the beginning of the New Left
movement in Europe during the 1960s and 1970s led political scientists on an endless
search to classify a number of modern movements that appear to be motivated around
a few narrow issues. In fact, Kitschelt (1995) theorizes that the existence of the radical
right in Europe was in part a reaction to the New Left environmental movements. Never-
86
theless, contemporary literature presents conflicting findings when exploring social class
and radical right vote choice.
Betz (1994) argues that radical right supporters vote with no political loyalties. In-
deed, Norris (2005) and Mudde (2007) make the claim that radical right voters represent
a new class of voters. Mudde (2007) recognizes that radical right voters cut across class
divisions. He states that these voters are overrepresented by two opposing groups: the
self-employed and blue collar workers. Consistent with Mudde (2007), several scholars
point out that blue collar workers appear to predominately vote for the radical right
(Kitschelt 1995, Givens 2005, Stefanova 2009). In comparison, Norris (2005) notes that
manual laborers and the unemployed appear to be overrepresented, while professional and
managerial employees are less likely to vote for the radical right. Hainsworth (2008) also
points to the overrepresentation of unemployed citizens in voting for the radical right.
On the other hand, several scholars simply note that radical right voters tend to be
from the “lower classes” or “working class” (Hainsworth 2008, Bale et al. 2010, van der
Brug et al. 2013, Betz and Meret 2013). For instance, Betz and Meret (2013) argue
that radical right parties owe their success to appealing to lower class voters that prefer a
restrictive position on immigration due to the uncertainty of their economic position. Bale
et al. (2010) point out that radical right voters tend to be from working class backgrounds
that would traditionally be supportive of the center left. However, the scholars note that
external threat and the incitement of specific political attitudes have led to these voters
supporting more radical platforms. Here, one should expect that predominately working
class individuals will be more likely to vote for radical right parties and professionals will
be less likely.
Political Attitudes and Radical Right Vote
The area of radical right scholarship most interesting to political scientists investigates
the attitudes that radical right parties espouse. Understanding voting attitudes is imper-
ative since these parties are considered illiberal, and perhaps dangerous, to liberal demo-
cratic governance. By necessity, full comprehension can only come from understanding
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the extent to which voters support the illiberal policies present in radical right platforms.
In particular, this research is important because it explores whether the main ideological
pillars of radical right parties are present in the general public. Van der Brug and Fen-
nema (2007) point out that recent research has been too focused on supply side factors
only, and that characteristics of citizens need to be brought back to the forefront in order
to fully explain the electoral fortunes of radical right parties. The ideological pillars rep-
resenting radical right parties include: far right positioning, anti-immigrant/xenophobic
attitudes (i.e. nativism), populist/anti-system attitudes, authoritarian attitudes, welfare
chauvinism, neoliberalism, and Euro-skepticism (Betz 1994, Kitschelt 1995, Givens 2005,
Norris 2005, Hainsworth 2008, Mudde 2011).
Ideological Positioning
When a citizen casts a vote for a political party or politician there is a calculation that
occurs where the citizen decides which entity best represents their ideological beliefs or
interests. Downs (1957) was one of the first political scientists to theorize a spatial model
of voting where politicians and parties position themselves on an ideological space in order
to attract votes. In his model, parties strategically place themselves on an ideological
spectrum where a distribution of voters exists. Parties do so in order to give themselves
the best possible prospect of winning election. If a spatial model of voting explains vote
choice, one would expect that people voting for radical right parties are those citizens
that position themselves on the far/extreme right end of the political spectrum.
Givens (2005) found that far right self-placement on an ideological spectrum was
positively correlated with voting for a radical right party. In addition, van der Brug,
Fennema and Tillie (2000) found that voters for these parties are ideologically closer to
radical right parties than any other party in the political market, and that ideological
proximity is the most useful individual-level attribute for predicting vote choice. Mudde
(2007) reiterates that at the micro-level (i.e. individual-level) extreme right ideological
positioning on a left-right scale is predictive of radical right support. However, the author
places much less emphasis on the importance of voter ideology in his analysis.
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In contrast, Hainsworth (2008) argues that most members of and voters for the radical
right do not self-identify as members of the extreme right. Instead, the author claims that
these parties are populist organizations that claim to speak for the people of the nation.
Therefore, voters for radical right parties tend to view themselves as a member of the
“common people.” Thus, these voters do not view themselves as some segment of voters
occupying an extreme placement on the ideological spectrum. In addition, Stefanova
(2009) found that extreme right voters in Bulgarian parliamentary elections tend to be of
centrist ideology. The author argues that other attitudes are more predictive of radical
right vote than a simple ideological spatial relationship, such a xenophobic attitudes.
Here, the hypothesis advanced is that a far-right positioning on a left-right spectrum
increases the probability of voting radical right.
Anti-Immigrant/Xenophobic Attitudes
Several scholars find that there is a relationship between anti-immigrant, xenophobic,
racist attitudinal positions (i.e. nativist positions) and radical right vote choice (van der
Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000b, Kitschelt 1995, van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003, Givens
2005, Mudde 2007, Rydgren 2008, Sprague-Jones 2010, Cutts, Fieldhouse and Russell
2010, Ford and Goodwin 2010, Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2012, Doosje et al. 2013). In
fact, some argue that the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and radical
right vote choice is strong enough as to define these parties as single-issue parties, or
simply, “anti-immigrant parties” (Bos and van der Brug 2010, van der Brug, Fennema,
and Tillie 2000a, and van Spanje 2010). The crux of the argument is that the voters
holding nativist attitudes will vote for radical right parties because these parties are the
only option in the electoral market representing their view on these issues. These issues
include immigration, foreign workers, asylum seekers, and multicultural societies.
A number of studies have empirically demonstrated the predictability power of anti-
immigrant sentiment on radical right vote choice. van Holsteyn and Irwin (2003) found
that in the 2002 Dutch national elections there was a relationship between the belief
that foreigners should adapt to Dutch society and voting for List Pim Fortuyn (LPF).
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Further more, Rydgren (2008) uncovered that the single greatest predictor of radical
right vote choice among several Western European countries (i.e. Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Norway) is immigration skepticism. The result
was replicated in the United Kingdom when Cutts, Fieldhouse and Russell (2010) and
Ford and Goodwin (2010) concluded that high levels of anxiety about immigration led
people to vote for the British National Party (BNP). Cutts, Ford and Goodwin (2011)
even found that the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which is considered
less radical than the BNP, achieved most of its support from voters that had negative
views of immigrants. What is important is that most studies recognize the crucial role
that anti-immigrant sentiment plays in radical right vote choice.
Welfare Chauvinism
The most obvious way that anti-immigrant attitudes manifest themselves is with
strong welfare chauvinistic positions. Welfare chauvinism refers to two positions regarding
the recipients of government benefits. First, the concept refers to the idea that some
people receiving government benefits are abusing the system, and have, in fact, the means
to support themselves. Second, the concept refers to the idea that governmental economic
support should be restricted to certain groups. For radical right parties, government
support and welfare programs should be restricted to native people, or people that the
party identifies as being true natives. These parties advocate that non-native people,
illegal immigrants, and legal immigrants should not have the same access to government
services.
However, it is important to note that welfare chauvinism is not a synonym for market
liberalism. In fact, many radical right parties actively promote protectionist economic
platforms. For instance, the BNP has rallied against European Union (EU) policies that
could negatively impact the British market. In fact, a number of radical right parties
have rallied against EU economic intervention and economic control in their member-
state. Further, radical right parties may not advocate for pro-market privatization and
the rolling back of state economic policies like the 1980s neoconservatives. It would be
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difficult to find a scholar that holistically equates Thatcherism or Reaganism with the
current string of radical right movements. However, some of the same negative portrayals
of “underserving” welfare recipients do exist within radical right parties. The hypothesis
is that increases in welfare chauvinistic attitudes will lead to an increase in the probability
of voting radical right.
Populist Attitudes
Populist individual attitudes and susceptibility to populism in the general public are
illusive concepts that are difficult too operationalize. Mudde (2007) argues that populist
attitudes are a major driving force of voting for the radical right. Pauwels (2010, 2011)
agrees with this assertion and argues that populism should be understood as the idea that
the “pure people” are in conflict with the “corrupt people.” The idea is that the common
people are in conflict with those corrupt politicians that seek to reap the benefits from the
labor of the common folk (Luther 2011). Populism also refers to the idea that politicians
unnecessarily complicate basic political problems in order to inflate the amount of gain
that they are able to extract from the solution. This extraction either occurs through
making the population appear as though the politician is the only one capable of solving
the problem, or through the extraction of benefits within the program itself (e.g. pork).
Usually, these parties advocate for “common sense” solutions to problems, which is even
evident in the United States’ Tea Party movement.
In contrast, several authors define populism under the “politics of discontent” (Ignazi
2003, Norris 2005, Stefanova 2009, Ford and Goodwin 2010, Doosje et al. 2013). In this
view, populism includes discontent or disillusionment with the system and a lack of trust
in the government. This attitude is said to be a function of insecurity with the citizen’s
economic situation (Bornschier and Kriesi 2013). In fact, voting for the radical right has
commonly been attributed as protest voting against the current system (Ignazi 2003).
Ignazi (2003) argues that radical right parties tend to represent people who feel alienated
by the system. In particular, scholars have advocated for the idea that populism could
be understood more clearly as a lack of trust or increased skepticism in the system’s
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institutions. For instance, Norris (2005) found a correlation between having less trust
in governmental institutions and voting for a radical right party. In addition, when
the radical right party is in government, the author found that supporters have more
positive views of government. However, Hainsworth (2008) argues that the opposite
is empirically true; especially in instances where a radical right party joins a coalition
government with a mainstream party. Hainsworth (2008) argues that radical right parties
in government will witness a decrease in support. Nevertheless, it is important to attempt
to capture the extent to which the component attributes of populism, such as anti-
establishment attitudes and skepticism of the political elite, drive radical right vote choice.
The hypothesis is that increases in populist attitudes will lead to an increase in the
probability of voting radical right.
Authoritarian Attitudes
Another major attitudinal position of radical right voters is an authoritarian position
on issues, such as crime. Authoritarianism can be understood as the position that ille-
gal infringements of society should be punished severely, and that punishment is more
important than rehabilitation (Mudde 2007). Rydgren (2013) argues that working class
support for the radical right can be explained by the fact that the working class, on
average, tends to be more socio-culturally authoritarian than other workers. Further,
Ivarsflaten and Stubager (2013) find that citizens with authoritarian values tend to vote
for radical right parties. In particular, the authors argue that through education people
move on the spectrum from authoritarian to libertarian values. When citizens do not
obtain a high level of education they appear to retain a large amount of authoritarian in-
clinations. Indeed, several authors find that authoritarian positions on legal punishment
practices are positively correlated with radical right vote choice (Kitschelt 1995, Givens
2005).
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Debated Characteristics - Neoliberalism & Euro-skepticism
The last two attitudes receive some empirical support in the literature, but are heavily
debated between radical right scholars. First, Betz (1994) argues that radical right voters
hold neoliberal economic positions. The problem with this argument is that welfare-
chauvinism, which is an attitudinal position of these voters that is not debated, does
not necessarily translate into neoliberal economics. However, there is a small amount
of evidence in the literature that voters hold some neoliberal economic positions. For
instance, Norris (2005) finds that these voters seek to roll back the power of the state,
and advocate pro-market economic ideas of privatization and inequality (45). In addition,
some radical right parties, such as the the Progress Party (FrP) in Norway, advocate
strong individualistic platforms. However, it is important to note that individualism and
rolling back the power of the state do not appear to be primary concerns for radical right
parties. Therefore, it would be difficult to imagine that voters are receiving strong cues
from parties about their stances on these issues.
Finally, Euroskepticism is an attitudinal feature that some radical right voters have
been found to possess. The debate over this attitude is whether voters for all radical
right parties hold anti-EU attitudes. Recently, Ford, Goodwin and Cutts (2012) find
that Euroskepticim was the most important driver for the radical right UKIP. However,
Givens (2005) finds mixed results when exploring whether voters for radical right parties
hold negative attitudes towards the EU. Mudde (2007) and Givens (2008) argue that this
perceived Euroskepticism is really just a skepticism of large multi-state organizations
that subvert the power of the state. However, an increase in the EU’s role may lead some
voters to move from mainstream parties to more radical parties. The EU’s handling of
the Euro crisis and other economic hardships could very well lead to an abandonment of
the status quo. It will be interesting to explore whether radical right parties were able
to attract these voters. Again, it is important to note that these last two attitudes are
highly debated in the literature. Nevertheless, previous findings reveal an important area
of inquiry to be explored here.
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Data & Variable Operationalization
The biannual survey data utilized for this analysis includes all six rounds of the
European Social Survey (ESS), which were conducted between 2002-2012 (ESS 2014).57
The dependent variable for the statistical analysis is whether the respondent voted for
the radical right party in their country’s national election.58 The statistical analyses are
separated based on survey round for two reasons. First, the prevalence of radical right
parties obtaining a significantly higher share of the vote and entering government increases
over time. Therefore, individuals might have different incentives to vote for radical right
parties throughout this time period. Second, rotating question modules that are specific
to a given round provide useful information in order to test theoretical constructs. For
example, questions that allow for one to test for the role that welfare chauvinism plays in
radical right vote choice are only included in a special rotating module in the ESS Round
4 (2008).
Operationalizing the socio-demographic variables for the empirical analyses was rela-
tively straightforward. Respondent age was operationalized as the respondent’s current
age when the survey was conducted.59 The respondent’s gender was coded a one for
women and a zero for men.60 Education was operationalized as a continuous variable
coded based on the level achieved and the International Standard Classification of Edu-
cation (ISCE).61 Income was also operationalized as a continuous variable coded based
on the household’s total income after taxes and deductions. In particular, the respondent
was asked to select an income category, and then the variable was recoded to be nu-
meric.62 A variable indicating whether a respondent had been unemployed was created
57It is important to note that there are data limitations. Mainly, surveys were not conducted in every
country for every round (see, ESS methodology for more information).
58The proportion of respondents voting for the radical right party in a given election approximates
the aggregate national results. The mean for the radical right individual vote variable was 8.1%. The
minimum was zero and the maximum was 34.33%.
59The mean age for respondents across surveys was 48.09, the minimum age of a respondent was 18,
and the maximum age was 98.
60The mean percentage of women across surveys was 53.78%.
61Since the question that asks about education was coded based on different standards for the classifi-
cation scheme from 2002-2010, the variable was recoded to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation
of one in order to be comparable across surveys.
62The question that asks about income category was also coded based on a different category scheme
between 2002-2010. For ease of comparison, this variable was also recoded to have a mean of zero and a
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using the question that asks whether a respondent had been unemployed and looking
for work for a period of three months or longer.63 In addition, a variable was created
in order to represent membership in a occupational union. The variable was coded a
one for current or previous union membership, and a zero if the respondent was never
a member of a union.64 In addition to union membership, an occupational variable was
included in the 2008-2012 statistical analyses that looked at type of work. The occupa-
tion variable is intended to capture the social class of the respondent.65 Finally, there
were two variables that were created in order to represent whether the respondent was a
member of what a radical right party would label as an “out-group.” The first variable
represents whether a respondent was born in a different country than the one in which
they are currently residing. The variable is coded a one for foreign-born respondents and
zero otherwise.66 The final variable explores whether the respondent has a parent that
was born in a different country. The variable was coded a one if the respondent has a
parent that is foreign-born, and a zero if both parents were born in the country where
the respondent is currently residing.67
The attitudinal variables utilized in the empirical analyses were constructed in a
number of ways. Ideological positioning was coded based on a simplistic left-right scale
where respondents are directed to self-place where their ideology is located. The scale
ranges from zero to ten, where zero indicates extremely liberal and ten indicates extremely
conservative.68
A variable was created in order to represent the level of anti-immigrant attitudes that
a respondent holds. The variable was created by estimating factor analysis scores based
on responses to five questions that asks about immigrants.69 The first two questions asked
standard deviation of one.
63The mean percentage of people that were unemployed and looking for work for a period of three
months or longer across surveys was 25.84%.
64The mean percentage of union membership across surveys was 45.59%.
65The respondent’s choices were private firm, local government, public sector job, state owned enter-
prise, or other.
66The mean percentage of foreign-born respondents across surveys was 8.35%.
67The mean percentage of respondents across surveys that had at least one parent that was foreign-born
was 14.71%.
68The mean self-placed ideological location on the left-right spectrum was 5.084 across surveys.
69The average Cronbach Alpha score across surveys was .808. The average proportion of the variance
explained across surveys with one factor loading was .547. The average calculation for the squared
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about the acceptable level of immigration into the country from different race or ethnic
groups and from immigrants outside of Europe. The respondent could choose “allow
many to come live here,” “allow some,” “allow few,” or “allow none.” The next three
variables asked respondents to place where they would align on a 0-10 scale based their
feeling towards a given statement. First, respondents were asked whether immigrants
where good or bad for the economy. Second, respondents were asked whether immigrants
enrich or damage cultural life. Finally, respondents were asked whether immigrants make
a country a better or worse place to live. All of the responses were recoded to numeric
variables where higher values indicate more hostility to immigrants.
A measure for the welfare chauvinism attitudinal position was only estimated for the
2008 model. Unfortunately, Round 4’s rotating module was the only situation in the ESS
where questions tapped into the idea of welfare chauvinism. The variable was created by
estimating factor analysis scores based on responses to five questions.70 For three of the
questions, respondents were given a statement, and then asked to indicate whether they
“agree strongly,” “agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “disagree,” or “disagree strongly.”
The first statement is that, “benefits encourage others to come to the country.” The
second statement is that “benefits tend to make people lazy.” The last statement was
that “the unemployed don’t look for work.” An additional question utilized a 0-10 feeling
thermometer and asked whether immigrants receive more in governmental benefits than
they contribute. The final question asked about the length of time it should take for
an immigrants to receive social benefits. The possible responses were “immediately on
arrival,” “after a year, whether or not have worked,” “after worked and paid taxes at least
a year,” “once they have become a citizen,” or “they should never get the same rights.” All
of the responses were recoded to numeric variables where higher values indicate welfare
chauvinistic attitudes.
multiple correlation of the factors scores across surveys for all of the variables was .893. This high
statistic indicates that the factors scores were created based on the value of these variables with minimal
error.
70The Cronbach Alpha score was .537. The proportion of the variance explained with one factor loading
was .229. The average calculation for the squared multiple correlation of the factors scores across surveys
for all of the variables was .636. The statistic indicates that the factors scores were created based on the
value of these variables with only a small amount of error.
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Populist attitudes are difficult to tap capture using traditional survey questions. Here,
populism is operationalized as distrust in governmental entities. Since theoretical argu-
ments indicate that populism is understood as an ideological feature that “pits the pure
people against the corrupt people” (Mudde 2007), and the corrupt people are viewed
as politicians holding office (Pauwels 2010), these features offer an appropriate starting
point. In addition, Mudde (2007) and Pauwels (2011) argue that radical right parties
view institutions with skepticism. In particular, the variable was created by estimating
factor analysis scores based on responses to three questions.71 The questions ask the level
of trust the respondent obtains for politicians, the country’s parliament, and the legal
system. The variables were recoded so that higher scores indicate less trust.
There were two variables included in all of the analyses that attempted to capture
authoritarian attitudes. The first variable was created based on a question that asks
whether it is important for people to follow traditions and customs. The second vari-
ables asks whether it is important for government to be strong and ensure safety. The
respondent’s choices were this sounds, “very much like me,” “like me,” “somewhat like
me,” “a little like me,” “not like me,” and “not like me at all.” The variables were nu-
merically coded so that larger values indicated more authoritarian attitudes.72 In the
2010 analysis, three additional variables were utilized in the empirical analysis in order
to measure authoritarianism. The two original variables are not strong proxies, and the
2010 rotating module included additional variables that more directly tapped into this
idea. The first variables asks whether people who break the laws should receive much
harsher penalties than they currently receive. The second variable asks whether all laws
should be strictly obeyed. For both of these questions, the respondent’s options were
the same as above. The final question gave the respondent a criminal situation, then
asked them to choose the penalty. The presented situation documented was a second
offense for house burglary. The respondent could choose between “community sentence,”
71The Cronbach Alpha score was .863. The proportion of the variance explained with one factor loading
was .664. The average calculation for the squared multiple correlation of the factors scores across surveys
for all of the variables was .859. The statistic indicates that the factors scores were created based on the
value of these variables with only a minimal amount of error.
72The mean for the traditions and customs variables was a 3.262 on a 1-5 scale across the surveys.
The mean for the government strength variable was a 3.602 on a 1-5 scale across surveys.
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“fine,” “suspended prison,” or “prison sentence.” The variables were coded numerically
so that higher values indicated more authoritarian attitudes. For the 2010 analysis, factor
analysis scores were estimated based on the three additional variables.73
Neoliberalism is another attitudinal position that is difficult to operationalize using
general survey questions. There were two variables included in all of the analyses that
attempts to capture neoliberal attitudes. First, a question was utilized that asked whether
the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels. Second, a
question was utilized that asks whether it is important for people to be treated equally and
have equal opportunities. The respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement
with these statements in the same way described above. For the 2002 analysis, two
additional variables were included in the statistical analysis in order to more concretely
measure neoliberal attitudes. The first question asks whether it is important for the
government not to intervene in the economy. The second asks whether employees need
strong trade unions in order to protect their working conditions and wages. Again, all of
the variables were coded numerically so that higher values indicated neoliberal attitudes.
The final attitudinal position tested in the empirical analysis was Euroskepticism.
The major variable used to operationalize Euroskepticism was the respondent’s level of
trust in the EU. The respondent was offered a 0-10 scale where they could place their
level of trust. The variable was coded so that larger values indicate less trust.74 A
second indicator was utilized where for the 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2012 analyses. In these
rounds, the ESS asked respondents whether they believe EU unification went too far.
The respondent was offered a 0-10 scale where they could place their position on the
issues. The variable was also coded so that larger values indicate that unification has
already gone too far.75
73The Cronbach Alpha score was .582. The proportion of the variance explained with one factor loading
was .294. The average calculation for the squared multiple correlation of the factors scores across surveys
for all of the variables was .796. The statistic indicates that the factors scores were created based on the
value of these variables with only a small amount of error.
74The mean across surveys for trust in the EU was 5.504.
75The mean was a 4.68 across all of the surveys in regards to unification going too far.
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Method
Since the dependent variable (i.e. radical right vote choice) is binary, Bayesian bi-
nary models were estimated using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method.76
For several survey rounds, additional models were estimated. An additional model was
estimated for 2002 that explored the effect of additional neoliberal attitudes on radical
right vote choice. Further, additional models were estimated to explore occupation for
2008, 2010, and 2012. Finally, additional models were estimated for 2008 to account for
the effect of welfare chauvinism and 2010 to explore authoritarianism. In order to have
coefficients that are directly comparable in the model output, all continuous variables
were scaled to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
The models testing radical right vote choice had the prior variance for each variable set
at multivariate normal with the mean vector equalling zero and a precision matrix that is
diagonal. The prior means for each variable were set at zero when estimating the model.77
When plotting the distributions for the chains, the distributions overlapped quite closely.
The models presented here were all estimated by using a burnin of 100,000, and a sample
of 50,000 that was thinned by 5.78 In regards to model convergence, each parameter
for both chains passed Gelman and Rubin, Geweke, and Heidelberger and Welch tests.
The Gelman and Rubin test statistics gave a potential scale reduction factor of 1 for all
parameters; indicating there was no need to run the chains longer to improve convergence
of the stationarity distribution79 The Geweke diagnostic test statistics indicated that the
76The Bayesian models were estimated in JAGS version 4.0. The models were estimated in R version
3.2.2 on a MAC running OS X 10.11.
77It is important to note that two additional models were estimated for each model presented here.
The first additional model set the prior mean for each variable as either +1 or -1 depending on the
directionality of the theoretical expectations for the variable. For instance, the effective number of
parties prior mean was set at +1, because the theory expects that the number of parties is positively
related to radical right existence. Then, another model was estimated where the prior mean for each
variable was set as the opposite of the first model (i.e. effective number of parties set at -1). This was
done in order to test the robustness of the prior specification. In particular, one would want to know
whether the probability distributions of the estimated Markov Chains for the models were statistically
different from each other in any meaningful way that could skew results. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests indicated that the probability distributions of the models were not statistically different from one
another, which means that prior mean specification did not bias results received here. However, model
convergence was impacted by prior specification. Models where prior means were set to the opposite of
theoretical expectations took significantly longer to converge, or did not converge at all.
78Several models were estimated where the number of burnin, sampling, and thinning were changed.
When the models converged, the results were substantively the same.
79Statistics of 1.2 or higher are the cutoff.
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means of the parameters from two different locations in the chains converged to a standard
normal distribution. All parameters passed the stationarity and half-width tests of the
Heidelberger and Welch test. In addition, trace plots of the Markov chains showed that
there was no trending present for the chains, or the individual parameters for each chain.
Lastly, density plots conveyed that the distribution of the posterior parameters were
normally distributed. The equation for the basic models are presented here:
log
(
Pr(RRVoteChoice)
1− Pr(RRVoteChoice)
)
= α + β1Age + β2Gender
+ β3Income + β4Education
+ β5Unemployed
+ β6UnionMember + β7Foreign-Born
+ β8ParentForeign-Born
+ β9Ideology + β10Nativism
+ β11Populism + β12TradBeliefs
+ β13StrongGov + β14GovDisparity
+ β15EqualOpp + β16EUTrust + 
 ∼ N(0, θ2 )
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Table 9: Radical Right Vote Choice: 2002-2006
Basic Full Basic Basic
Model Model Model Model
(2002) (2002) (2004) (2006)
Intercept -3.009∗ -3.004∗ -2.996∗ -2.969∗
(-3.123, -2.900) (-3.119, -2.889) (-3.108, -2.885) (-3.076, -2.865)
Age -0.115∗ -0.117∗ -0.209∗ -0.212∗
(-0.203, -0.029) (-0.205, -0.028) (-0.298, -0.120) (-0.299, -0.126)
Gender -0.173∗ -0.177∗ -0.258∗ -0.219∗
(-0.262, -0.085) (-0.267, -0.088) (-0.347, -0.170) (-0.304, -0.134)
Education -0.298∗ -0.295∗ -0.314∗ -0.259∗
(-0.395, -0.203) (-0.392, -0.197) (-0.415, -0.214) (-0.356, -0.163)
Income 0.284∗ 0.277∗ 0.252∗ 0.220∗
(0.190, 0.378) (0.185, 0.372) (0.158, 0.346) (0.126, 0.315)
Unemployed -0.122∗ -0.115∗ 0.046 0.091∗
(-0.214, -0.033) (-0.207, -0.025) (-0.039, 0.132) (0.009, 0.172)
Union -0.046 -0.052 -0.086∗ 0.045
(-0.130, 0.038) (-0.140, 0.035) (-0.171, -0.002) (-0.037, 0.128)
Foreign-Born 0.031 0.022 -0.025 -0.065
(-0.068, 0.124) (-0.078, 0.118) (-0.137, 0.080) (-0.173, 0.037)
Parent Foreign-Born 0.054 0.056 0.030 0.064
(-0.043, 0.148) (-0.043, 0.150) (-0.137, 0.080) (-0.031, 0.156)
Ideology 0.604∗ 0.605∗ 0.530∗ 0.582∗
(0.512, 0.698) (0.510, 0.700) (0.438, 0.622) (0.492, 0.673)
Nativism 0.551∗ 0.554∗ 0.547∗ 0.445∗
(0.456, 0.648) (0.456, 0.653) (0.448, 0.645) (0.350, 0.543)
Populism 0.154∗ 0.148∗ 0.174∗ 0.236∗
(0.053, 0.257) (0.042, 0.252) (0.067, 0.279) (0.134, 0.339)
Traditional Beliefs -0.075 -0.073 0.098∗ 0.058
(-0.162, 0.012) (-0.160, 0.016) (0.010, 0.188) (-0.029, 0.147)
Strong Government 0.018 0.015 0.023 0.091
(-0.076, 0.112) (-0.078, 0.109) (-0.070, 0.116) (-0.002, 0.182)
Gov. Reduce Disparity 0.043 0.059 -0.094∗ 0.044
(-0.043, 0.128) (-0.031, 0.146) (-0.184, -0.006) (-0.042, 0.129)
Equal Opportunities 0.118∗ 0.121∗ 0.156∗ 0.095∗
(0.038, 0.198) (0.040, 0.201) (0.076, 0.235) (0.016, 0.172)
Gob. Intervene (Econ) -0.007
(-0.092, 0.077)
Strong Trade Unions -0.027
(-0.115, 0.060)
EU Trust 0.188∗ 0.183∗ 0.095 0.029
(0.091, 0.285) (0.085, 0.285) (-0.012, 0.203) (-0.071, 0.129)
Unification Too Far 0.160∗ 0.125∗
(0.069, 0.253) (0.037, 0.215)
N 8837 8702 8693 9382
PRE 0.917 0.917 0.917 0.919
(0.916, 0.917) (0.916, 0.918) (0.915, 0.918) (0.919, 0.920)
95% credible intervals are in parentheses
∗ indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.
PRE = Proportional Reduction in Error
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Results
Statistical outputs for the radical right vote choice models are presented in Tables 10-
13. When testing the impact of specific socio-demographic trends have on radical right
vote choice, the statistically significant results align quite well with theoretical expec-
tations. First, across all of the individual-level models presented here age is negatively
related to radical right vote choice. There is debate in the literature whether older people
with more conservative values and a negative view of immigrants are the radical right’s
voting base, or whether younger people dissatisfied with older, mainstream parties are the
culprit. Here, the results indicate definitively that younger people are more likely to vote
radical right. One possible explanation for this result could be the fact that a majority of
older voters have maintained their ties to more established parties, while many younger
voters dissatisfied with politics, tend to view established parties as part of the problem.
Second, across all of the individual-level vote choice models, gender is statistically
related to vote choice. In particular, women are less likely to vote for radical right
parties. Third, an increase in education is correlated with a decrease in the probability of
voting radical right. Relative to income, data reveal to trends. Between 2002 and 2006,
income is positively related to voting for the radical right. However, income is negatively
related to voting radical right from 2008-2012. The result might seem surprising at first,
but a closer look helps to explain why this result emerges. There has been a movement
for radical right parties to shift from more neoliberal economic rhetoric towards the
advocating of protectionist policies. For instance, the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the
Netherlands has increased their support for the welfare state steadily with every election.
The result also explains why unemployment is only significant for 2002 and 2006, and
the directionality of the relationship appears to shift. Across models, union membership
is positively related to radical right vote choice following 2006. The trend demonstrates
that radical right parties may be poaching lower to middle, working class voters. Finally,
it is worth noting that there are instances where the foreign-born variables are significant.
If a respondent or their parents were foreign-born they are less likely to vote for a radical
right party.
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Table 10: Radical Right Vote Choice: 2008
Full Basic Sparse
Model Model Model
Intercept -3.656∗ -3.601∗ -3.267∗
(-4.014, -3.319) (-3.941, -3.274) (-3.388, -3.150)
Age -0.338∗ -0.342∗ -0.351∗
(-0.439, -0.237) (-0.440, -0.245) (-0.449, -0.255)
Gender -0.227∗ -0.229∗ -0.235∗
(-0.323, -0.132) (-0.323, -0.135) (-0.326, -0.144)
Education -0.228∗ -0.235∗ -0.244∗
(-0.336, -0.122) (-0.339, -0.132) (-0.348, -0.139)
Income -0.098∗ -0.092∗ -0.089∗
(-0.196, 0.000) (-0.189, 0.006) (-0.187, 0.009)
Job: Private Firm 0.457∗ 0.405∗
(0.119, 0.817) (0.072, 0.746)
Job: Local Gov 0.620∗ 0.522∗
(0.201, 1.050) (0.109, 0.936)
Job: Public Sec 0.114 0.021
(-0.363, 0.590) (-0.454, 0.495)
Job: State Owned 0.324 0.276
(-0.141, 0.784) (-0.179, 0.736)
Job: Other 0.173 0.080
(-0.560, 0.858) (-0.665, 0.754)
Unemployed 0.001 0.000 0.007
(-0.090, 0.093) (-0.089, 0.089) (-0.082, 0.094)
Union 0.126∗ 0.121 0.128∗
(0.032, 0.220) (-0.073, 0.149) (0.038, 0.220)
Foreign-Born 0.040 0.041 0.044
(-0.074, 0.149) (-0.073, 0.149) (-0.071, 0.154)
Parent Foreign-Born -0.049 -0.058 -0.055
(-0.166, 0.063) (-0.173, 0.052) (-0.171, 0.054)
Ideology 0.621∗ 0.640∗ 0.634∗
(0.521, 0.722) (0.544, 0.738) (0.536, 0.732)
Nativism 0.359∗ 0.403∗ 0.409∗
(0.250, 0.467) (0.301, 0.505) (0.308, 0.510)
Welfare Chauvinism 0.168∗
(0.066, 0.273)
Populism -0.191∗ -0.195∗ -0.196∗
(-0.307, -0.076) (-0.308, -0.083) (-0.308, -0.084)
Traditional Beliefs 0.108∗ 0.095∗ 0.099∗
(0.014, 0.205) (0.003, 0.188) (0.006, 0.194)
Strong Government 0.035 0.047 0.045
(-0.063, 0.134) (-0.050, 0.144) (-0.052, 0.144)
Gov. Reduce Disparity 0.034 0.045 0.049
(-0.061, 0.127) (-0.048, 0.136) (-0.043, 0.141)
Equal Opportunities 0.059 0.052 0.058
(-0.028, 0.146) (-0.034, 0.137) (-0.029, 0.143)
EU Trust 0.329∗ 0.350∗ 0.353∗
(0.220, 0.441) (0.242, 0.458) (0.244, 0.462)
Unification Too Far 0.299∗ 0.295∗ 0.294∗
(0.203, 0.394) (0.201, 0.389) (0.200, 0.388)
N 9735 9245 9245
PRE 0.929 0.932 0.931
(0.926, 0.931) (0.930, 0.933) (0.930, 0.933)
95% credible intervals are in parentheses
∗ indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.
PRE = Proportional Reduction in Error
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Evaluating the relative strength of attitudinal variables is easily done by viewing
the size of the variables’ coefficients in relation to one another. The most apparent
finding is that radical right self-placement on a left-right ideological scale and nativist
attitudes have a great impact on voting for a radical right party. Across all of the models,
when moving from the most extreme left value to the most extreme right value, there
is an increase on average of .18 in the probability of voting radical right.80 The result
contradicts Hainsworth’s (2008) claim that most members and voters for the radical right
do no self-identify as members of the extreme right. Here, as a respondent moves closer
to the extreme area on the right side of the spectrum, the probability of voting radical
right increases.
Similarly, nativist attitudes have one of the strongest relationships to radical right vote
choice in the estimated models. The relationship between holding nativist attitudes and
voting radical right is positive, an increase in anti-immigrant attitudes leads to an increase
in the probability of voting radical right. Since ideology and nativism have overlapping
95% confidence bounds in all of the models, it is not directly apparent which variable holds
more predictive power. On average across models, moving from very positive attitudes
towards immigrants to very negative attitudes (i.e. nativism) leads to an increase of
.14 in the probability of voting radical right. Therefore, a far right positioning on the
ideological spectrum, along with holding nativist attitudes, could explain over a quarter
of the variance in the probability to vote for the radical right when compared to someone
with contrasting attitudes.
As stated previously, the most obvious way that anti-immigrant attitudes manifest
themselves is with strong welfare-chauvinist attitudinal positions. Unfortunately, it was
not possible to test the effect that welfare chauvinistic attitudes have on radical right vote
choice for every year. The survey only include one module (2008) where applicable ques-
tions were asked. Table 11 provides the model output testing the relationship between
welfare chauvinism and radical right vote choice. The result is that welfare chauvinistic
80Predicted probabilities were calculated for significant variables by holding dummy variables at zero
and continuous variables at their median. There is almost no variance across models regarding the size
of the substantive effect of ideology. Further, the 95% confidence bounds are extremely tight around the
predicted values.
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attitudes have a positive, statistically significant effect on radical right vote choice. How-
ever, the substantive effect of the variable is very small. When moving from one extreme
value to the opposite extreme value on the variable there is only an increase of .0002 in
voting radical right. Further, the 95% confidence bounds around the predicted values are
quite large.
The effect of populism on radical right vote choice is more difficult to interpret based
on model output. As expected, from 2002-2006 populism has a statistically significant,
positive relationship with radical right vote choice. Radical right voters appear to have
less trust in politicians, political parties, and the legal system. The result provides
confirmatory evidence that radical right voters hold populist attitudes. However, it is
important to warn against reading too much into the results for three reasons. First, the
populism measure is very indirect. The measure attempts to capture the idea that voters
see mainstream politicians as corrupt people succeeding at the expense of the voters.
The only way to measure this idea using the ESS was by looking at trust in politicians,
parties, and institutions; which indirectly operationalizes the concept. Second, the model
output indicates that in 2008 and 2010 populism is negatively related to radical right vote
choice. The result runs counter to theoretical expectations. On the other hand, this result
could be explained away by the fact that radical right parties began to enter public office
more successfully in these years. Therefore, radical right voters are seeing politicians
and parties as more trustworthy since the parties they vote for are entering office. The
result runs counter to the claims made by Hainsworth (2008) about voters losing trust
in government as radical right parties secure more seats. Finally, the substantive effect
of the populism variable is miniscule. From 2002-2006, the variable explains less than a
.02 increase in the probability of voting radical right, and from 2008-2010 the variable
explains less than a .01 decrease in the probability of voting radical right.81
81The 95% confidence bounds around the predicted values are incredibly large.
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Table 11: Radical Right Vote Choice: 2010
Full Basic Sparse
Model Model Model
Intercept -3.531∗ -3.563∗ -3.151∗
(-3.822, -3.254) (-3.849, -3.292) (-3.254, -3.051)
Age -0.299∗ -0.308∗ -0.327∗
(-0.385, -0.213) (-0.392, -0.223) (-0.409, -0.245)
Gender -0.228∗ -0.243∗ -0.241∗
(-0.310, -0.147) (-0.324, -0.163) (-0.320, -0.163)
Education -0.314∗ -0.319∗ -0.318∗
(-0.406, -0.225) (-0.409, -0.229) (-0.407, -0.229)
Income -0.202∗ -0.193∗ -0.185∗
(-0.289, -0.115) (-0.278, -0.108) (-0.269, -0.099)
Job: Private Firm 0.476∗ 0.498∗
(0.197, 0.766) (0.224, 0.785)
Job: Local Gov 0.399∗ 0.432∗
(0.049, 0.752) (0.084, 0.784)
Job: Public Sec 0.375∗ 0.403∗
(0.001, 0.746) (0.032, 0.777)
Job: State Owned 0.226 0.254
(-0.152, 0.605) (-0.121, 0.626)
Job: Other -0.144 0.028
(-0.852, 0.506) (-0.634, 0.637)
Unemployed 0.005 0.016 0.029
(-0.073, 0.082) (-0.061, 0.092) (-0.047, 0.105)
Union 0.133∗ 0.130∗ 0.141∗
(0.053, 0.213) (0.049, 0.210) (0.063, 0.220)
Foreign-Born -0.162∗ -0.134∗ -0.131∗
(-0.288, -0.047) (-0.255, -0.024) (-0.252, -0.019)
Parent Foreign-Born 0.007 0.001 0.001
(-0.088, 0.100) (-0.094, 0.093) (-0.095, 0.093)
Ideology 0.588∗ 0.597∗ 0.586∗
(0.503, 0.673) (0.512, 0.682) (0.503, 0.670)
Nativism 0.451∗ 0.456∗ 0.457∗
(0.362, 0.539) (0.370, 0.543) (0.371, 0.544)
Populism -0.166∗ -0.152∗ -0.159∗
(-0.269, -0.064) (-0.254, -0.051) (-0.260, -0.058)
Authoritarianism 0.095∗
(0.016, 0.175)
Traditional Beliefs -0.007 -0.006 -0.012
(-0.089, 0.076) (-0.087, 0.075) (-0.094, 0.070)
Strong Government -0.017 0.004 0.002
(-0.102, 0.069) (-0.079, 0.088) (-0.081, 0.087)
Gov. Reduce Disparity 0.062 0.058 0.064
(-0.019, 0.143) (-0.025, 0.138) (-0.015, 0.144)
Equal Opportunities 0.136∗ 0.144∗ 0.142∗
(0.064, 0.209) (0.072, 0.215) (0.071, 0.212)
EU Trust 0.384∗ 0.378∗ 0.378∗
(0.287, 0.480) (0.283, 0.475) (0.283, 0.473)
N 11845 12157 12157
PRE 0.928 0.928 0.929
(0.927, 0.929) (0.926, 0.929) (0.926, 0.929)
95% credible intervals are in parentheses
∗ indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.
PRE = Proportional Reduction in Error
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Model output lends some support to the idea that radical right voters tend to hold
authoritarian attitudes. Though the substantive impact was not very large, voters that
believe it is important to follow traditions and customs were statistically more likely to
vote for the radical right party in 2004 and 2008. On the other hand, belief that there
needs to be a strong government in order to protect the security of the people has no
statistical relationship with voting radical right.
Similarly, the results show that radical right voters are statistically more likely to
hold neoliberal attitudes. For example, radical right voters in 2002, 2004, 2006, and
2010 were more likely to hold the attitude that it is not important for people to be
treated equally and have equal opportunities. On the other hand, believing that the
government should not reduce inequality, that the government should not intervene in
the economy, and that strong trade unions are unimportant were not predictors of radical
right vote choice. Therefore, one could conclude that respondents interpret discussions
about the importance of equal opportunity as being targeted towards particular groups.
A respondent might be aware that questions of this nature are indirectly asking whether
all groups should be equal, which radical right voters would reject.
The last attitudinal positions explored were attitudes towards the EU. The literature
is unclear about whether radical right parties are anti-European integration due to their
hostility towards other cultures, or have more positive feelings towards the EU through
participation in the European Parliament (EP). The unequivocal finding is that radical
right voters are anti-EU. In fact, behind far right ideological positioning and nativism,
anti-EU sentiment ranks as the third strongest predictor for radical right vote choice. For
example, when moving from a high level of trust in the EU to a low level of trust there
is an increase of .1 on average across models in the probability of voting radical right. In
addition, belief that European unification has gone too far explains a shift of .03 in the
probability of voting radical right.
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Table 12: Radical Right Vote Choice: 2012
Basic Sparse
Model Model
Intercept -3.256∗ (-3.389, -3.126) -3.335∗ (-3.445, -3.227)
Age -0.366∗ (-0.452, -0.281) -0.375∗ (-0.459, -0.292)
Gender -0.289∗ (-0.372, -0.207) -0.301∗ (-0.382, -0.219)
Education -0.312∗ (-0.403, -0.223) -0.319∗ (-0.408, -0.230)
Income -0.095∗ (-0.181, -0.008) -0.094∗ (-0.180, -0.008)
Job: Private Firm -0.075 (-0.338, 0.181)
Job: Local Gov -0.280∗ (-0.545, -0.024)
Job: Public Sec -0.115 (-0.397, 0.157)
Job: State Owned -0.160 (-0.466, 0.132)
Job: Other -0.716∗ (-1.400, -0.114)
Unemployed 0.010 (-0.067, 0.087) 0.009 (-0.067, 0.085)
Union 0.200∗ (0.120, 0.280) 0.193∗ (0.114, 0.272)
Foreign-Born 0.040 (-0.067, 0.142) 0.042 (-0.066, 0.145)
Parent Foreign-Born -0.110∗ (-0.217, -0.007) -0.108∗ (-0.215, -0.005)
Ideology 0.562∗ (0.477, 0.648) 0.563∗ (0.477, 0.648)
Nativism 0.580∗ (0.492, 0.670) 0.580∗ (0.492, 0.668)
Populism -0.088 (-0.193, 0.016) -0.087 (-0.190, 0.018)
Traditional Beliefs -0.051 (-0.130, 0.027) -0.052 (-0.129, 0.026)
Strong Government 0.011 (-0.072, 0.096) 0.009 (-0.073, 0.093)
Gov. Reduce Disparity -0.024 (-0.103, 0.053) -0.022 (-0.099, 0.056)
Equal Opportunities 0.017 (-0.056, 0.090) 0.020 (-0.052, 0.092)
EU Trust 0.326∗ (0.226, 0.427) 0.327∗ (0.227, 0.427)
Unification Too Far 0.333∗ (0.251, 0.419) 0.334∗ (0.251, 0.419)
N 12731 12731
PRE 0.932 (0.931, 0.932) 0.932 (0.931, 0.932)
95% credible intervals are in parentheses
∗ indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.
PRE = Proportional Reduction in Error
Conclusion
The major takeaway from these individual-level analyses on radical right vote choice
is that extreme right self-placement and anti-immigrant sentiment are the attitudinal
positions driving a citizen to vote for a radical right party. In fact, attitudes towards
immigrants and ideological self-placement are the strongest predictors of vote choice
when compared to other attitudinal positions. In addition, this work corroborates the
findings in other research that suggest several other attitudes play a minor role in vote
choice. For example, radical right voters tend to be hostile towards the EU and European
integration. Trust in the EU among radical right voters is low compared to voters for
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other parties, and a belief that European integration has gone too far exists among these
supporters. Radical right supporters are also driven to vote for these parties, in part
because of populist sentiment, authoritarian positions, and neoliberal tendencies.
Do radical right voters constitute a well-defined demographic block? Radical right
voters tend to be younger men at lower education levels. Further, there is a positive
relationship between voting radical right, being a member of a union, and holding a job
at a private firm or in the public sector. The result provides some evidence that these
voters tend to be from the traditional working class. Therefore, there is some evidence
that radical right voters constitute a defined voting base.
As previously stated, the major takeaway here is that anti-immigrant sentiment is
clearly the driving force behind radical right vote choice. This finding informs the way
that governments and mainstream parties should approach the issue in order to limit
radical right vote share. Governments should conduct attitudinal research targeted at
the particular immigration issues that radial right voters find most important, and at-
tempt to alleviate these issues when possible. Mainstream parties need to find a way to
either reduce hostility towards immigrants through legislation, or must co-opt segments
of the radical right’s immigration platform. Finding a solution to the problem of hostility
towards immigrants is difficult. If mainstream parties co-opt the radical right’s platforms
then they are contributing to the nativist sentiment. On the other hand, legislation that
pushes for cultural competency education would probably take years to cause a shift in
attitudinal positions in the general public. Nevertheless, it would benefit mainstream
parties to not ignore the large role that anti-immigrant sentiment plays in determining
vote choice.
Where should research go from here? Moving forward, research should explore the
macro-social forces that determine the important attitudinal positions leading to radical
right vote choice. If the forces that drive people towards a nativist attitudinal position
are identified, then it might be possible to circumvent the creation of these attitudes.
For example, say we found that high unemployment, interacted with a large immigrant
population, is creating anti-immigrant attitudes. Knowing this result would make it
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possible to advocate for legislation that alleviates the strain caused by high unemployment
in order to potentially subvert anti-immigrant attitudes.
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Chapter 5
The Conditioning Effect of Macro-Social
Forces on Political Attitudes
“I’ve never before seen Red Cross helpers attacked in a civilized country like
Germany” (Red Cross Head, Ru¨diger Unger 2015)
“That’s the great danger, that those racist views and propensity for violence
reaches normal people, that they start taking part in racist protests” (Amadeu
Antonio Foundation, Robert Lu¨deck 2015)
The German Federal Ministry of the Interior registered 202 attacks on refugee shelters
from January to July 2015. The high number of attacks in the first half of the year were
more than all of the registered attacks in 2014. The Interior Ministry has attributed the
vast majority of these attacks to right-wing extremists and supporters of the radical right
National Democratic Party of Germany, and speculates that the violence will continue
(Somaskanda 2015). The quotes above were made by members of non-governmental
organizations that were assisting in providing shelter and aid for the Syrian citizens
seeking refuge in Germany. The non-governmental organizations have seen their efforts
to help refugees impeded by citizens, and witnessed an increase in anti-immigrant rhetoric
from the German populations where they are holding operations.
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As one of the above quotes indicates, organizations against the increase in right-wing
extremist rhetoric are worried about the possibility that the average citizen will adopt a
radical stance against immigrants entering the country. Implicitly, the statement made
here would indicate that these non-governmental organizations believe that the current
wave of refugees entering the country could exacerbate the negative views of immigrants.
However, the question remains whether macro situations/forces, such as an influx of
refugees, really ignite radical right attitudes in the public? The analyses conducted here
test for the relationships between macro-social forces and attitudes that are related to
radical right party vote choice.
Macro-Social Forces
Macro-level explanations for radical right success encompass demand-side theories
that focus on the broad economic, historical, and social processes that take place at the
national level (Mudde 2007). In the literature, macro-level explanations for success are
abundant (Ignazi 1992, Betz 1994, Kitschelt 1995, Jackman and Volpert 1996, DeClair
1999, Ignazi 2003, Golder 2003, Norris 2005, Veugelers and Magnan 2005b, Arzheimer and
Carter 2006, Mudde 2007, Art 2007, Copsey 2008, Bowyer 2008, Berezin 2009, Arzheimer
2009, Jesuit, Paradowski and Mahler 2009, Ford and Goodwin 2010, Evans and Ivaldi
2010, Fitzgerald and Lawrence 2011, Dinas and van Spanje 2011, Poznyak, Abts and
Swyngedouw 2011, Rydgren and Ruth 2011, van der Waal, de Koster and Achterberg
2013). In particular, the literature has focused on perceived threats from outsiders, eco-
nomic strain, and responses to new social movements. However, empirical investigations
of the relationship between macro-level explanations and success suffer from three main
deficiencies.
The first problem with current empirical studies linking macro-social forces to radical
right success is that they fail to demonstrate a mechanism capable of fully explaining
the relationship. The literature delves into some theoretical depth in regards to why
people experiencing the impact of some macro-force (i.e. influx of immigrants) might
be inclined to vote for a radical right party. However, the empirical tests implemented
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solely explore the correlation between a macro-social force and radical right vote share.
For instance, Jackman and Volpert (1996) argue that high unemployment provides a
favorable condition for the success of extreme right parties. Indeed, the authors find that
high unemployment is positively correlated with radical right vote share. Unfortunately,
the statistical test does not provide a mechanism to explain why this correlation exists.
What exactly is it about high unemployment, or being unemployed, that drives radical
right vote share to increase? Current empirical testing does not directly answer this
question.
The second problem with current research exploring the impact of macro-social forces
is that the literature does not disaggregate explanations for radical right success in their
empirical analyses. In this situation, macro-social variables are estimated in a model of
success with several other explanations that do not operate at the same level of analysis.
For instance, Arzheimer and Carter (2006) included individual-level voter characteristics,
external supply-side factors, and macro-social factors in order to predict radical right
vote choice. The problem with the analysis is that macro-social factors may effect voter
attitudes, and external supply-side factors may impact the translation of attitudes to vote
choice. However, the model is a simple additive model that oversimplifies the relationship,
and does not account for the inter-relationships between these different factors.
The final problem is that current research finds contradictory conclusions regarding
the role that particular macro-social forces play when predicting the success of radical
right parties. The conflicting findings might be due to the two problems outlined above.
For example, Arzheimer and Carter (2006) find that high unemployment decreases radical
right vote share, while Mudde (2007), and Jesuit, Paradowski, and Mahler (2009), Evans
and Ivaldi (2010) find that high unemployment increases radical right vote share. Further,
Golder (2003), and Arzheimer (2009) find that the relationship between unemployment
and radical right vote share is conditional on immigration rates.
The present inquiry attempts to correct for these deficiencies in the literature. First,
this research agenda tests for the direct relationship that macro-social forces have on
individual attitudes that lead to radical right vote share. Second, by conducting the
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analysis in this manner, the factors that lead to radical right success are disaggregated in
order to not oversimplify the relationship. Finally, the statistical testing conducted here
attempts to provide a definitive statement regarding the role that macro-social forces have
on radical right success. However, before conducting statistical testing, the literature and
theoretical constructs are presented here. In particular, the role that immigration and
economic strain play on developing radical right attitudes is discussed.
Immigrant/Group Threat Theory
The most prominent macro-level theory explaining radical right success is the per-
ceived threat from foreign “outsiders.” In fact, the literature places so much emphasis
on the importance of immigration and anti-immigrant attitudes that some scholars sim-
ply refer to radical right parties as anti-immigrant parties (Bos and van der Brug 2010,
van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000b, van Spanje 2010). However, other authors argue
that these parties are not single issue parties that can be solely understood as a response
to the influx of immigrants (Kitschelt 1995).The literature posits that the relationship is
positive. Therefore, when immigration increases, the success of radical right parties in
terms of vote share will increase. Further, the literature argues that citizens witnessing
an influx of immigrants in their country will view this occurrence as a threat, and that
these people will vote for radical right parties because these are the only parties in the
electoral market wiling to deal with the perceived problem.
Mudde (2007) argues that radical right success at the macro-level could be explained
by “ethnic backlash,” which is a defensive response by the majority to a perceived ethnic
threat. In particular, the author argues that this perceived threat comes from non-
European migrants. Further, Berezin (2009) argues that an exogenous shock (i.e. influx
of immigrants) creates a situation where a political system transforms difference between
groups from a social fact to social exacerbation. As far as empirical findings, Jesuit,
Paradowski, and Mahler (2009) find that an increase in immigration leads to an increase
in radical right success. Further, Ford and Goodwin (2010) discover that in areas with
large Muslim minority populations of Pakistani or African origin, the British National
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Party witnesses an increase in success. Likewise, Evans and Ivaldi (2010), Fitzgerald and
Lawrence (2011), Dinas and van Spanje (2011), and Poznyak, Abts, and Sqyngedouw
(2011) all find that an increase in immigration leads to an increase in radical right voting
in different contexts throughout Europe.
Some authors argue that the relationship is more complex than the one described
above. In particular, several scholars point out that the particular immigrant group is
of great importance. For instance, Betz (1994) argues that an increase in the number
of migrant workers and asylum seekers, and not overall immigration, leads to increased
support for the radical right. DeClair (1999), Norris (2005), and Mudde (2007) agree that
there is importance in the status of the immigration group, and that migrant workers
and asylum seekers receive particular attention. Further, several authors disaggregate the
immigration groupings, arguing that radical right support comes from people hostile to
immigrants from particular areas. As stated above, Ford and Goodwin (2010) find that
hostility to Muslims leads to success. In addition, Poznyak, Abts, and Sqyngedouw (2011)
find that a higher proportion of immigrants from Turkey is correlated with higher radical
right vote share. Overall, Betz (1994) claims that there are differences from country to
country in regards to which immigrant groups illicit a negative response based on cultural
backgrounds of the countries. Therefore, attention needs to be paid to particular groups.
At the local level, scholars have find that immigrant location matters for success.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to replicate these results at the national level. Still, the
literature warrants a brief review. Bowyer (2008) found that BNP support at the district
level was highest where large ethnic minority populations exist. When the authors delves
within districts, the party is strongest in predominantly white neighborhoods. Rydgren
and Ruth (2011) confirm that radical right support is highest in areas close to immigrant
dense areas, but not within these areas. Finally, van der Waal, de Koster, and Achterberg
(2013) found that ethnic segregation of Dutch cities leads to voting for the Party for
Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands.
The relationship described between macro-social forces and attitudes indicates that
an influx of immigrants should lead to an increase in attitudes that are associated with
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radical right vote choice. An influx of immigrants alone does not lead to vote choice.
Instead, the argument presented here is that an influx of immigrants ignites attitudes
that then leads to vote choice. Therefore, the empirical analysis should demonstrate a
relationship between immigration and attitudes.
Economic Strain Theory
Betz (1994) was the first scholar to argue that economic forces lead to radical right
party success. Broadly, the author argued that postindustrial capitalism creates an indi-
vidualistic economy where long-standing identities are broken down and people are less
able to rely on group identity for economic success. Therefore, citizens are less likely to
align with a political party based on social class, and more likely to allow specific issue po-
sitions to drive vote choice. In addition, since competition is played out globally, national
governments lose capacity to control economic outcomes. Thus, individuals in a negative
economic situation blame established parties (Berezin 2009). If this theory is interpreted
broadly, any economic crisis could incite a vote for the radical right (Mudde 2007). Fur-
ther, economic indicators such as income inequality, redistribution of wealth, and per
capita income have also been correlated with radical right success (Jesuit, Paradowski,
and Mahler 2009, Poznyak, Abts, and Sqyngedouw 2011).
The primary economic situation that scholars agree impacts radical right success is
unemployment (Jackman and Volpert 1996, DeClair 1999, Arzheimer and Carter 2006,
Mudde 2007, Arzheimer 2009). However, scholars do not always agree on directionality
of the relationship. Norris (2005) argues that the public has reacted to the consequence
of globalization negatively when it is accompanied by growing numbers of job losses.
Jackman and Volpert (1996), Arzheimer and Carter (2006), and Arzheimer (2009) find
that the odds of radical right success decrease with higher unemployment. What explains
the relationship between unemployment and radical right success? The predominant
theory argues that people will view increasing unemployment as being caused by the
mainstream political parties. Therefore, these citizens will move their votes from the
establishment to the more radical parties. Again, the effect that this macro-social force
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has on particular attitudes has not been explored previously.
Similar to the immigrant threat theory, a negative economic situation on its own
does not necessarily lead to vote choice. One would be hard-pressed to find a political
party in any electoral market advocating for high unemployment and a great disparity in
wealth. However, there could be a connection between difficult economic situations and
the acquisition of attitudes correlated with radical right voting. In particular, one would
expect someone in a bad economic situation to be more likely to succumb to populist
and anti-immigrant attitudes. Perhaps, individuals adopting populist attitudes may even
blame the European Union for their misfortune.
Interacting Relationships: Modernization-Loser Theory
A more reasonable and theoretically grounded means of understanding the effect of
the macro-social forces above would be to explore the conditional relationship between
these factors. Kitschelt (1995) argued that radical right parties that could be explained
by one of these macro-social forces. More specifically, Mudde (2007) argues that radical
right parties predominantly attract the “losers of modernization” in order to gain success.
The author argues that the processes of modernization lead to important societal changes,
which, in turn, have political effects. In particular, Rydgren and Ruth (2011) argue that
socio-economic marginalization leads to a higher radical right vote share. Connecting
these findings, this paper argues that economic downturns resulting from an increase in
the availability of cheap labor creates a population of citizens know as the losers of mod-
ernization. Specifically, people that have recently lost their job view immigrants as the
reason for their economic misfortunes. Previous research demonstrates this conditional
relationship between economic distress and immigration influx.
Previous research demonstrates this conditional relationship between economic dis-
tress and immigration influx. Golder (2003) finds that although immigration has a pos-
itive effect on populist parties irrespective of the unemployment level. Rather, unem-
ployment only matters when immigration is high. Further, Arzheimer (2009) determined
that the interaction between unemployment and immigration is negative when exploring
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radical right success. The author also finds that unemployment does not matter when im-
migration is sufficiently high. It will be important to explore exactly how the interactive
relationship conditions attitudes.
If there is an interaction between negative economic strain and immigration, one would
expect to see these two factors impact a number of attitudes correlated with radical right
vote choice. For instance, when unemployment and the number of asylum seekers is
high one would expect populist attitudes to flourish in a country. Therefore, it is worth
estimating models where both of these theories are allowed to interact with one another.
Alternative Explanations
The main alternative explanation advocating for the success of radical right parties
through a profound macro-social force is the growth of the New Left and the welfare
state (Ignazi 1992, Kitschelt 1995, Vuegelers and Magnan 2005). Kitschelt (1995) argues
that the “New Right” constitutes the mirror image and opposite political pole of a New
Left social movement that began in the 1960’s. Further, Iganzi (1992, 2003) advocates
that the radical right’s emergence represents a “counter-revolution” against the New
Left’s emergence. The problem is that these radical right movements do not constitute
a mirror opposite ideologically of the much larger New Left social movement (Mudde
2007). For instance, radical right movements, such as the Party for Freedom (PVV) in
the Netherlands, actually promote welfare programs. In addition, there is no correlation
between the arrival of a New Left movement, or strength of New Left movement, and
the emergence of a radical right party (attributed to the difficulty of determining when
exactly a new radical right movement emerges). In fact, there are currently no research
agendas empirically testing the moment of emergence for these parties. Still, this early
explanation lays the foundation for developing more concrete macro-social explanations.
In a slightly related strain of argumentation, Kitschelt (1995) theorizes and observes
that radical right parties are most likely to appear in postindustrial societies with large
welfare states. Further, Veugelers and Magnan (2005) argue that growth in the welfare
state leads to radical right success. In particular, these scholars theorize that radical right
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parties constitute the only competitor party in the electoral market that are looking to
deconstruct the welfare state. However, as stated above, the difficulty in accepting this
theoretical construct is that several radical right parties advocate comprehensive state
intervention. In addition, is it difficult to point to a theory or mechanism explaining why
these parties would oppose state intervention.
Variable Operationalization
The dependent variables utilized in the statistical modeling include relevant attitudes
correlated with radical right vote choice. The data on individual-level attitudes was
acquired from the European Social Survey (ESS). Further, the attitudes that were sta-
tistically significant in predicting vote choice in the previous chapter are the attitudes
included in the empirical analysis: ideology, populism, nativism, feeling towards the Eu-
ropean Union, and feelings toward equality.
The immigrant threat theory is represented in the empirical model by two distinct
variables. The two variables are utilized in order to account for differing theoretical
strains in the literature. First, several authors point out that the success of radical
right parties is owed broadly to an influx of immigrants or non-native people living
in a country. The proportion of the population that is foreign-born was included in
the statistical analysis because it would make sense, theoretically, that a larger pool of
non-native people might have an effect on radical right attitudes.82 In the statistical
modeling, the variable is lagged one year in order to align more precisely with theoretical
expectations for two reasons.83 First, it is not entirely clear in the literature that the
number of immigrants has an immediate effect on attitudes. Second, the surveys were
conducted at different times throughout the year. Therefore, it is important to err on
the side of caution and ensure that the independent variable does indeed precede the
dependent variable in the empirical model. When exploring descriptive statistics, one
observes that the country that consistently has the highest proportion of immigrants
82The proportion of immigrants in a country ranges from 0.0058 (Bulgaria) to .2565 (Switzerland),
and has a mean of 0.0891.
83The lag proportion of immigrants in a country ranges from 0.009 to 0.235, and has a mean of 0.087.
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is Switzerland. Further, Switzerland’s Swiss People’s Party is historically one of the
most successful radical right parties in Europe. Further, the country with the lowest
proportion of foreign-born people is Bulgaria, which is a country with a radical right
party that normally only obtains about 1% of the vote share. At least initially, there is
some indication that the number of non-native people is related to radical right success.
The second measure utilized in order to represent the immigrant threat theory is more
specific regarding which members of the overall immigrant population are most salient for
inciting radical right attitudes. In particular, several scholars note that asylum seekers are
an especially noticable group to radical right voters (DeClair 1999, Norris 2005, Mudde
2007). Therefore, the raw number of asylum seeking grantees in a given year is utilized
as an independent variable.84 Again, the variable is lagged for the reasons listed above.
Further, the variable is logged in order to account for any non-linearity.85 When exploring
the descriptive statistics, the relationship between radical right success and the number
of asylum seekers is not readily apparent. Estonia accepted the fewest number of asylum
seekers overall, and Estonia’s radical right party is not very successful. However, Germany
accepted the highest number of asylum seekers, and radical right parties have not been all
that successful historically. On the other hand, Germany is usually considered a hot bed
in terms of anti-immigrant sentiment. For example, Germany is currently the location
that is experiencing some of the most hostile rallies and demonstrations espousing neo-
nazi sentiment towards asylum seekers.
The empirical analysis also utilizes two different variables in order to represent eco-
nomic strain. The first variable is the unemployment rate of the country.86 The variable
is lagged due to theoretical expectations regarding the timed effect of macro forces.87
The expectation is that a high unemployment rate could possibly incite anger and the
adoption of radical attitudes that exist on the right side of the ideological spectrum. The
84The number of asylum seeker grantees ranges from 15 (Estonia) to 202,645 (Germany), and has a
mean of 24,980.
85The lagged number of asylum seeker grantees ranges from 40 (Estonia) to 126,700 (Germany), and
has a mean of 23,530.
86The unemployment rate ranges from 2.6% (Norway) to 16.9% (Estonia), and has a mean of 6.885%.
87The lagged unemployment rate variable ranges from 2.1(Netherlands) to 16.2 (Slovakia), and has a
mean of 6.766.
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second variable included in the models is the Gini Coefficient for each country.88 The Gini
Coefficient is a measure of inequality based on the dispersion of income in a given country.
The Gini Coefficient is included in order to account for the alternative argument that
radical right success rises in countries with expansive welfare systems. Since countries
with expansive welfare systems have smaller gaps in wealth among citizens, this measure
would accurately capture this idea.89 In particular, the lag of the Gini Coefficient is
utilized.90
Method
Since the attitudes were measured on a continuous scale, Bayesian linear hierarchi-
cal models were estimated using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method.91
Further, hierarchical models were estimated because the dependent variable is measured
at the individual level, but the independent variables are measured at the country level
(n=17).92 Finally, in the models the intercepts and slopes were allowed to vary in order to
account for differences between countries. For each attitude, two models were estimated.
There was a model estimated with the four independent variables, and a model estimated
with an interaction between the asylum seekers variable and unemployment.93
The models testing radical right attitudes had the prior variance and prior means for
each variable set at zero when estimating the model. When plotting the distributions for
the chains, the distributions overlapped quite closely. The models presented here were
all estimated by using a burnin of 50,000, and a sample of 50,000 that was thinned by
88The Gini Coefficient ranges from 23.72 (Slovenia) to 36.01 (Bulgaria), and has a mean of 29.81.
89Data availability for the Gini Coefficient is limited. Therefore, additional models were estimated
where the gini coefficient variable was left out. In these instances, many independent variables had a
slightly stronger relationship with the attitudes. However, the overall substantive effects did not change
much.
90The lagged Gini Coefficient variable has a range of 24.37 (Slovenia) to 39.4 (Latvia), and has a mean
of 29.74.
91The Bayesian models were estimated in JAGS version 4.0. The models were estimated in R version
3.2.2 on a MAC running OS X 10.11.
92The independent variables were scaled in order to be on comparable scales when assessing substantive
importance across variables.
93A third set of models were estimated that also explored the interaction between the proportion of the
population that was foreign-born and the unemployment rate. The models are presented in Appendix
C. There was only one instance where the interactive models were substantively important (i.e. equality
model).
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5.94 In regards to model convergence, each parameter for both chains passed Gelman and
Rubin, Geweke, and Heidelberger and Welch tests. The Gelman and Rubin test statistics
gave a potential scale reduction factor of 1 for all parameters; indicating there was no
need to run the chains longer to improve convergence of the stationarity distribution.95
The Geweke diagnostic test statistics indicated that the means of the parameters from
two different locations in the chains converged to a standard normal distribution. All
parameters passed the stationarity and half-width tests of the Heidelberger and Welch
test. In addition, trace plots of the Markov chains showed that there was no trending
present for the chains, or the individual parameters for each chain. Lastly, density plots
conveyed that posterior parameters were normally distributed. The equation for the
Bayesian hierarchical models are presented here:
RadicalRightAttitude = β0j
β0j = b0 + b1ForeignBornPopj + b2AsylumSeekersj
+ b3UnemploymentRatej + b4jGiniIndexj
+ υj
b ∼ N4(0, ε)
ε = 10I4
υ ∼ N(0, θ2υ)
θ2υ ∼ IG(1, .1)
θ2 ∼ IG(1, .1)
Results
The results from the models that explored the effect of macro-forces on radical right
attitudes are presented in Table 13. It is important to remind the reader that the at-
94Several models were estimated where the number of burnin, sampling, and thinning were changed.
When the models converged, the results were substantively the same.
95Statistics of 1.2 or higher are the cutoff.
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titudinal variables are measured so that higher values indicate radical right positions.
Besides the intercepts, there is only one significant coefficient in any of the models that
explored radical right attitudes. In particular, the models demonstrate that the Gini
Coefficient is a statistically significant predictor of populist attitudes for individuals. As
the Gini Coefficient increases, the likelihood of holding populist attitudes increases. The
result indicates that higher income inequality may lead to populist attitudes. The finding
is intuitive. When individuals view income inequality as being considerably high, they
may hold elected officials and the establishment as the cause. Thus, voters witnessing
this situation will take a negative view of those elected officials and institutions.
Table 13: Macro-Forces Effect on Attitudes
Ideology Populism Nativism EU Equal
Intercept 5.127∗ 0.159 0.078 5.360∗ 0.986∗
(4.851, 5.394) (-0.053, 0.371) (-0.125, 0.281) (5.059, 5.652) (0.871, 1.102)
Foreign 0.057 -0.216 -0.041 0.006 0.030
Born (-0.239, 0.356) (-0.449, 0.018) (-0.260, 0.181) (-0.316, 0.327) (-0.095, 0.156)
Asylum -0.136 -0.059 -0.033 ) 0.178 -0.121
Grantees (-0.490, 0.216) (-0.335, 0.220) (-0.300, 0.230) (-0.208, 0.563) (-0.271, 0.029)
Unemp. 0.016 0.189 0.155 0.084 -0.073
Rate (-0.335, 0.368) (-0.087, 0.466) (-0.108, 0.420) (-0.297, 0.470) (-0.222, 0.079)
Gini -0.034 0.246∗ 0.085 0.081 0.027
Coef (-0.347, 0.279) (0.002, 0.493) (-0.148, 0.319) (-0.257, 0.421) (-0.106, 0.161)
N 28660 28660 28660 28660 28660
R2 0.003 0.099 0.016 0.006 0.005
(0.000, 0.014) (0.022, 0.129) (0.000, 0.024) (0.000, 0.010) (0.000, 0.010)
95% credible intervals are in parentheses
∗ indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.
The result uncovered in Table 13 that the Gini Index’s coefficient is the only significant
predictor, given the 95% credible bounds, for radical right attitudes might be anticlimatic.
However, Bayesian statistical theory provides other avenues for exploring the statistical
significance of a variable. For example, the alternative strategy that a researcher could
could utilize for explore statistical significance is to view the percentage of observations in
the posterior distribution of the data that fall on one side or the other of the value of zero.
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The posterior distribution provides the predicted unobserved observations, conditional
on the observed data. When exploring the posterior distribution, a couple of additional
variables of interest have a statistical relationship with the radical right attitudes.
First, the unemployment rate of a country appears to have a significant impact on
whether individuals hold nativist attitudes. For example, 91.38% of the time, the unem-
ployment rate is positively related to nativist attitudes. Substantively, as unemployment
rises, people tend to hold anti-immigrant attitudes. The result would make sense given
the theoretical construct that individuals might hold immigrants responsible for their
negative economic situation. Second, the unemployment rate of a country is also related
to whether an individual holds populist attitudes. In particular, 91.67% of the time, the
unemployment rate is positively related to populist attitudes. Therefore, an increase in
unemployment is associated with an increase in individuals holding populist attitudes.
Table 14: Macro-Forces Effect on Attitudes: Interactive Models
Ideology Populism Nativism EU Equal
Intercept 5.126∗ 0.159 0.077 5.360∗ 0.897∗
(4.843, 5.405) (-0.039, 0.357) (-0.131, 0.286) (5.069, 5.644) (0.778, 1.014)
Foreign-Born 0.012 -0.079 0.000 0.143 -0.083
(-0.365, 0.395) (-0.357, 0.194) (-0.288, 0.287) (-0.252, 0.530) (-0.216, 0.051)
Asylum 0.128 -0.866 -0.275 -0.624 0.522∗
Grantees (-1.243, 1.487) (-1.866, 0.172) (-1.333, 0.802) (-1.999, 0.802) (0.010, 1.026)
Unemployment 0.330 -0.770 -0.132 -0.871 -0.137∗
Rate (-1.288, 1.929) (-1.952, 0.446) (-1.379, 1.136) (-2.484, 0.807) (-0.268, -0.005)
Gini -0.050 0.296∗ 0.100 0.131 -0.015
Coef (-0.383, 0.283) (0.060, 0.530) (-0.148, 0.347) (-0.211, 0.469) (-0.129, 0.100)
Interaction -0.308 0.941 0.282 0.939 -0.196∗
(Asylum:Unemp) (-1.846, 1.241) (-0.228, 2.077) (-0.934, 1.471) (-0.677, 2.493) (-0.344, -0.049)
N 28660 28660 28660 28660 28660
R2 0.003 0.100 0.014 0.012 0.005
(0.000, 0.010) (0.036, 0.129) (0.000, 0.023) (0.004, 0.014) (0.000, 0.011)
95% credible intervals are in parentheses
∗ indicates at least 95% of the posterior density on the same side of zero.
In comparison, Table 14 presents the results of models estimating the effect of macro-
forces on radical right attitudes where an interactive relationship was estimated between
unemployment and asylum seekers. When exploring the coefficients and credible bounds,
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there are several macro-social variables that have an impact on radical right attitudes.
Again, the Gini Coefficient is positively associated with populist attitudes.
Further, two macro-social forces have an impact on the importance people place on
equality. The variable explores whether individual believe it is important for people to
be treated equally and have equal opportunities. The results for this model are slightly
puzzling. First, the number of asylum grantees is positively related to feelings on equal-
ity. Substantively, the result is intuitive and indicates that an increase in asylum seekers
is associated with an increase in feelings that people should not be treated equally. The-
oretically, the result is explained as existing because individuals might not want asylum
grantees to receive the same benefits as themselves. The individuals might be experi-
encing the effects of group threat when the number asylum grantees is high. Second,
unemployment is negatively related to feelings that people should not be treated equally.
When unemployment is high, people tend to view equality and equal treatment as impor-
tant. Finally, the interaction between the two variables is significant and negative. When
unemployment is low, variation in asylum matters a lot. Similarly, when the number of
asylum grantees is low, unemployment matters a lot.96
An exploration of the posterior distributions for the interactive models indicate a
number of variables have a statistical relationship with radical right attitudes. For citizens
holding populist attitudes, both unemployment and the Gini Coefficient are positively
related. In fact, 97.57% of the observations in the posterior distribution that lay on
the positive side of zero for unemployment, and 99.12% for the Gini Coefficient. As
unemployment and income inequality rise, individuals tend to hold populist attitudes.
In addition, 94.67% of the observations in the posterior distribution are located on the
positive side of zero for the interaction. The result suggests that as unemployment and
the number of asylum grantees rise, individuals are more likely to adopt positive attitudes.
Finally, the posterior distributions demonstrate that there is a relationship between
macro-forces and feelings towards EU. In particular, 90.5% of observation fall on the
positive side of zero when exploring the impact of the interaction between unemployment
96The negative result could be explained by the fact that there are countries that are very high on one
variable and not on the other (see, Appendix C).
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and the number of asylum grantees. The result indicates that when unemployment and
the number of asylum grantees is high, individuals have less trust in the EU. The result
is intuitive because one could imagine that people blame these situations on the EU for
their overarching economic and social policies.
Conclusion
The present chapter explored the impact of macro-social forces on attitudes that are
correlated with radical right vote choice. Previous research has focused solely on the
direct effect that macro forces, such as unemployment or immigration, have on radical
right vote choice. However, these previous attempts to explore the radical right have
not established a mechanism that explains the link between the two. Thus, a significant
contribution of this research is that it provides the mechanism linking macro-social forces
to radical right vote choice. Specifically, macro-social forces create or amplify attitudes,
and then these attitudes translate into vote choice.
In addition, several broad observations should be highlighted. First, economic distress
represented by income inequality and unemployment have an impact on key radical right
attitudes. These attitudes include nativism/anti-immigrant attitudes, populism, feelings
toward the European Union, and feelings about equality. As a person’s economic situation
declines, the probability of that individual acquiring or holding important radical right
attitudes increases.
Second, there is evidence to support the idea that an immigrant threat is related to
a higher proportion of a population holding radical right attitudes. For example, the
number of asylum grantees is positively related to views on the importance of equality.
When the number of asylum grantees is large, individuals indicate that treating people
equally is not important. Pending data availability, future research on the role of immi-
gration should seek more nuanced measures of immigration that account for the type of
immigrant group.
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Chapter 6
A Comprehensive Model of Radical Right
Vote Choice
Radical right parties promote a number of public policies that would appear to be
in conflict with the spirit of liberal democracies throughout Europe. From advocating
for the banning of the Quran, to promotion of racially antagonistic campaign material,
radical right parties espouse ideas that one would expect to be unacceptable to citizens in
countries with rich histories of democracy. However, across Europe radical right parties
have been able to achieve a surprising level of success. The present research agenda set
out to understand the mechanisms that explain why individuals ultimately decide to cast
a vote for the illiberal parties.
Thus far, the empirical analyses presented in this research have uncovered a wealth of
evidence in favor of a more comprehensive theory for explaining radical right vote choice.
The preceding investigations in this research agenda have focused on very particular
relationships between specific sets of explanatory variables, which include supply-side
factors, individual level characteristics and attitudes, and macro-social forces. The major
goal of this chapter is to utilize the findings from previous analyses in order to estimate
a comprehensive model that explains radical right vote choice. The chapter proceeds by
reviewing the theory and preceding findings. Then, discussion is provided regarding the
estimation of a comprehensive model of radical right vote choice. Following statistical
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testing, the substantive results are discussed. Finally, concluding remarks are offered on
the direction of future research on this topic.
Theory Review
The framework provided is a sequential theory of individual radical right vote choice.
The theory links all of the previously hypothesized factors in the radical/extreme right
literature. For reference, a visual interpretation of the theoretical construct is provided
again in Figure 8. The two stages of the model consist of factors that determine the supply
of a viable radical right party, and the factors that determine the individual demand to
vote for such a party (i.e political opportunity structure).
Figure 8: Theory: Individual Radical Right Vote Choice
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Viability
The first stage of the theoretical vote choice model involves the existence (supply)
of a viable radical right party in the electoral market. Obviously, before a voter is able to
cast a vote for a particular party type, that party must exist as an electoral option. The
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existence of a viable radical right party to locate at a particular ideological space where
voters are located is a function of two types of factors. First, systems-level, institutional
factors that are external to the party have the ability to either restrict the ability of a
radical right party to form or determine some level of success. In addition, these variables
can damage the viability of the party in the voters’ eyes if the institutional rules pose
considerable constraints. For example, first-past-the-post electoral rules tend to lead to
lower vote share for radical parties. Thus, not only can these external institutional factors
determine whether a radical right party exists in a political system, but they also function
to regulate the competitive viability of a party.
The second set of factors that determine the supply of a viable radical right party
are those factors that are internal to the party, such a professionalization, organization,
message/ideology, and leadership. For example, professionalized parties that are highly
organized are going to be more viable because professional parties are traditionally better
adapt at running electoral campaigns. What determines party internal factors? The
theory presented here argues that party internal factors are largely determined by the
external institutional rules of a country. For instance, strict campaign finance or ballot
access laws can make it more difficult for smaller, niche parties, to organize and compete.
In this situation, a radical right party would have a more difficult time creating an efficient
party structure because the electoral rules are difficult to navigate. For instance, strict
party finance laws could result in a radical right party that lacks the resources necessary to
create an effective electoral campaign and therefore appears unprofessional in comparison
to the “main” parties. In this case, it would be irrational for an individual to vote for
the radical right party, as the vote would be “wasted” (Downs 1957, Cox 1997).
Given that a radical right party exists in the electoral market, the second stage of
the theoretical vote choice model involves demand (desire to cast a vote) for a radical right
party. As perviously stated, prior research hypothesizes that three types of factors impact
an individual’s propensity to vote for the radical right party, or a radical right party’s
vote share in a country: macro factors, voter soci-demographics, and voter attitudes.
In the theory advanced here, I argue that macro factors, such as high unemployment
129
and immigration, illicit extreme attitudes that are correlated with radical right vote
choice, such as nativism and populism. Finally, research on the socio-demographics
of radical right voters has largely demonstrated patterns dealing with age, education,
working status, etc.; where specific socio-demographic groups are more likely to hold
these radical right attitudes.
In Figure 8, the displayed framework conveys the relationship between these demand
factors. The argument presented here is that macro-forces play a key role in driving
demand by conditioning attitudes within specific socio-demographic populations. Al-
ternatively stated, macro forces create attitudes in the population of voters that are
commonly understood as the losers of modernization. Subsequently, it is these attitudes
that drive an individual to vote for a radical right party. Once these attitudes are ignited
in a population where a viable radical right party exists, a vote is cast for the radical
right party.
Findings Review
The preceding chapters empirically tested stages of the theoretical framework ad-
vanced in this research agenda. A review of each stage of these analyses is presented
here. Chapter 2 encompassed an in-depth investigation of the isolated impact that ex-
ternal and internal supply-side factors have on radical right parties. First, the chapter
explored the impact of external supply-side variables on radical right existence. The ma-
jor finding was that institutional rules have a statistically significant relationship with
the existence of a radical right party. For example, the total number of seats, split rules
elections, compulsory voting, and the effective number of parties in an election all have
a positive relationship with radical right party existence. Specifically, compulsory voting
is associated with the existence of a radical right party. Collectively, the results hint at
the unintended negative consequences that occur when people are forced to participate
in democratic procedures.
The second part of the analysis explored the impact of external supply-side variables
on radical right success, measured as vote and seat share. The important findings were
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that both overall electoral system rules, and specific institutional rules targeting candi-
dates, matter for determining radical right success. For example, the overall electoral
system (proportional representation vs. plurality elections) has a significant impact on
overall radical right success. Radical right parties achieve a higher level of success in
proportional representation systems. In addition, institutional rules targeting individu-
als, such as the the strictness of ballot access and campaign finance, also impact overall
radical right success. In particular, the stricter the ballot access and campaign finance
laws, the lower radical right success in terms of vote and seat share. Finally, in terms of
success, Chapter 2 explored the impact that internal supply-side features have on radical
right parties. The results indicate that factors internal to the party matter. The experi-
ence of the party, party professionalization, and organizational structure impact radical
right success. A centralized, professional party can expect a significant increase in both
vote and seat share when compared to a party without those qualities.
A large piece of the theoretical puzzle that had previously not been explored is the
relationship between external and internal supply-side factors. Certainly, it must be the
case that if external factors impact radical right success, radical right parties would change
their approach in elections with particular external institutional configurations. There-
fore, Chapter 3 explored the effect that external supply-side variables have on internal
supply-side variables. The findings indicate that external factors have a relationship with
internal party factors. For example, party ideology has a tendency to be more extreme
when a larger proportion of space exists on the right side of the ideological spectrum
in an election. In addition, in countries with strict ballot access laws, parties have a
tendency to be more professional and decentralized. The results provide some evidence
that parties make strategic decisions based on the institutional structures within which
they must compete.
Chapter 4 set out to concretely examine the socio-demographic characteristics and
attitudinal beliefs of radical right voters. In regards to socio-demographics, a clear pattern
emerged for these citizens. Radical right voters tend to be older men at lower levels of
education and income. Further, the radical right voters were born in the country were they
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currently reside. At least initially, some anecdotal evidence is provided by these results
regarding the literatures’ losers of modernization theory. Next, attitudes were explored.
The attitudes correlated with radical right vote choice align well with the literature and
theoretical expectations. In particular, a far-right ideological stance, populism, nativism,
anti-EU sentiment, and a rejection of equality are associated with radical right vote
choice. Clearly, the attitudes of radical right voters are not the traditional attitudes one
would associate with advanced, liberal democracies.
The final stand alone empirical analysis explored the impact that macro-social forces
have on attitudes correlated with radical right vote choice. In particular, the theory argues
that negative economic circumstances and an influx of immigrants illicit the adoption of
these radical attitudes. The results indicate that these two macro-social forces do indeed
have an impact on crucial radical right attitudes. For example, the unemployment rate of
a country is correlated with holding nativist attitudes. Further, the interaction between
the number of asylum grantees and unemployment leads to higher rates of populism and
negative feelings towards the idea of equality. What is unique about this analysis is that
it is the first one that explored a relationship between these two sets of variables in the
radical right literature.
Comprehensive Model
The final empirical analysis is the estimation of a comprehensive model of radical
right vote choice with the inclusion of all of the theoretically relevant variables previously
explored.97 Since independent variables operate at different levels of analysis, and specific
variables at the second level have an impact on select variables in the first level, model
selection is very important. The estimated models are generalized linear mixed-effects
97In the final models, only the statistically significant variables from previous chapters are included.
The reason is that there are degrees of freedom issues given the structure of the data. The significant
variables include: External factors - effective number of parties, party finance restrictiveness, ballot
access restrictiveness, and electoral system. Internal factors - party professionalization and organizational
structure. Macro factors - asylum grantees, unemployment rate, and Gini Coefficient. Demographics
- age, gender, education, income, unemployed, union, foreign born. Attitudinal positions - ideology,
nativist, populism, equality, EU trust. However, three significant variables are not included in the final
model. Party organizational structure and the electoral system are not included due to a lack of variation
in the final dataset. Similarly, the Gini Coefficient is not included due to a high volume of missing data.
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models. The models incorporate fixed effects parameters in a linear predictor via max-
imum likelihood estimation. In the model, the systems level variables, such as external
supply-side, internal supply-side, and macro factors, are grouped by country and year.
The systems level variables only have an effect on the intercept for a particular country
and year, while individual level variables coefficients’ vary.98 The basic format of the
model is presented in the equation below:
log
(
Pr(RRVoteChoice)
1− Pr(RRVoteChoice)
)
= αj + β1Age + β2Gender
+ β3Income + β4Education
+ β5Unemployed + β6UnionMember
+ β7Foreign-Born + β8Ideology
+ β9Nativism + β10Populism
+ β11Equality + β12EUTrust + 
αj = γ1Effective#ofPartiesj + γ2FinanceLawsj
+ γ3BallotAccessj + γ4OrgStructurej
+ γ5AsylumGranteesj + γ6UnemploymentRatej + j
In all, three models were estimated.99 The first model is a basic mixed effects model
with the inclusion of all relevant variables. The second model takes into account the
results from Chapter 5 by estimating an additive attitude conditioning model. In par-
ticular, the second model includes interactions between the macro-social forces (i.e. un-
employment and asylum grantees) and voter attitudes. For each attitude, there are two
interactions; one interaction with unemployment and one with the number of asylum
98An alternative approach would have been to estimate a Bayesian binary hierarchical model that takes
into account the relationship between macro-social forces in the second level and the individual attitudes
in the first round. Unfortunately, the estimation of a model of this nature was computationally too
intensive. The specific problem was that the intensive calculations made model convergence seemingly
impossible. Therefore, the approach described above was taken as the next best alternative.
99All three models converged. The models were estimated with a specification of 25,000 iterations
using the BOBYQA optimizer.
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grantees. There is recognition in this model that macro-social forces might impact the
radical right attitudes that lead to vote choice. Likewise, the final model takes into ac-
count this relationship, but model estimation is slightly different. The third model is a
multiplicative attitude conditioning model. The model includes a three way interaction
between each individual attitude and both macro-social forces. The models are estimated
in this manner in order to more accurately account for the idea that the impact of one
of the macro-social forces on an attitude might be contingent on the level of another
macro-social force.
Results
Model outputs for the mixed effects models are presented in Table 15. The first aspect
of the output to explore is the comparison between the three models. According to Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) scores the additive
attitude conditioning model, estimated with the two-way interactions between individual
attitudes and each of the macro-social forces, is the best model. Further, log-likelihood
ratio tests were not significant. Therefore, this section will focus on the results from only
the additive model.
Theoretically, the set of factors that immediately impact the political opportunity
structure for radical right parties includes the external supply-side factors. Two external
supple-side variables have a statistically significant effect on radical right vote choice.
First, the effective number of parties that exist in an election is related to radical right vote
choice. Where there are more parties in the electoral market, voters will be more likely
to choose a radical right party. The result is indirectly tapping into the combined effect
of a number of specific electoral rules. Mainly, the result is indicative of the numerous
electoral rules in a system that translate votes to seats. Therefore, where more parties
are able to exist and compete, radical right parties will achieve a higher level of success.
Since a higher number of parties have a chance to participate in government, citizens will
not view their vote for a radical right party as a wasted vote. The other external variable
correlated with radical right vote choice is ballot access. In particular,
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Table 15: Vote Choice: Comprehensive Models
Additive Multiplicative
Attitude Attitude
Basic Conditioning Conditioning
Model Model Model
Intercept -5.181∗ (0.744) -5.269∗ (0.379) -5.22∗ (0.396)
Age -0.251∗ (0.018) -0.281∗ (0.019) -0.286∗ (0.019)
Gender -0.228∗ (0.018) -0.243∗ (0.019) -0.241∗ (0.019)
Education -0.203∗ (0.022) -0.354∗ (0.031) -0.355∗ (0.031)
Income -0.168∗ (0.018) -0.126∗ (0.020) -0.126∗ (0.020)
Unemployed 0.105∗ (0.017) 0.109∗ (0.018) 0.109∗ (0.018)
Union 0.187∗ (0.040) 0.206∗ (0.041) 0.206 (0.041)
Foreign-Born -0.201∗ (0.099) -0.202∗ (0.102) -0.201∗ (0.102)
Ideology 0.596∗ (0.019) 0.587∗ (0.047) 0.578∗ (0.047)
Nativism 0.724∗ (0.020) 0.716∗ (0.038) 0.728∗ (0.035)
Populism 0.340∗ (0.024) 0.380∗ (0.042) 0.377∗ (0.042)
Equality 0.074∗ (0.016) 0.106∗ (0.017) 0.105∗ (0.018)
EU Trust 0.166∗ (0.022) 0.138∗ (0.038) 0.141∗ (0.037)
Effective # of Parties 0.360∗ (0.048) 0.463∗ (0.125) 0.457∗ (0.125)
Finance Laws 1.057∗ (0.091) -0.303 (0.201) -0.372 (0.219)
Ballot Access Laws -2.688∗ (0.945) -1.508∗ (0.523) -1.404∗ (0.548)
Org. Structure 0.320 (0.615) 0.727∗ (0.219) 0.728∗ (0.220)
Asylum 0.149∗ (0.055) -0.037 (0.149) -0.056 (0.188)
Unemployment -0.070 (0.048) -0.130 (0.181) -0.110 (0.189)
Ideology×Asylum 0.145∗ (0.052) 0.182∗ (0.059)
Ideology×Unemp -0.186∗ (0.047) -0.202∗ (0.048)
Nativism×Asylum 0.155∗ (0.044) 0.100∗ (0.045)
Nativism×Unemp -0.086∗ (0.038) -0.066 (0.035)
Populism×Asylum 0.036 (0.051) 0.049 (0.056)
Populism×Unemp 0.030 (0.042) 0.024 (0.043)
Equality×Asylum 0.065∗ (0.023) 0.060∗ (0.024)
Equality×Unemp 0.065∗ (0.018) 0.064∗ (0.018)
EU Trust×Asylum -0.090∗ (0.044) -0.107∗ (0.049)
EU Trust×Unemp -0.016 (0.037) -0.009 (0.038)
Asylum×Unemp 0.004 (0.127)
Ideology×Asylum×Unemp -0.055 (0.048)
Nativism×Asylum×Unemp 0.108∗ (0.038)
Populism×Asylum×Unemp -0.014 (0.046)
Equality×Asylum×Unemp 0.021 (0.022)
EU Trust×Asylum×Unemp 0.023 (0.041)
N 65203 65203 65203
AIC 24910.0 23782.7 23784.7
BIC 25082.7 24227.9 24284.4
Log-Likelihood -12436.0 -11842.3 -11837.3
Std. Errors are in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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as ballot access laws are made more strict, radical right vote choice decreases. One
explanation for this result is that strict ballot access laws render smaller parties less
effective when it comes to electoral participation. In regards to voters, voters might
witness that the more extreme parties are not able to field the number of high quality
candidates necessary for substantial participation in government. Therefore, voting for
these parties is viewed by the citizen as a wasted vote.
Chapter 4 found that a particular pattern exists when exploring the socio-demographic
indicators of radical right voters. The final model results confirm this pattern. Age,
gender, education, income, and foreign birth are statistically, and negatively, related to
radical right vote choice. If these voters are losers of modernization, then this result is in-
tuitive. Radical right voters are more likely to be at a lower level on key sociodemographic
indicators (i.e. poorer, lower educated, male, etc). Further, the results demonstrate that
these voters are younger than some studies previously hypothesized. There is some de-
bate in the literature regarding the direction of the impact of age on vote choice for
these parties. Here, it is clear that younger voters are more likely to support radical
right parties. The finding can be explained by the fact that older voters tend to have
long-standing party ties that are hard to break. Another demographic finding is that
citizens born in a different country than the one in which they voted are less likely to
support the radical right party. In contrast, union membership and unemployment are
positively related to radical right vote choice. Again, these results align well with the
modernization-loser theory. Radical right voters tend to be unemployed or working in
lower paying, blue-collar jobs. The economic and working positions of these citizens are
seen as being caused by the process of modernization.
The attitudes correlated with radical right vote choice are similar to previous find-
ings. Since all of the attitudinal variables are coded so that higher values indicate a
more extreme right positioning, interpretation of the results is straightforward. Further,
the variables were scaled in order to easily compare impact across variables. There are
a number of attitudes that impact vote choice. First, nativism (i.e. anti-immigrant at-
titudes) is the strongest predictor of vote choice. Clearly, there is some validity to the
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claim that the defining characteristics of these parties are their anti-immigrant platforms.
Next, a far right self-placement on the ideological spectrum comes second in importance
for predicting vote choice. Since some scholars posit that radical right voters do not
view themselves as extreme, the result might be viewed with skepticism. However, model
output indicates that it is indeed the case that these people understand the extremity of
their views. In addition, populist sentiment is another fairly strong attitudinal predictor
of radical right vote choice. Radical right voters tend to be suspicious of the political
establishment. Finally, a rejection of equality and a negative view of the EU are also
statistically associated with radical right vote choice. It is heavily debated in the liter-
ature whether these last two attitudes are really a feature of radical right parties. The
results make it clear that there is evidence of a relationship between these two attitudes
and radical right vote choice.
Finally, the results reveal that a conditioning effect exists between macro-social forces
and radical right attitudes. In fact, macro-social forces on their own do not have a
direct effect on vote choice. There are a number of unique observations regarding the
relationship between attitudes, macro-forces, and radical right vote choice in the model
output. First, the interactions between ideology and asylum grantees, as well as ideology
and unemployment rate are both statistically significant. The finding indicates that the
impact of ideology is amplified as the number of asylum seekers increases. However,
the impact is decreased as the unemployment rate increases. This suggests that an
influx of a particular group of immigrants into a country incites more extreme attitudes
associated with radical right vote choice. The same result is present when exploring the
relationship between nativism and the macro-social forces. The impact of nativism is
larger when the number of asylum grantees is higher, and smaller when unemployment is
higher. Additionally, both the number of asylum grantees and unemployment rate have
a boosting effect on the importance of equality. When the number of asylum grantees
and unemployment is high, a citizen’s belief that people should not be equal has a larger
impact on voting for the radical right party. Intuitively, it would make sense that citizens
with low socio-economic backgrounds would not believe that immigrants should be treated
137
equally during times of economic decline. This result provides added support for the losers
of modernization theory. The final conditional result is that the number asylum grantees
decreases the impact of ‘trust in the EU’ on vote choice. When comparing the effect of the
number of asylum grantees across attitudes, there are different outcomes. The number
of asylum grantees has a positive effect on those attitudes that are most predictive of
radical right vote choice. However, when the number of asylum grantees is high, there
is a lessening effect on other attitudes, such as ‘trust in the EU,” which matters less in
terms of vote choice. In sum, the number of asylum grantees is crucial for determining
the attitudes that predict radical right vote choice.
Concluding Remarks
This research provides the first complete, sequential theory and empirical testing
that explains radical right vote choice. Three concluding remarks deserve emphasis.
First, evidence supports a sequential model of radical right vote choice. The chapters
outlined here, as well as the results from the final empirical model demonstrate that
there is a relationship between the independent variables that predict radical right vote
choice. For example, macro-social forces have a conditioning effect on important attitudes
correlated with radical right vote choice. Further, previous chapters demonstrated a link
between sets of explanatory variables, such as external and internal supply-side variables.
However, there should be some caution taken when applying the theory holistically. There
should be some recognition that a feedback loop exists. For instance, it would not be
unreasonable to expect that demand for a radical right party, in the form of a proportion of
the population holding extreme right attitudes, could lead to the creation of a radical right
party. Further, demand in this form could drive a party to adopt strategic internal party
characteristics, such as an extreme right ideology. In this vein, concerns of endogeneity
are present. The theory advanced here acknowledges the possibility, but advocates that
on average the theory operates based on the sequencing outlined previously.
Second, there is now overwhelming evidence in support of the idea that radical right
voters are predominately citizens that could be categorized as “losers of modernization.”
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The socio-demographic make-up of the citizens voting for radical right parties comprises
the same set of factors that identify the losers of modernization. The susceptible pop-
ulation includes young men at lower levels of income and education. Further, these
citizens hold radical attitudes generally associated with populism far-right ideas about
government, and simplistic notions regarding the operations of government. Finally, the
macro-level forces most associated with the theory have a direct effect on attitudes cor-
related with radical right vote choice. This research agenda is the first one to uncover a
direct relationship between these two sets of independent variables.
The final remark deals with normative ideas of the impact of these parties. If radical
right parties advocate illiberal public policies that are dangerous to liberal democracies,
then there is some usefulness in recognizing the situations where radical right parties are
not successful. Chapter 2 demonstrated that radical right parties are not successful in
countries that have electoral systems benefiting large, mainstream, and moderate parties.
Further, compulsory voting is associated with the existence of a radical right party. The
finding is unique in the democratic literature because we commonly believe that more
participation is better for the health of democracy. Overall, in countries where anti-
immigrant and extreme right ideological sentiment is high, mainstream political parties
looking to eliminate radical right parties would be wise to reform the electoral system
in order to limit competition from niche parties. The reform could be done by targeting
particular electoral rules that have a direct effect on electoral system disproportionality,
such as thresholds, number of seats, etc.
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Figure 9: Swiss People’s Party (SVP) Ads
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Figure 10: German National Democratic Party (NPD) Ads
Figure 11: Multi-Modal Distribution
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Appendix B
Results: Interactive Models
Table 16: Linear Predictors Interactive Models - Vote Share
Vote Share
Full Significance Significance
Model Model (.1 level) Model (.05 level)
Intercept 0.126∗ -0.001 -0.001
(0.021, 0.231) (-0.032, 0.030) (-0.032, 0.030)
External Factors -2.030∗ 0.129 0.128
(-3.723, -0.342) (-0.466, 0.723) (-0.465, 0.725)
Internal Factors -0.681 0.459 0.458
(-1.724, 0.359) (-0.031, 0.948) (-0.031, 0.948)
Interaction 26.756∗ 7.744 7.772
(10.475, 43.142) (-0.483, 16.073) (-0.509, 16.035)
N 120 194 194
R2 0.317 0.345 0.345
(0.283, 0.325) (0.325, 0.349) (0.324, 0.349)
95% credible intervals are in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Table 17: Linear Predictors Interactive Models - Seat Share
Seat Share
Full Significance Significance
Model Model (.1 level) Model (.05 level)
Intercept 0.007 -0.002 -0.004
(-0.059, 0.074) (-0.030, 0.025) (-0.032, 0.024)
External Factors 0.177 0.216 0.245
(-0.894, 1.258) (-0.349, 0.781) (-0.321, 0.811)
Internal Factors 0.295 0.304 0.241
(-0.443, 1.032) (-0.113, 0.720) (-0.198, 0.681)
Interaction 8.953 10.329∗ 11.703∗
(-2.492, 20.299) (2.696, 17.940) (3.805, 19.630)
N 120 194 194
R2 0.335 0.365 0.370
(0.301, 0.342) (0.345, 0.370) (0.351, 0.374)
95% credible intervals are in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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Appendix C
Results: Macro-Forces Model
Ideology Populism Nativism EU Equal
Intercept 5.126∗ 0.159 0.078 5.359∗ 0.986∗
(4.839, 5.406) (-0.058, 0.377) (-0.132, 0.289) (5.052, 5.661) (0.876, 1.096)
Foreign-Born 0.020 -0.017 0.054 0.162 -0.172
(-0.743, 0.786) (-0.608, 0.570) (-0.512, 0.620) (-0.656, 0.978) (-0.470, 0.128)
Asylum Seekers -0.006 0.305 0.210 0.174 -0.191
(-0.555, 0.542) (-0.116, 0.726) (-0.198, 0.618) (-0.412, 0.761) (-0.405, 0.023)
Unemployment -0.130 -0.092 -0.050 0.152 -0.087
Rate (-0.518, 0.258) (-0.387, 0.204) (-0.335, 0.237) (-0.262, 0.566) (-0.237, 0.063)
Gini -0.035 0.255 0.091∗ 0.089 0.018
Coef (-0.365, 0.296) (0.004, 0.506) (-0.150, 0.334) (-0.265, 0.443) (-0.109, 0.146)
Interaction 0.043 -0.234 -0.112 -0.185 0.237
(ForBor:Unemp) (-0.772, 0.863) (-0.862, 0.401) (-0.717, 0.502) (-1.060, 0.689) (-0.084, 0.559)
N 28660 28660 28660 28660 28660
R2 0.002 0.097 0.015 0.004 0.001
(0.000, 0.010) (0.021, 0.130) (0.000, 0.024) (0.000, 0.011) (0.000, 0.014)
95% credible intervals are in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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Figure 12: Interaction: Asylum:Unemployment on Equality
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